LIFE

OF

NAPOLEON BUONAPARTE.

PRINTED BY JULES DIDOT SENIOR,

PRINTER TO HIS MAJESTY, RUE DU PONT-DE-LODI, N° 6

THE

LIFE

OF

NAPOLEON BUONAPARTE,

EMPEROR OF THE FRENCH.

WITH A

Preliminary View of the French Revolution.

BY SIR WALTER SCOTT.

———————Sed non in Cæsare tantum
Nomen erat, nec fama ducis, sed nescia virtus
Stare loco, solusque pudor non vincere bello.
Acer et indomitus, quo spes, quoque ira vocasset,
Ferre manum et nunquam temerando parcere ferro
Successus urgere suos: instare favori
Numinis, impellens quidquid sibi summa petenti
Obstaret gaudensque viam fecisse ruina.

LUCANI *Pharsalia*, Lib. I.

IN NINE VOLUMES.

VOL. V.



PARIS:
PUBLISHED BY A. AND W. GALIGNANI,
AT THE ENGLISH, FRENCH, ITALIAN, GERMAN, AND SPANISH LIBRARY,
N° 18, RUE VIVIENNE.

1827.

CONTENTS

OF

VOLUME V.

CHAPTER I.

CHAPTER II.

CHAPTER III.

CHAPTER IV.

CHAPTER V.

CHAPTER VIII.

CHAPTER IX.

CHAPTER X.

CHAPTER XI.

CHAPTER XII.



LIFE

OF

NAPOLEON BUONAPARTE.

CHAPTER I.

Different Views entertained by the English Ministers and the Chief Consul of the effects of the Treaty of Amiens.—Napoleon, misled by the Shouts of a London Mob, misunderstands the Feelings of the People of Great Britain.—His continued encroachments on the Independence of Europe—His Conduct to Switzerland—Interferes in their Politics, and sets himself up, uninvited, as Mediator in their Concerns—His extraordinary Manifesto addressed to them.—Ney enters Switzerland at the head of 40,000 men—The patriot, Reding, disbands his Forces, and is imprisoned.—Switzerland is compelled to furnish France with a Subsidiary Army of 16,000 Troops.—The Chief Consul adopts the title of Grand Mediator of the Helvetic Republic.

THE eyes of Europe were now fixed on Buonaparte, as master of the destinies of the civilized world, which his will could either maintain

in a state of general peace, or replunge into all the miseries of renewed and more inveterate war. Many hopes were entertained, from his eminent personal qualities, that the course in which he would direct them might prove as honourable to himself as happy for the nations over whom he now possessed such unbounded influence. The shades of his character were either lost amid the lustre of his victories, or excused from the necessity of his situation. The massacre of Jaffa was little known, was acted afar off, and might present itself to memory as an act of military severity, which circumstances might palliate, if not excuse.

Napoleon, supposing him fully satiated with martial glory, in which he had never been surpassed, was expected to apply himself to the arts of peace, by which he might derive fame of a more calm, yet not less honourable character. Peace was all around him, and, to preserve it, he had only to will that it should continue; and the season seemed eminently propitious for taking the advice of Cineas to the King of Epirus, and reposing himself after his labours. But he was now beginning to show that, from the times of Pyrrhus to his own, ambition has taken more pleasure in the hazards and exertions of the chase than in its successful issue. All the power which Buonaparte already possessed seemed only valuable

in his eyes, as it afforded him the means of getting as much more; and, like a sanguine and eager gamester, he went on doubling his stakes at every throw, till the tide of fortune, which had so long run in his favour, at length turned against him, and his ruin was total. His ruling and predominating vice was ambition—we would have called it his only one, did not ambition, when of a character intensely selfish, include so many others.

It seems the most natural course, in continuing our history, first to trace those events which disappointed the general expectations of Europe, and after a jealous and feverish armistice of little more than a year, again renewed the horrors of war. We shall then resume the internal history of France and her ruler.

Although the two contracting powers had been able to agree upon the special articles of the peace of Amiens, they possessed extremely different ideas concerning the nature of a general pacification in general, and the relations which it establishes between two independent states. The English minister, a man of the highest personal worth and probity, entertained no doubt that peace was to have its usual effect, of restoring all the ordinary amicable intercourse betwixt France and England; and that, in matters concerning their mutual allies, and the state of the European republic in general, the latter country, on

sheathing the sword, had retained the right of friendly counsel and remonstrance. Mr Addington could not hope to restore the balance of Europe, for which so much blood had been spilled in the 18th century. The scales and beams of that balance were broken into fragments, and lay under the feet of Buonaparte. But Britain did not lie prostrate. She still grasped in her hand the trident of the Ocean, and had by no event, in the late contest, been reduced to surrender the right of remonstrating against violence and injustice, and of protecting the feeble, as far as circumstances would still permit.

But Buonaparte's idea of the effects of the treaty of Amiens was very different. It was, according to his estimation, a treaty, containing every thing that Britain was entitled to expect on the part of herself and her allies, and the accepting of which excluded her from all farther right of interference in the affairs of Europe. It was like a bounding charter, which restricts the right of the person to whom it is granted to the precise limits therein described, and precludes the possibility of his making either claim or acquisition beyond them. All Europe, then, was to be at the disposal of France, and states created, dissolved, changed, and re-changed at her pleasure, unless England could lay her finger on the line in the treaty of Amiens, which prohibited the

proposed measure. « England,» said the *Moniteur*, in an official tone, « shall have the treaty of Amiens, the whole treaty of Amiens, and nothing but the treaty of Amiens!» In this manner the treaty was, so far as England was concerned, understood to decide, and that in favour of France, all questions which could possibly arise in the course of future time between the two countries; while, in ordinary candour, and in common sense, it could be only considered as settling the causes of animosity between the parties, as they existed at the date of the pacification.

The insular situation of England was absurdly alleged as a reason why she should not interfere in continental politics; as if the relations of states to each other were not the same, whether divided by an ocean or a line of mountains. The very circumstance had been founded upon eloquently and justly by one of her own poets, for claiming for Britain the office of an umpire,[1] because less liable to be agitated by the near vicinity of continental war, and more likely to decide with impartiality concerning contending claims, in which she herself could have little interest, It was used by France in the sense of another poet, and made a reason for thrusting England out of the Eu-

[1] Thrice happy Britain, from the kingdoms rent,
To sit the Guardian of the Continent.

ADDISON.

ropean world, and allowing her no vote in its most important concerns.[1]

To such humiliation it was impossible for Britain to submit. It rendered the treaty of Amiens, thus interpreted, the counterpart of the terms which the Cyclops granted to Ulysses, that he should be the last devoured. If Britain were compelled to remain, with fettered hands and padlocked lips, a helpless and inactive witness, while France completed the subjection of the Continent, what other doom could she expect than to be finally subdued? It will be seen afterwards that disputes arose concerning the execution of the treaty. These, it is possible, might have been accommodated, had not the general interpretation, placed by the First Consul on the whole transaction, been inconsistent with the honour, safety, and independence of Great Britain.

It seems more than probable, that the extreme rejoicing of the rabble of London at signing the preliminaries, their dragging about the carriage of Lauriston, and shouting « Buonaparte for ever! » had misled the ruler of France into an opinion that peace was indispensably necessary to England; for, like other foreigners, misapprehending the nature of our popular government, he may easily enough have mistaken the cries of a London mob for

[1] —— penitus toto divisos orbe Bri[illegible]os.

the voice of the British people. The ministers also seemed to keep their ground in Parliament on condition of their making and maintaining peace; and as they showed a spirit of frankness and concession, it might be misconstrued by Buonaparte into a sense of weakness. Had he not laboured under some such impression, he would probably have postponed, till the final pacification of Amiens, the gigantic steps towards farther aggrandizement, which he hesitated not to take after signing the preliminaries, and during the progress of the Congress.

We have specified, in the last volume, Napoleon's acceptance of the Presidency of the Cisalpine Republic, on which he now bestowed the name of Italian, as if it was designed at a future time to comprehend the whole peninsula of Italy. By a secret treaty with Portugal, he had acquired the province of Guiana, so far as it belonged to that power. By another with Spain, he had engrossed the Spanish part of Louisiana, and, what was still more ominous, the reversion of the Duchy of Parma, and of the island of Elba, important as an excellent naval station.

In the German Diet, for settling the indemnities to be granted to the various princes of the empire who had sustained loss of territory in consequence of late events, and particularly of the treaty of Lunéville, the influence of France predominated in a manner which

threatened entire destruction to that ancient confederation. It may be in general observed, that towns, districts, and provinces, were dealt from hand to hand like cards at a gaming-table; and the powers of Europe once more, after the partition of Poland, saw with scandal the government of freemen transferred from hand to hand, without regard to their wishes, aptitudes, and habits, any more than those of cattle. This evil imitation of an evil precedent was fraught with mischief, as breaking every tie of affection betwixt the governor and governed, and loosening all attachments which bind subjects to their rulers, excepting those springing from force on the one side, and necessity on the other.

In his transfer of territories and jurisdictions, the King of Prussia obtained a valuable compensation for the Duchy of Clèves, and other provinces transferred to France, as lying on the left bank of the Rhine. The neutrality of that monarch had been of the last service to France during her late bloody campaigns, and was now to be compensated. The smaller princes of the Empire, especially those on the right bank of the Rhine, who had virtually placed themselves under the patronage of France, were also gratified with large allotments of territory; whilst Austria, whose pertinacious opposition was well remembered, was considered as yet retaining too high pre-

tensions to power and independence, and her indemnities were as much limited as those of the friends of France were extended.

The various advantages and accessions of power and influence which we have hitherto alluded to, as attained by France, were chiefly gained by address in treating, and diplomatic skill. But shortly after the treaty of Amiens had been signed, Buonaparte manifested to the world, that where intrigue was unsuccessful, his sword was as ready as ever to support and extend his aggressions.

The attack of the Directory on the Swiss Cantons had been always considered as a coarse and gross violation of the law of nations, and was regarded as such by Buonaparte himself. But he failed not to maintain the military possession of Switzerland by the French troops; nor, however indignant under the downfall of her ancient fame and present liberties, was it possible for that country to offer any resistance, without the certainty of total destruction.

The eleventh article of the treaty of Lunéville seemed to afford the Swiss a prospect of escaping from this thraldom, but it was in words only. That treaty was declared to extend to the Batavian, Helvetic, Cisalpine, and Ligurian Republics. « The contracting parties guarantee the *independence* of the said republics, » continues the treaty, « and the right

of the people who inhabit them, to adopt what form of government they please.» We have seen how far the Cisalpine Republic profited by this declaration of independence; the proceedings respecting Switzerland were much more glaring.

There was a political difference of opinion in the Swiss cantons, concerning the form of government to be adopted by them; and the question was solemnly agitated in a Diet held at Berne. The majority inclined for a constitution framed on the principle of their ancient government by a federative league, and the plan of such a constitution was accordingly drawn up and approved of. Aloys Reding, renowned for wisdom, courage, and patriotism, was placed at the head of this system. He saw the necessity of obtaining the countenance of France, in order to the free enjoyment of the constitution which his countrymen had chosen, and betook himself to Paris to solicit Buonaparte's consent to it. This consent was given, upon the Swiss government agreeing to admit to their deliberations six persons of the opposite party, who, supported by the French interest, desired that the constitution should be one and indivisible, in imitation of that of the French Republic.

This coalition, formed at the First Consul's request, terminated in an act of treachery, which Buonaparte had probably foreseen. Availing

themselves of an adjournal of the Diet for the Easter holidays, the French party summoned a meeting, from which the other members were absent, and adopted a form of constitution which totally subverted the principles of that under which the Swiss had so long lived in freedom, happiness, and honour. Buonaparte congratulated them on the wisdom of their choice. It was, indeed, sure to meet his approbation, for it was completely subversive of all the old laws and forms, and so might receive any modification which his policy should dictate; and it was to be administered of course by men, who, having risen under his influence, must necessarily be pliant to his will. Having made his compliments on their being possessed of a free and independent constitution, he signified his willingness to withdraw the troops of France, and did so accordingly. For this equitable measure much gratitude was expressed by the Swiss, which might have been saved, if they had known that Buonaparte's policy rather than his generosity dictated his proceedings. It was, in the first place, his business to assume the appearance of leaving the Swiss in possession of their freedom; secondly, he was sure that events would presently happen, when they should be left to themselves, which would afford a plausible pretext to justify his armed interference.

The aristocratic cantons of the ancient Swiss

League were satisfied with the constitution finally adopted by the French party of their country; but not so the democratic, or small cantons, who, rather than submit to it, declared their resolution to withdraw from the general League, as new-modelled by the French, and to form under their own ancient laws a separate confederacy. This was to consist of the cantons of Schweitz, Uri, and Underwalden, forest and mountain regions, in which the Swiss have least degenerated from the simple and hardy manners of their ancestors. A civil war immediately broke out, in the course of which it was seen, that in popularity, as well as patriotism, the usurping Helvetic government, established by French interest, was totally inferior to the gallant foresters. These last were guided chiefly by the patriotic Reding, who strove, with undaunted though ultimately with vain resolution, to emancipate his unfortunate country. The intrusive government were driven from Berne, their troops everywhere routed, and the federative party were generally received with the utmost demonstrations of joy by their countrymen, few adhering to the usurpers, excepting those who were attached to them by views of emolument.

But while Reding and the Swiss patriots were triumphing in the prospect of restoring their ancient constitution, with all its privileges and immunities, the strong grasp of superior

power was extended to crush their patriotic exertions.

The fatal tidings of the proposed forcible interference of France were made known by the sudden arrival of Rapp, Adjutant-general of Buonaparte, with a letter addressed to the eighteen Swiss cantons. This manifesto was of a most extraordinary nature. Buonaparte upbraided the Swiss with their civil discords of three years' standing, forgetting that these discords would not have existed but for the invasion of the French. He told them that, when he, as a boon granted, had been pleased to withdraw his troops from their country, they had immediately turned their arms against each other. These are singular propositions enough to be found in a proclamation addressed by one independent nation to another. But what follows is still more extraordinary. « You have disputed three years, without understanding one another; if left to yourselves, you will kill each other for three years more, without coming to any better result. Your history shows that your intestine wars cannot be terminated without the efficacious intervention of France. It is true, I had resolved not to intermeddle with your affairs, having always found that your various governments have applied to me for advice which they never meant to follow, and have sometimes made a bad use of my name to favour their own private inter-

ests and passions. But I cannot remain insensible to the distress of which I see you the prey—I recal my resolution of neutrality—I consent to be the mediator of your differences. But my mediation shall be effectual, as becomes the great nation in whose name I address you. »

This insulting tone, with which, uninvited, and as if granting a favour, the Chief Consul took upon him, as a matter of course, to exercise the most arbitrary power over a free and independent people, is equally remarkable at the close of the manifesto. The proclamation commands, that a deputation be sent to Paris, to consult with the Chief Consul; and concludes with an assertion of Buonaparte's « right to expect that no city, community, or public body, should presume to contradict the measures which it might please him to adopt. » To support the reasoning of a manifesto which every schoolboy might have confuted, Ney, with an army of forty thousand men, entered Switzerland at different points.

As the presence of such an overpowering force rendered resistance vain, Aloys Reding, and his gallant companions, were compelled to dismiss their forces after a touching address to them. The Diet of Schweitz also dissolved itself, in consequence of the interference, as they stated, of an armed force of foreigners,

whom it was impossible, in the exhausted state of the country, to oppose.

Switzerland was thus, once more, occupied by the French soldiers. The patriots, who had distinguished themselves in asserting her rights, were sought after and imprisoned. Aloys Reding was urged to conceal himself, but he declined to do so; and when upbraided by the French officer who came to arrest him, as being the head of the insurrection, he answered nobly, « I have obeyed the call of conscience and my country—do you execute the commands of your master.» He was imprisoned in the Castle of Aarsbourg.

The resistance of these worthy patriots, their calm, dignified, and manly conduct, their simple and affecting pleas against over-mastering violence, though they failed to procure the advantages which they hoped for their country, were not lost to the world, or to the cause of freedom. Their pathetic complaints, when perused in many a remote valley, excited detestation of French usurpation, in bosoms which had hitherto contented themselves with regarding the victories of the Republic with wonder, if not with admiration. For other aggressions, the hurry of revolution, the extremity of war, the strong compulsion of necessity might be pleaded; but that upon Switzerland was as gratuitous and unprovoked as it was ne-

fariously unjust. The name of the Cantons, connected with so many recollections of ancient faith and bravery, hardy simplicity, and manly freedom, gave additional interest to the sufferings of such a country; and no one act of his public life did Buonaparte so much injury throughout Europe, as his conduct towards Switzerland.

The dignified resistance of the Swiss, their renown for courage, and the policy of not thwarting them too far, had some effect on the Chief Consul himself; and in the final act of mediation, by which he saved them the farther trouble of taking thought about their own constitution, he permitted federalism to remain as an integral principle. By a subsequent defensive treaty, the Cantons agreed to refuse all passage through the country to the enemies of France, and engaged to maintain an army of a few thousand men to guarantee this engagement. Switzerland also furnished France with a subsidiary army of sixteen thousand men, to be maintained at the expense of the French government. But the firmness which these mountaineers showed in the course of discussing this treaty was such, that it saved them from having the conscription imposed on them, as in other countries under the dominion of France.

Notwithstanding these qualifications, however, it was evident that the voluntary and

self-elected Mediator of Switzerland was in fact sovereign of that country, as well as of France and the north of Italy; but there was no voice to interdict this formidable accumulation of power. England alone interfered, by sending an envoy (Mr Moore) to the Diet of Schweitz, to inquire by what means she could give assistance to their claims of independence; but, ere his arrival, the operations of Ney had rendered all farther resistance impossible. A remonstrance was also made by England to the French government upon this unprovoked aggression on the liberties of an independent people. But it remained unanswered and unnoticed, unless in the pages of the *Moniteur*, where the pretensions of Britain to interfere with the affairs of the Continent were held up to ridicule and contempt. After this period, Buonaparte adopted, and continued to bear, the title of Grand Mediator of the Helvetian Republic, in token, doubtless, of the right which he had assumed, and effectually exercised, of interfering in their affairs whenever it suited him to do so.

CHAPTER II.

Increasing Jealousies betwixt France and England—Additional Encroachments and Offences on the part of the former.—Singular Instructions given by the First Consul to his Commercial Agents in British Ports.—Orders issued by the English Ministers, for the Expulsion of all Persons acting under them.—Violence of the Press on both sides of the Channel.—Peltier's celebrated Royalist Publication, *l'Ambigu*.—Buonaparte answers through the *Moniteur*.—Monsieur Otto's Note of Remonstrance—Lord Hawkesbury's Reply.—Peltier tried for a Libel against the First Consul—found Guilty—but not brought up for Sentence.—Napoleon's continued Displeasure.—Angry Discussions respecting the Treaty of Amiens—Malta.—Offensive report of General Sebastiani—Resolution of the British Government in consequence.—Conferences betwixt Buonaparte and Lord Whitworth.—The King sends a Message to Parliament, demanding additional aid.—Buonaparte quarrels with Lord Whitworth at a Levee—Particulars—Resentment of England upon this occasion.—Farther Discussions concerning Malta.—Reasons why Buonaparte might desire to break off Negotiations.—Britain declares War against France on 18th May, 1803.

THESE advances towards universal empire, made during the very period when the pacific measures adopted by the preliminaries, and

afterwards confirmed by the treaty of Amiens, were in the act of being carried into execution, excited the natural jealousy of the people of Britain. They had not been accustomed to rely much on the sincerity of the French nation; nor did the character of its present chief, so full of ambition, and so bold and successful in his enterprises, incline them to feelings of greater security. On the other hand, Buonaparte seems to have felt as matter of personal offence the jealousy which the British entertained; and instead of soothing it, as policy dictated, by concessions and confidence, he showed a disposition to repress, or at least to punish it, by measures which indicated anger and irritation. There ceased to be any cordiality of intercourse betwixt the two nations, and they began to look into the conduct of each other for causes of offence, rather than for the means of removing it.

The English had several subjects of complaint against France, besides the general encroachments which she had continued to make on the liberties of Europe. A law had been made during the times of the wildest Jacobinism, which condemned to forfeiture every vessel under a hundred tons burthen, carrying British merchandise, and approaching within four leagues of France. It was now thought proper, that the enforcing a regulation of so hostile a character, made during a

war of unexampled bitterness, should be the first fruits of returning peace. Several British vessels were stopped, their captains imprisoned, their cargoes confiscated, and all restitution refused. Some of these had been driven on the French coast unwillingly, and by stress of weather; but the necessity of the case created no exemption. An instance there was, of a British vessel in ballast, which entered Charente, in order to load with a cargo of brandy. The plates, knives, forks, etc. used by the cap tain, being found to be of British manufacture, the circumstance was thought a sufficient apology for seizing the vessel. These aggressions, repeatedly made, were not, so far as appears, remedied on the most urgent remonstrances, and seemed to argue that the French were already acting on the vexatious and irritating principle which often precedes a war, but very seldom immediately follows a peace. The conduct of France was felt to be the more unreasonable and ungracious, as all restrictions on her commerce, imposed during the war, had been withdrawn on the part of Great Britain so soon as the peace was concluded. In like manner, a stipulation of the treaty of Amiens, providing that all sequestrations imposed on the property of French or of English, in the two contending countries, should be removed, was instantly complied with in Britain,

but postponed and dallied with on the part of France.

The above were vexatious and offensive measures, intimating little respect for the government of England, and no desire to cultivate her good-will. They were perhaps adopted by the Chief Consul, in hopes of inducing Britain to make some sacrifices in order to obtain from his favour a commercial treaty, the advantages of which, according to his opinion of the English nation, was a boon calculated to make them quickly forgive the humiliating restrictions from which it would emancipate their trade. If this were any part of his policy, he was ignorant of the nature of the people to whom it was applied. It is the sluggish ox alone that is governed by a goad. But what gave the deepest offence and most lively alarm to Britain, was, that while Buonaparte declined affording the ordinary facilities for English commerce it was his purpose, nevertheless, to establish a commercial agent in every port of the British dominions, whose ostensible duty was to watch over that very trade which the First Consul showed so little desire to encourage, but whose real business resembled that of an accredited and privileged spy. These official persons were not only, by their instructions, directed to collect every possible information on commercial points, but also to

furnish a plan of the ports of each district with all the soundings, and to point out with what wind vessels could go out and enter with most ease, and at what draught of water the harbour might be entered by ships of burthen. To add to the alarming character of such a set of agents, it was found that those invested with the office were military men and engineers.

Consuls thus nominated had reached Britain, but had not, in general, occupied the posts assigned to them, when the British government, becoming informed of the duties they were expected to perform, announced to them that any one who might repair to a British seaport under such a character, should be instantly ordered to quit the island. The secrecy with which these agents had been instructed to conduct themselves was so great, that one Fauvelet, to whom the office of commercial agent at Dublin had been assigned, and who had reached the place of his destination before the nature of the appointment was discovered, could not be found out by some persons who desired to make an affidavit before him as Consul of France. It can be no wonder that the very worst impression was made on the public mind of Britain respecting the further projects of her late enemies, when it was evident that they availed themselves of the first moments of returning peace to procure, by an indirect and most sus-

picious course of proceeding, that species of information, which would be most useful to France, and most dangerous to Britain, in the event of a renewed war.

While these grievances and circumstances of suspicion agitated the English nation, the daily press, which alternately acts upon public opinion, and is reacted upon by it, was loud and vehement. The personal character of the Chief Consul was severely treated; his measures of self-aggrandizement arraigned, his aggressions on the liberty of France, of Italy, and especially of Switzerland, held up to open day; while every instance of petty vexation and oppression practised upon British commerce or British subjects, was quoted as expressing his deep resentment against the only country which possessed the will and the power to counteract his acquiring the universal dominion of Europe.

There was at this period in Britain a large party of French Royalists, who, declining to return to France, or falling under the exceptions to the amnesty, regarded Buonaparte as their personal enemy, as well as the main obstacle to the restoration of the Bourbons, to which, but for him only, the people of France seemed otherwise more disposed than at any time since the commencement of the Revolution. These gentlemen found an able and active advocate of their cause in Monsieur Peltier,

an emigrant, a determined royalist, and a man of that ready wit and vivacity of talent which is peculiarly calculated for periodical writing. He had opposed the democrats during the early days of the Revolution, by a publication termed the «Acts of the Apostles;» in which he held up to ridicule and execration the actions, pretensions, and principles of their leaders, with such success as induced Brissot to assert, that he had done more harm to the Republican cause than all the allied armies. At the present crisis, he commenced the publication of a weekly paper in London, in the French language, called *l'Ambigu.* The decoration at the top of the sheet was a head of Buonaparte, placed on the body of a Sphinx. This ornament being objected to after the first two or three numbers, the Sphinx appeared with the neck truncated; but, being still decked with the consular emblems, continued to intimate emblematically the allusion at once to Egypt, and to the ambiguous character of the First Consul. The columns of this paper were dedicated to the most severe attacks upon Buonaparte and the French government; and as it was highly popular, from the general feelings of the English nation towards both, it was widely dispersed and generally read.

The torrent of satire and abuse poured forth from the English and Anglo-gallican periodical press, was calculated deeply to annoy and irri-

tate the person against whom it was chiefly aimed. In England we are so much accustomed to see characters the most unimpeachable, nay, the most venerable, assailed by the daily press, that we account the individual guilty of folly, who, if he be innocent of giving cause to the scandal, takes it to heart more than a passenger would mind the barking of a dog, that yelps at every passing sound. But this is a sentiment acquired partly by habit, partly by our knowledge, that unsubstantiated scandal of this sort makes no impression on the public mind. Such indifference cannot be expected on the part of foreigners, who, in this particular, resemble horses introduced from neighbouring counties into the precincts of forest districts, that are liable to be stung into madness by a peculiar species of gad-fly, to which the race bred in the country are from habit almost totally indifferent.

If it be thus with foreigners in general, it must be supposed that from natural impatience of censure, as well as rendered susceptible and irritable by his course of uninterrupted success, Napoleon Buonaparte must have winced under the animated and sustained attacks upon his person and government, which appeared in the English newspapers, and Peltier's *Ambigu*. He attached at all times, as we have already had occasion to remark, much importance to the influence of the press, which in Paris he had

taken under his own especial superintendence, and for which he himself often condescended to compose or correct paragraphs. To be assailed, therefore, by the whole body of British newspapers, almost as numerous as their navy, seems to have provoked him to the extremity of his patience; and resentment of these attacks aggravated the same hostile sentiments against England, which, from causes of suspicion already mentioned, had begun to be engendered in the British public against France and her ruler.

Napoleon, in the mean time, endeavoured to answer in kind, and the columns of the *Moniteur* had many an angry and violent passage directed against England. Answers, replies, and rejoinders passed rapidly across the Channel, inflaming and augmenting the hostile spirit, reciprocally entertained by the two countries against each other. But there was this great disadvantage on Buonaparte's side, that while the English might justly throw the blame of this scandalous warfare on the license of a free press, the Chief Consul could not transfer the responsibility of the attack on his side; because it was universally known, that the French periodical publications being under the most severe regulations, nothing could appear in them except what had received the previous sanction of the government. Every attack upon England, therefore, which was published in the French

papers, was held to express the personal sentiments of the Chief Consul, who thus, by destroying the freedom of the French press, had rendered himself answerable for every such license as it was permitted to take.

It became speedily plain, that Buonaparte could reap no advantage from a contest in which he was to be the defendant in his own person, and to maintain a literary warfare with anonymous antagonists. He had recourse, therefore, to a demand upon the British government, and, after various representations of milder import, caused his envoy, Monsieur Otto, to state in an official note the following distinct grievances:—First, the existence of a deep and continued system to injure the character of the First Consul, and prejudice the effect of his public measures, through the medium of the press; Secondly, the permission of a part of the princes of the house of Bourbon, and their adherents, to remain in England, for the purpose (it was alleged) that they might hatch and encourage schemes against the life and government of the Chief Consul. It was therefore categorically demanded, 1st, That the British government do put a stop to the publication of the abuse complained of, as affecting the head of the French government. 2d, That the emigrants residing in Jersey be dismissed from England—that the bishops who had declined to resign their sees be also sent

out of the country—that George Cadoudal be transported to Canada—that the princes of the house of Bourbon be advised to repair to Warsaw, where the head of their family now resided—and, finally, that such emigrants who continued to wear the ancient badges and decorations of the French court, be also compelled to leave England. Lest the British ministers should plead, that the constitution of their country precluded them from gratifying the First Consul in any of these demands, Monsieur Otto forestalled the objection, by reminding them that the Alien Act gave them full power to exclude any foreigners from Great Britain at their pleasure.

To this peremptory mandate, Lord Hawkesbury, then Minister for Foreign Affairs, instructed the British agent, Mr Merry, to make a reply, at once firm and conciliatory; avoiding the tone of pique and ill temper which is plainly to be traced in the French note, yet maintaining the dignity of the nation he represented. It was observed, that, if the French government had reason to complain of the license of the English journals, the British government had no less right to be dissatisfied with the retorts and recriminations which had been poured out from those of Paris; and that there was this remarkable feature of difference betwixt them, that the English ministry neither had, could have, nor wished to have, any control

over the freedom of the British press; whereas the *Moniteur*, in which the abuse of England had appeared, was the official organ of the French government. But, finally upon this point, the British monarch, it was said, would make no concession to any foreign power, at the expense of the freedom of the press. If what was published was libellous or actionable, the printers and publishers were open to punishment, and all reasonable facilities would be afforded for prosecuting them. To the demands so peremptorily urged, respecting the emigrants, Lord Hawkesbury replied, by special answers applying to the different classes, but summed up in the general argument, that his Majesty neither encouraged them in any scheme against the French government, nor did he believe there were any such in existence; and that while these unfortunate princes and their followers lived in conformity to the laws of Great Britain, and without affording nations with whom she was at peace any valid or sufficient cause of complaint, his Majesty would feel it inconsistent with his dignity, his honour, and the common laws of hospitality, to deprive them of that protection, which individuals resident within the British dominions could only forfeit by their own misconduct.

To render these answers, being the only reply which an English minister could have made to the demands of France, in some degree ac-

ceptable to Buonaparte, Peltier was brought to trial for a libel against the First Consul, at the instance of the attorney-general. He was defended by Mr Mackintosh (now Sir James), in one of the most brilliant speeches ever made at bar or in forum, in which the jury were reminded, that every press on the continent was enslaved, from Palermo to Hamburgh, and that they were now to vindicate the right we had ever asserted, to speak of men both at home and abroad, not according to their greatness, but their crimes.

The defendant was found guilty; but his cause might be considered as triumphant.[1] Accordingly, every part of the proceedings gave offence to Buonaparte. He had not desired to be righted by the English law, but by a vigour beyond the law. The publicity of the trial, the wit and eloquence of the advocate, were all calculated to soothe the feelings of Buonaparte, who knew human nature, and the character of his usurped power, too well, to suppose that public discussion could be of service to him. He had demanded darkness, the English government had answered by giving him light, he had wished, like those who are conscious of flaws in their conduct, to suppress all censure of his measures, and by Peltier's

[1] He was never brought up to receive sentence, our quarrel with the French having soon afterwards come to an absolute rupture

trial, the British ministers had made the investigation of them a point of legal necessity. The First Consul felt the consciousness that he himself, rather than Peltier, was tried before the British public, with a publicity which could not fail to blaze abroad the discussion. Far from conceiving himself obliged by the species of atonement which had been offered him, he deemed the offence of the original publication was greatly aggravated, and placed it now directly to the account of the English ministers, of whom he could never be made to understand, that they had afforded him the only remedy in their power.

The paragraphs hostile to England in the *Moniteur* were continued; an English paper called the Argus, conducted by Irish refugees, was printed at Paris, under permission of the government, for the purpose of assailing Britain with additional abuse, while the fire was returned from the English side of the Channel, with double vehemence and tenfold success. These were ominous precursors to a state of peace, and more grounds of misunderstanding were daily added.

The new discussions related chiefly to the execution of the treaty of Amiens, in which the English government showed no promptitude. Most of the French colonies, it is true, had been restored; but the Cape, and the other Batavian settlements, above all, the island of

Malta, were still possessed by the British forces. At common law, if the expression may be used, England was bound instantly to redeem her engagement, by ceding these possessions, and thus fulfilling the articles of the treaty. In equity, she had a good defence; since in policy, for herself and Europe, she was bound to decline the cession at all risks.

The recent acquisitions of France on the continent afforded the plea of equity to which we have alluded. It was founded on the principle adopted at the treaty of Amiens, that Great Britain should, out of her conquests over the enemy's foreign settlements, retain so much as to counterbalance, in some measure, the power which France had acquired in Europe. This principle being once established, it followed that the compact at Amiens had reference to the then existing state of things; and since, after that period, France had extended her sway over Italy and Piedmont, England became thereby entitled to retain an additional compensation, in consequence of France's additional acquisitions. This was the true and simple position of the case; France had innovated upon the state of things which existed when the treaty was made, and England might, therefore, in justice, claim an equitable right to innovate upon the treaty itself, by refusing to make surrender of what had been promised in other and very different cir-

cumstances. Perhaps it had been better to fix upon this obvious principle, as the ground of declining to surrender such British conquests as were not yet given up, unless France consented to relinquish the power which she had usurped upon the Continent. This, however, would have produced instant war; and the Ministers were naturally loath to abandon the prospect of prolonging the peace which had been so lately established, or to draw their pen through the treaty of Amiens, while the ink with which it was written was still moist. They yielded, therefore, in a great measure. The Cape of Good Hope and the Dutch colonies were restored, Alexandria was evacuated, and the ministers confined their discussions with France to the island of Malta only; and, condescending still farther, declared themselves ready to concede even this last point of discussion, providing a sufficient guarantee should be obtained for this important citadel of the Mediterranean being retained in neutral hands. The Order itself was in no respect adequate to the purpose; and as to the proposed Neapolitan garrison (none of the most trust-worthy in any case), France, by her encroachments in Italy, had become so near and so formidable a neighbour to the King of Naples, that, by a threat of invasion of his capital, she might have compelled him to deliver up Malta upon a very brief notice. All this

was urged on the part of Britain. The French ministry, on the other hand, pressed for literal execution of the treaty. After some diplomatic evasions had been resorted to, it appeared as if the cession could be no longer deferred, when a publication appeared in the *Moniteur*, which roused to a high pitch the suspicions, as well as the indignation, of the British nation.

The publication alluded to was a report of General Sébastiani. This officer had been sent as the emissary of the First Consul, to various Mahommedan courts in Asia and Africa, in all of which it seems to have been his object, not only to exalt the greatness of his master, but to misrepresent and degrade the character of England. He had visited Egypt, of which, with its fortresses, and the troops that defended them, he had made a complete survey. He then waited upon Djezzar Pacha, and gives a flattering account of his reception, and of the high esteem in which Djezzar held the First Consul, whom he had so many reasons for wishing well to. At the Ionian Islands, he harangued the natives, and assured them of the protection of Buonaparte. The whole report is full of the most hostile expressions towards England, and accuses General Stuart of having encouraged the Turks to assassinate the writer. Wherever Sébastiani went, he states himself to have interfered in the factions and quarrels of the country; he inquired

into its forces; renewed old intimacies, or made new ones with leading persons; enhanced his master's power, and was liberal in promises of French aid. He concludes, that a French army of six thousand men would be sufficient to conquer Egypt, and that the Ionian Islands were altogether attached to the French interest.

The publication of this report, which seemed as if Buonaparte were blazoning forth to the world his unaltered determination to persist in his Eastern projects of colonization and conquest, would have rendered it an act of treason in the English ministers, if, by the cession of Malta, they had put into his hand, or at least placed within his grasp, the readiest means of carrying into execution those gigantic schemes of ambition, which had for their ultimate, perhaps their most desired object, the destruction of the Indian commerce of Britain.

As it were by way of corollary to the gasconading journal of Sébastiani, an elaborate account of the forces and natural advantages of France was published at the same period, which, in order that there might be no doubt concerning the purpose of its appearance at this crisis, was summed up by the express conclusion, « that Britain was unable to contend with France single-handed.» This tone of defiance, officially adopted at such a moment,

added not a little to the resentment of the English nation, not accustomed to decline a challenge or endure an insult.

The court of Britain, on the appearance of this Report on the State of France, together with that of Sébastiani, drawn up and subscribed by an official agent, containing insinuations totally void of foundation, and disclosing intrigues inconsistent with the preservation of peace, and the objects for which peace had been made, declared that the King would enter into no farther discussion on the subject of Malta, until his Majesty had received the most ample satisfaction for this new and singular aggression.

While things were thus rapidly approaching to a rupture, the Chief Consul adopted the unusual resolution, of himself entering personally into conference with the British ambassador. He probably took this determination upon the same grounds which dictated his contempt of customary forms, in entering, or attempting to enter, into direct correspondence with the princes whom he had occasion to treat with. Such a deviation from the established mode of procedure seemed to mark his elevation above ordinary rules, and would afford him, he might think, an opportunity of bearing down the British ambassador's reasoning, by exhibiting one of those bursts of pas-

sion, to which he had been accustomed to see most men give way.

It would have been more prudent in Napoleon to have left the conduct of the negotiation to Talleyrand. A sovereign cannot enter in person upon such conferences, unless with the previous determination of adhering precisely and finally to whatever ultimatum he has to propose. He cannot, without a compromise of dignity, chaffer or capitulate, or even argue, and of course is incapable of wielding any of the usual, and almost indispensable weapons of negotiators. If it was Napoleon's expectation, by one stunning and emphatic declaration of his pleasure, to beat down all arguments, and confound all opposition, he would have done wisely to remember, that he was not now, as in other cases, a general upon a victorious field of battle, dictating terms to a defeated enemy; but was treating upon a footing of equality with Britain, mistress of the seas, possessing strength as formidable as his own, though of a different character, and whose prince and people were far more likely to be incensed than intimidated by any menaces which his passion might throw out.

The character of the English ambassador was as unfavourable for the Chief Consul's probable purpose, as that of the nation he repre-

sented. Lord Whitworth was possessed of great experience and sagacity. His integrity and honour were undoubted; and, with the highest degree of courage, he had a calm and collected disposition, admirably calculated to give him the advantage in any discussion with an antagonist, of a fiery, impatient, and overbearing temper.

We will make no apology for dwelling at unusual length on the conferences betwixt the First Consul and Lord Whitworth, as they are strikingly illustrative of the character of Buonaparte, and were in their consequences decisive of his fate, and that of the world.

Their first interview of a political nature took place in the Tuileries, 17th February, 1803. Buonaparte, having announced that this meeting was for the purpose of « making his sentiments known to the King of England in a clear and authentic manner, » proceeded to talk incessantly for the space of nearly two hours, not without considerable incoherence, his temper rising as he dwelt on the alleged causes of complaint which he preferred against England, though not so much or so incautiously as to make him drop the usual tone of courtesy to the ambassador.

He complained of the delay of the British in evacuating Alexandria and Malta; cutting short all discussion on the latter subject, by declaring he would as soon agree to Britain's

possessing the suburb of St Antoine as that island. He then referred to the abuse thrown upon him by the English papers, but more especially by those French journals published in London. He affirmed that George and other Chouan chiefs, whom he accused of designs against his life, received relief or shelter in England; and that two assassins had been apprehended in Normandy, sent over by the French emigrants to murder him. This, he said, would be publicly proved in a court of justice. From this point he diverged to Egypt, of which he affirmed he could make himself master whenever he had a mind; but that he considered it too paltry a stake to renew the war for. Yet, while on this subject, he suffered it to escape him, that the idea of recovering this favourite colony was only postponed, not abandoned. « Egypt,» he said, « must sooner or later belong to France, either by the falling to pieces of the Turkish government, or in consequence of some agreement with the Porte.» In evidence of his peaceable intentions, he asked, what he should gain by going to war, since he had no means of acting offensively against England, except by a descent, of which he acknowledged the hazard in the strongest terms. The chances, he said, were a hundred to one against him; and yet he declared that the attempt should be made if he were now obliged to go to war.

He extolled the power of both countries. The army of France, he said, should be soon recruited to four hundred and eighty thousand men; and the fleets of England were such as he could not propose to match within the space of ten years at least. United, the two countries might govern the world, would they but understand each other. Had he found, he said, the least cordiality on the part of England, she should have had indemnities assigned her upon the Continent, treaties of commerce, all that she could wish or desire. But he confessed that his irritation increased daily, « since every gale that blew from England, brought nothing but enmity and hatred against him. »

He then made an excursive digression, in which, taking a review of the nations of Europe, he contended that England could hope for assistance from none of them in a war with France. In the total result, he demanded the instant implement of the treaty of Amiens, and the suppression of the abuse in the English papers. War was the alternative.

During this excursive piece of declamation, which the First Consul delivered with great rapidity, Lord Whitworth, notwithstanding the interview lasted two hours, had scarcely time to slide in a few words in reply or explanation. As he endeavoured to state the new grounds of mistrust which induced the King of England to demand more advantageous terms,

in consequence of the accession of territory and influence which France had lately made, Napoleon interrupted him—« I suppose you mean Piedmont, and Switzerland—they are trifling occurrences, which must have been foreseen while the negotiation was in dependence. You have no right to recur to them at this time of day.» To the hint of indemnities which might be allotted to England out of the general spoil of Europe, if she would cultivate the friendship of Buonaparte, Lord Whitworth nobly answered, that the King of Britain's ambition led him to preserve what was his, not to acquire that which belonged to others. They parted with civility, but with a conviction on Lord Whitworth's part, that Buonaparte would never resign his claim to the possession of Malta.

The British ministry were of the same opinion; for a message was sent down by his Majesty to the House of Commons, stating, that he had occasion for additional aid to enable him to defend his dominions, in case of an encroachment on the part of France. A reason was given, which injured the cause of the ministers, by placing the vindication of their measures upon simulated grounds;—it was stated, that these apprehensions arose from naval preparations in the different ports of France. No such preparations had been complained of during the intercourse between the ministers of France

and England,—in truth, none such existed to any considerable extent,—and in so far, the British ministers gave the advantage to the French, by not resting the cause of their country on the just and true grounds. All, however, were sensible of the real merits of the dispute, which were grounded on the grasping and inordinate ambition of the French ruler, and the sentiments of dislike and irritation with which he seemed to regard Great Britain.

The charge of the pretended naval preparations being triumphantly refuted by France, Talleyrand was next employed to place before Lord Whitworth the means which, in case of a rupture, France possessed of wounding England, not directly, indeed, but through the sides of those states of Europe whom she would most wish to see, if not absolutely independent, yet unoppressed by military exactions. « It was *natural,* » a note of this statesman asserted, « that Britain being armed in consequence of the King's message, France should arm also—that she should send an army into Holland—form an encampment on the frontiers of Hanover—continue to maintain troops in Switzerland—march others to the south of Italy, and, finally, form encampments upon the coast. » All these threats, excepting the last, referred to distant and to neutral nations, who were not alleged to have themselves given any cause of complaint to France; but who were

now to be subjected to military occupation and exaction, because Britain desired to see them happy and independent, and because harassing and oppressing them must be in proportion unpleasing to her. It was an entirely new principle of warlike policy, which introduced the oppression of unoffending and neutral neighbours as a legitimate mode of carrying on war against a hostile power, against whom there was little possibility of using measures directly offensive.

Shortly after this note had been lodged, Buonaparte, incensed at the message of the King to Parliament, seems to have formed the scheme of bringing the protracted negotiations betwixt France and England to a point, in a time, place, and manner, equally extraordinary. At a public Court held at the Tuileries, on the 13th March, 1803, the Chief Consul came up to Lord Whitworth in considerable agitation, and observed aloud, and within hearing of the circle,—« You are then determined on war? »—and, without attending to the disclamations of the English ambassador, proceeded,—« We have been at war for fifteen years—you are determined on hostility for fifteen years more—and you force me to it.» He then addressed Count Marcow and the Chevalier Azzara—«The English wish for war; but if they draw the sword first, I will be the last to return it to the scabbard. They do not respect

treaties, which henceforth we must cover with black crape!» He then again addressed Lord Whitworth—«To what purpose are these armaments? Against whom do you take these measures of precaution? I have not a single ship of the line in any port in France—But if you arm, I too will take up arms—if you fight, I will fight—you may destroy France, but you cannot intimidate her.»

« We desire neither the one nor the other,» answered Lord Whitworth, calmly.— « We desire to live with her on terms of good intelligence.»

« You must respect treaties then,» said Buonaparte, sternly. « Woe to those by whom they are not respected! They will be accountable for the consequences to all Europe.»

So saying, and repeating his last remark twice over, he retired from the levee, leaving the whole circle surprised at the want of decency and dignity which had given rise to such a scene.

This remarkable explosion may be easily explained, if we refer it entirely to the impatience of a fiery temper, rendered, by the most extraordinary train of success, morbidly sensitive to any obstacle which interfered with a favourite plan; and, doubtless, it is not the least evil of arbitrary power, that he who possesses it is naturally tempted to mix up his own feelings of anger, revenge, or mortification, in

affairs which ought to be treated under the most calm and impartial reference to the public good exclusively. But it has been averred by those who had best opportunity to know Buonaparte, that the fits of violent passion which he sometimes displayed, were less the bursts of unrepressed and constitutional irritability, than means previously calculated upon to intimidate and astound those with whom he was treating at the time. There may, therefore, have been policy amid the First Consul's indignation, and he may have recollected, that the dashing to pieces Cobentzel's china-jar in the violent scene which preceded the signing of the treaty of Campo Formio,[1] was completely successful in its issue. But the condition of Britain was very different from that of Austria, and he might have broken all the porcelain at St Cloud without making the slightest impression on the equanimity of Lord Whitworth. This «angry parle,» therefore, went for nothing, unless in so far as it was considered as cutting off the faint remaining hope of peace, and expressing the violent and obstinate temper of the individual, upon whose pleasure, whether originating in judgment or caprice, the fate of Europe at this important crisis unhappily depended. In England, the interview at the Tuileries, where Britain was

[1] See vol. III. p. 357.

held to be insulted in the person of her ambassador, and that in the presence of the representatives of all Europe, greatly augmented the general spirit of resentment.

Talleyrand, to whom Lord Whitworth applied for an explanation of the scene which had occurred, only answered, that the First Consul, publicly affronted, as he conceived himself, desired to exculpate himself in presence of the ministers of all the powers of Europe. The question of peace or war came now to turn on the subject of Malta. The retention of this fortress by the English could infer no danger to France; whereas, if parted with by them under an insecure guarantee, the great probability of its falling into the hands of France, was a subject of the most legitimate jealousy to Britain, who must always have regarded the occupation of Malta as a preliminary step to the recapture of Egypt. There seemed policy, therefore, in Napoleon's conceding this point, and obtaining for France that respite, which, while it regained her colonies and recruited her commerce, would have afforded her the means of renewing a navy, which had been almost totally destroyed during the war, and consequently of engaging England, at some future and propitious time, on the element which she called peculiarly her own. It was accordingly supposed to be Talleyrand's opinion, that, by giving way to

England on the subject of Malta, Napoleon ought to lull her suspicions to sleep.

Yet there were strong reasons, besides the military character of Buonaparte, which might induce the First Consul to break off negotiation. His empire was founded on the general opinion entertained of his inflexibility of purpose, and of his unvaried success, alike in political objects as in the field of battle. Were he to concede the principle which England now contested with him in the face of Europe, it would have in a certain degree derogated from the pre-eminence of the situation he claimed, as Autocrat of the civilized world. In that character he could not recede an inch from pretensions which he had once asserted. To have allowed that his encroachment on Switzerland and Piedmont rendered it necessary that he should grant a compensation to England by consenting to her retention of Malta, would have been to grant that Britain had still a right to interfere in the affairs of the Continent, and to point her out to nations disposed to throw off the French yoke, as a power to whose mediation he still owed some deference. These reasons were not without force in themselves, and, joined to the natural impetuosity of Buonaparte's temper, irritated and stung by the attacks in the English papers, had their weight probably in inducing him to give way to that sally of resentment, by which

he endeavoured to cut short the debate, as he would have brought up his guard in person to decide the fate of a long-disputed action.

Some lingering and hopeless attempts were made to carry on negotiations. The English ministry lowered their claim of retaining Malta in perpetuity, to the right of holding it for ten years. Buonaparte, on the other hand, would listen to no modification of the treaty of Amiens, but offered, as the guarantee afforded by the occupation of Neapolitan troops was objected to, that the garrison should consist of Russians or Austrians. To this proposal Britain would not accede. Lord Whitworth left Paris, and, on the 18th May, 1803, Britain declared war against France.

Before we proceed to detail the history of this eventful struggle, we must cast our eyes backwards, and review some events of importance which had happened in France since the conclusion of the treaty of Amiens.

CHAPTER III.

Retrospect.—St Domingo—The Negroes, victorious over the Whites and Mulattoes, split into parties under different Chiefs—Toussaint Louverture the most distinguished of these—His plans for the amelioration of his Subjects—Appoints, in imitation of France, a Consular Government.—France sends an Expedition against St Domingo, under General Leclerc, in December, 1801, which is successful, and Tousaint submits—After a brief interval, he is sent to France, where he dies under the hardships of confinement.—The French, visited by Yellow Fever, are assaulted by the Negroes, and War is carried on of new with dreadful fury.—Leclerc is cut off by the distemper, and is succeeded by Rochambeau.—The French finally obliged to capitulate to an English Squadron, on 1st December, 1803.—Buonaparte's scheme to consolidate his power at home.—The Consular Guard augmented to 6000 men—Description of it.—Legion of Honour—Account of it.—Opposition formed, on the principle of the English one, against the Consular Government.—They oppose the establishment of the Legion of Honour, which, however, is carried.—Application to the Comte de Provence (Louis XVIII.) to resign the Crown—Rejected.

When the treaty of Amiens appeared to have restored peace to Europe, one of Buonaparte's first enterprises was to attempt the re-

covery of the French possessions in the large, rich, and valuable colony of St Domingo, the disasters of which island form a terrible episode in the history of the war.

The convulsions of the French Revolution had reached St Domingo, and, catching like fire to combustibles, had bred a violent feud between the white people in the island, and the mulattoes, the latter of whom demanded to be admitted into the privileges and immunities of the former; the newly established rights of men, as they alleged, having no reference to the distinction of colour. While the whites and the people of colour were thus engaged in a civil war, the negro slaves, the most oppressed and most numerous class of the population, arose against both parties, and rendered the whole island one scene of bloodshed and conflagration. The few planters who remained invited the support of the British arms, which easily effected a temporary conquest. But the European soldiery perished so fast through the influence of the climate, that, in 1798, the English were glad to abandon an island, which had proved the grave of so many of their best and bravest, who had fallen without a wound, and void of renown.

The negroes, left to themselves, divided into different parties, who submitted to the authority of chiefs more or less independent of each other, many of whom displayed considerable

talent. Of these the principal leader was Toussaint Louverture, who, after waging war like a savage, appears to have used the power which victory procured him with much political skill. Although himself a negro, he had the sagacity to perceive how important it was for the civilization of his subjects, that they should not be deprived of the opportunities of knowledge, and examples of industry, afforded them by the white people. He, therefore, protected and encouraged the latter, and established, as an equitable regulation, that the blacks, now freemen, should nevertheless continue to labour the plantations of the white colonists, while the produce of the estate should be divided in certain proportions betwixt the white proprietor and the sable cultivator.

The least transgressions of these regulations he punished with African ferocity. On one occasion, a white female, the owner of a plantation, had been murdered by the negroes by whom it was laboured, and who had formerly been her slaves. Toussaint marched to the spot at the head of a party of his horse-guards, collected the negroes belonging to the plantation, and surrounded them with his black cavalry, who, after a very brief inquiry, received orders to charge and cut them to pieces; of which order our informant witnessed the execution. His unrelenting rigour, joined

to his natural sagacity, soon raised Toussaint to the chief command of the island; and he availed himself of the maritime peace, to consolidate his authority by establishing a constitution on the model most lately approved of in France, which, being that of the year Eight, consisted of a consular government. Toussaint failed not, of course, to assume the supreme government to himself, with power to name his successor. The whole was a parody on the procedure of Buonaparte, which, doubtless, the latter was not highly pleased with, for there are many cases in which an imitation by others, of the conduct we ourselves have held, is a matter not of compliment, but of the most severe satire. The constitution of St Domingo was instantly put in force, although, with an ostensible deference to France, the sanction of her government had been ceremoniously required. It was evident that the African, though not unwilling to acknowledge some nominal degree of sovereignty on the part of France, was determined to retain in his own hands the effective government of the colony. But this in no respect consisted with the plans of Buonaparte, who was impatient to restore to France those possessions of which the British naval superiority had so long deprived her—colonies, shipping, and commerce.

A powerful expedition was fitted out at the

harbours of Brest, Lorient, and Rochefort, destined to restore St Domingo in full subjection to the French empire. The fleet amounted to thirty-four ships bearing forty guns and upwards, with more than twenty frigates and smaller armed vessels. They had on board above twenty thousand men, and General Leclerc, the brother-in-law of the First Consul, was named commander-in-chief of the expedition, having a staff composed of officers of acknowledged skill and bravery.

It is said that Buonaparte had the art to employ a considerable proportion of the troops which composed the late army of the Rhine, in this distant expedition to an insalubrious climate. But he would not permit it to be supposed, that there was the least danger, and he exercised an act of family authority on the subject, to prove that such were his real sentiments. His sister, the beautiful Pauline, afterwards the wife of Prince Borghese, showed the utmost reluctance to accompany her present husband, General Leclerc, upon the expedition, and only went on board when actually compelled to do so by the positive orders of the First Consul, who, although she was his favourite sister, was yet better contented that she should share the general risk, than, by remaining behind, leave it to be inferred that he himself augured a disastrous conclusion to the expedition.

The armament set sail on the 14th of December, 1801, while an English squadron of observation, uncertain of their purpose, waited upon and watched their progress to the West Indies. The French fleet presented themselves before Cape François on the 29th of January, 1802.

Toussaint, summoned to surrender, seemed at first inclined to come to an agreement, terrified probably by the great force of the expedition, which time and the climate could alone afford the negroes any chance of resisting. A letter was delivered to him from the First Consul, expressing esteem for his person, and General Leclerc offered him the most favourable terms, together with the situation of lieutenant-governor. Ultimately, however, Toussaint could not make up his mind to trust the French, and he determined upon resistance, which he managed with considerable skill. Nevertheless, the well-concerted military operations of the whites soon overpowered for the present the resistance of Toussaint and his followers. Chief after chief surrendered, and submitted themselves to General Leclerc. At length, Toussaint Louverture himself seems to have despaired of being able to make further or more effectual resistance. He made his formal submission, and received and accepted Leclerc's pardon, under the condi-

tion that he should retire to a plantation at Gonaives, and never leave it without permission of the commander-in-chief.

The French had not long had possession of the colony, ere they discovered, or supposed they had discovered, symptoms of a conspiracy amongst the negroes, and Toussaint was, on very slight grounds, accused as encouraging a revolt. Under this allegation, the only proof of which was a letter, capable of an innocent interpretation, the unfortunate chief was seized upon, with his whole family, and put on board of a vessel bound to France. Nothing official was ever learned concerning his fate. further than that he was imprisoned in the castle of Joux, in Franche Comté, where the unhappy African fell a victim to the severity of an Alpine climate, to which he was unaccustomed, and the privations of a close confinement The deed has been often quoted and referred to as one of the worst actions of Buonaparte, who ought, if not in justice, in generosity at least, to have had compassion on a man, whose fortunes bore in many respects a strong similarity to his own. It afforded but too strong a proof, that though humanity was often in Napoleon's mouth, and sometimes displayed in his actions, yet its maxims were seldom found sufficient to protect those whom he disliked or feared, from the fate which

tyranny most willingly assigns to its victims, that of being silently removed from the living world, and inclosed in their prison as in a tomb, from which no complaints can be heard, and where they are to await the slow approach of death, like men who are literally buried alive.

The perfidy with which the French had conducted themselves towards Toussaint was visited by early vengeance. That scourge of Europeans, the yellow fever, broke out among their troops, and in an incredibly short space of time swept off General Leclerc, with many of his best officers and bravest soldiers. The negroes, incensed at the conduct of the governor towards Toussaint, and encouraged by the sickly condition of the French army, rose upon them in every quarter. A species of war ensued, of which we are thankful it is not our task to trace the deplorable and ghastly particulars. The cruelty which was perhaps to be expected in the savage Africans, just broke loose from the bondage of slavery, communicated itself to the civilized French. If the former tore out their prisoners' eyes with cork-screws, the latter drowned their captives by hundreds, which imitation of Carrier's republican baptism they called « deportation into the sea.» On other occasions, numerous bodies of negroes were confined in hulks, and there smothered to death with the fumes of

lighted sulphur. The issue of this hellish warfare was, that the cruelty of the French enraged instead of terrifying their savage antagonists; and at length, that the numbers of the former, diminished by disease and constant skirmishing, became unequal to the defence even of the garrison-towns of the island, much more so to the task of reconquering it. General Rochambeau, who succeeded Leclerc as commander-in-chief, was finally obliged to save the poor wreck of that fine army, by submitting at discretion to an English squadron, 1st December, 1803. Thus was the richest colony in the West Indies finally lost to France. Remaining entirely in the possession of the black population, St Domingo will show, in process of time, how far the natives of Africa, having European civilization within their reach, are capable of forming a state, governed by the usual rules of polity.

While Buonaparte made these strong efforts for repossessing France of this fine colony, it was not to be supposed that he was neglecting the establishment of his own power upon a more firm basis. His present situation was —like every other in life—considerably short of what he could have desired, though so infinitely superior to all that his most unreasonable wishes could at one time have aspired to. He had all the real power of royalty, and, since the settlement of his authority for life, he had daily assumed more of the pomp and circum-

stance with which sovereignty is usually invested. The Tuileries were once more surrounded with guards without, and filled by levees within. The ceremonial of a court was revived, and Buonaparte, judging of mankind with accuracy, neglected no minute observance by which the princes of the earth are wont to enforce their authority. Still there remained much to be done. He held the sovereignty only in the nature of a life-rent. He could, indeed, dispose of it by will, but the last wills even of kings have been frequently set aside; and, at any rate, the privilege comes short of that belonging to an hereditary crown, which descends by the right of blood from one possessor to another, so that in one sense it may be said to confer on the dynasty a species of immortality. Buonaparte knew also the virtue of names. The title of Chief Consul did not necessarily infer sovereign rights—it might signify every thing, or it might signify nothing --in common language it inferred alike one of the annual executive governors of the Roman Republic, whose *fasces* swayed the world, or the petty resident who presides over commercial affairs in a foreign seaport. There were no precise ideas of power or rights necessarily and unalienably connected with it. Besides, Buonaparte had other objections to his present title of dignity. The title of First Consul implied, that there were two others,—far indeed, from being co-ordinate with Napo-

leon, but yet who occupied a higher rank on the steps of the throne, and approached his person more nearly, than he could have desired. Again, the word reminded the hearer, even by the new mode of its application, that it belonged to a government of recent establishment, and of revolutionary origin, and Napoleon did not wish to present such ideas to the public mind; since that which was but lately erected might be easily destroyed, and that which last arose out of the revolutionary cauldron might, like the phantoms which had preceded it, give place in its turn to an apparition more potent. Policy seemed to recommend to him, to have recourse to the ancient model which Europe had been long accustomed to reverence; to adopt the form of government best known and longest established through the greater part of the world; and, assuming the title and rights of a monarch, to take his place among the ancient and recognized authorities of Europe.

It was necessary to proceed with the utmost caution in this innovation, which, whenever accomplished, must necessarily involve the French people in the notable inconsistency, of having murdered the descendant of their old princes, committed a thousand crimes, and suffered under a mass of misery, merely because they were resolved not to permit the existence of that crown, which was now to be

placed on the head of a soldier of fortune. Before, therefore, he could venture on this bold measure, in which, were it but for very shame's sake, he must be certain of great opposition, Buonaparte endeavoured, by every means in his power, to strengthen himself in his government.

The army was carefully new-modelled, so as to make it as much as possible his own; and the French soldiers, who regarded the power of Buonaparte as the fruit of their own victories, were in general devoted to his cause, notwithstanding the fame of Moreau, to whom a certain part of their number still adhered. The Consular Guard, a highly-privileged body of selected forces, was augmented to the number of six thousand men. These formidable legions, which included troops of every species of arms, had been gradually formed and increased upon the plan of the corps of guides which Buonaparte introduced during the first Italian campaigns, for immediate attendance on his person, and for preventing such accidents as once or twice had like to have befallen him, by unexpected encounters with flying parties of the enemy. But the guards, as now increased in numbers, had a duty much more extended. They were chosen men, taught to consider themselves as superior to the rest of the army, and enjoying advantages in pay and privileges. When the other troops were sub-

ject to privations, care was taken that the guards should experience as little of them as possible, and that by every possible exertion they should be kept in the highest degree of readiness for action. They were only employed upon service of the utmost importance, and seldom in the beginning of an engagement, when they remained in reserve under the eye of Napoleon himself. It was usually by means of his guard that the final and decisive exertion was made which marked Buonaparte's tactics, and so often achieved victory at the very crisis when it seemed inclining to the enemy. Regarding themselves as considerably superior to the other soldiers, and accustomed also to be under Napoleon's immediate command, his guards were devotedly attached to him; and a body of troops of such high character might be considered as a formidable bulwark around the throne which he meditated ascending.

The attachment of these chosen legions, and of his soldiers in general, formed the foundation of Buonaparte's power, who, of all sovereigns that ever mounted to authoritiy, might be said to reign by dint of victory and of his sword. But he surrounded himself by another species of partisans. The Legion of Honour was destined to form a distinct and particular class of privileged individuals, whom, by ho-

nours and bounties bestowed on them, he resolved to bind to his own interest.

This institution, which attained considerable political importance, originated in the custom which Napoleon had early introduced, of conferring on soldiers, of whatever rank, a sword, fusee, or other military weapon, in the name of the state, as acknowledging and commemorating some act of peculiar gallantry. The influence of such public rewards was of course very great. They encouraged those who had received them to make every effort to preserve the character which they had thus gained, while they awakened the emulation of hundreds and thousands who desired similar marks of distinction. Buonaparte now formed the project of embodying the persons who had merited such rewards into an association, similar in many respects to those orders, or brotherhoods of chivalry, with which, during the middle ages, the feudal sovereigns of Europe surrounded themselves, and which subsist to this day, though in a changed and modified form. These, however, have been uniformly created on the feudal principles, and the honour they confer limited, or supposed to be limited, to persons of some rank and condition; but the scheme of Buonaparte was to extend this species of honourable distinction through all ranks, in the quality proper to each,

as medals to be distributed among various classes of the community are struck upon metals of different value, but are all stamped with the same dye. The outlines of the institution were these:—

The Legion of Honour was to consist of a great Council of Administration and fifteen Cohorts, each of which was to have its own separate head-quarters, in some distinguished town of the Republic. The Council of Administration was to consist of the three Consuls, and four other members; a senator, namely, a member of the Legislative Body, a member of the Tribunate, and one of the Council of State, each to be chosen by the body to which he belonged. The order might be acquired by distinguished merit, either of a civil or a military nature; and various rules were laid down for the mode of selecting the members.

The First Consul was, in right of his office, Captain-General of the Legion, and President of the Council of Administration. Every cohort was to consist of seven grand officers, twenty commanders, thirty subaltern officers, and three hundred and fifty legionaries. Their nomination was for life, and their appointments considerable. The grand officers enjoyed a yearly pension of 5000 francs; the commanders 2500; the officers 1000 francs; the privates, or legionaries, 250. They were to swear upon their honour to defend the govern-

ment of France, and maintain the inviolability of her empire; to combat, by every lawful means, against the re-establishment of the feudal institutions; and to concur in maintaining the principles of liberty and equality.

Notwithstanding these last words, containing, when properly understood, the highest political and moral truth, but employed in France originally to cover the most abominable cruelties, and used more lately as mere words of course, the friends of liberty were not to be blinded, regarding the purpose of this new institution. Their number was now much limited; but amidst their weakness they had listened to the lessons of prudence and experience, and abandoning these high-swoln, illusory, and absurd pretensions, which had created such general disturbance, seem to have set themselves seriou ly, and at the same time moderately to work, to protect the cause of practical and useful freedom, by such resistance as the constitution still permitted them to offer, by means of the Tribunate and the Legislative Body.

Among the statesmen who associated to form an Opposition, which, on the principle of the constitutional Opposition of England, were to act towards the executive government rather as to an erring friend, whom they desired to put right, than as an enemy, whom they meant to destroy, were Benjamin Constant, early dis-

tinguished by talent and eloquence, Chénier, author of the hymn of the Marseillaise,[1] Savoye-Rollin, Chauvelin, and others, among whose names that of Carnot was most distinguished. These statesmen had learned apparently, that it is better in human affairs to aim at that minor degree of good which is practicable, than to aspire to a perfection which is unattainable. In the opinion of most of them, the government of Buonaparte was a necessary evil, without which, or something of the same strength, to control the factions by which she was torn to pieces, France must have continued to be a prey to a succession of such anarchical governments as had already almost ruined her. They, therefore, entertained none of the usual views of conspirators. They considered the country as in the condition of a wounded warrior, compelled for a short time to lay aside her privileges, as he his armour; but they hoped, when France had renewed her strength and spirit by an interval of repose, they might see her, under better auspices than before, renew and assert her claims to be free from military law. Meantime they held it their duty, professing, at the same time, the highest respect to the government and its head, the First Consul, to keep alive as far as

[1] The Marseillaise is generally attributed to Rouget. Ed.

was permitted, the spirit of the country, and oppose the encroachments of its ruler. They were not long allowed to follow the practical and useful path which they had sketched out, but the French debates were never so decently or respectably conducted as during this period.

The Opposition, as they may be called, had not objected to the re-appointment of Buonaparte to the Consulate for life. Probably they were reluctant to have the appearance of giving him personal offence, were aware they would be too feebly supported, and were sensible, that struggling for a point which could not be attained, was unlikely to lead to any good practical results. The institution of the Legion of Honour offered a better chance to try their new opposition tactics.

Rœderer, the orator, by whom the measure was proposed to the Tribunate, endeavoured to place it in the most favourable light. It was founded, he said, upon the eighty-seventh article of the Constitutional Declaration, which provided that national recompenses should be conferred on those soldiers who had distinguished themselves in their country's service. He represented the proposed order as a moral institution, calculated to raise to the highest the patriotism and gallantry of the French people. It was a coin, he said, of a value different from, and far more precious than that

which was issued from the treasury—a treasure of a quality which could not be debased, and of a quantity which was inexhaustible, since the mine consisted in the national sense of honour.

To this specious argument, it was replied by Rollin and others, that the law was of a nature dangerous to public liberty. It was an abuse, they said, of the constitutional article, on which it was alleged to be founded, since it exhausted at once, by the creation of a numerous corps, the stock of rewards which the article referred to held in frugal reserve, to recompense great actions as they should occur. If every thing was given to remunerate merits which had been already ascertained, what stock, it was asked, remained for compensating future actions of gallantry, excepting the chance of a tardy admission into the corps as vacancies should occur? But especially it was pleaded, that the establishment of a military body, distinguished by high privileges and considerable pay, yet distinct and differing from all the other national forces, was a direct violation of the sacred principles of equality. Some reprobated the intermixture of the civil officers of the state in a military institution. Others were of opinion that the oath proposed to be taken was superfluous, if not ridiculous; since, how could the members of the Legion of Honour be more bound to serve the state, or

watch over the constitution, than any other citizens; or, in what manner was it proposed they should exert themselves for that purpose? Other arguments were urged, but that which all felt to be the most cogent, was rather understood than even hinted at. This was the immense additional strength which the First Consul must attain, by having at his command the distribution of the new honours, and being thus enabled to form a body of satellites entirely dependent upon himself, and carefully selected from the bravest and ablest within the realm.

The institution of the Legion of Honour was at length carried in the Tribunate, by a majority of fifty-six voices over thirty-eight, and sanctioned in the Legislative Body by one hundred and sixty-six over a hundred and ten. The strong divisions of the Opposition on this trying question, showed high spirit in those who composed that party; but they were placed in a situation so insulated and separated from the public, so utterly deprived of all constitutional guarantees for the protection of freedom, that their resistance, however honourable to themselves, was totally ineffectual, and without advantage to the nation.

Meanwhile Buonaparte was deeply engaged in intrigues of a different character, by means of which he hoped to place the sovereign authority which he had acquired, on a footing

less anomalous, and more corresponding with that of the other monarchs in Europe, than it was at present. For this purpose an overture was made by the Prussian minister Haugwitz, through the medium of Monsieur de Meyer, President of the Regency of Warsaw, proposing to the Comte de Provence (since Louis XVIII.), that he should resign his rights to the crown of France to the successful general who occupied the throne, in which case the exiled princes were to be invested with dominions in Italy, and restored to a brilliant existence. The answer of Louis was marked at once by moderation, sense, and that firmness of character which corresponded with his illustrious birth and high pretensions. « I do not confound Monsieur Buonaparte, » said the exiled monarch, « with those who have preceded him; I esteem his bravery and military talents; I owe him good-will for many acts of his government, for the good which is done to my people I will always esteem done to me. But he is mistaken if he thinks that my rights can be made the subjects of bargain and composition. The very step he is now adopting would go to establish them, could they be otherwise called in question. I know not what may be the designs of God for myself and my family, but I am not ignorant of the duties imposed on me by the rank in which it was his pleasure I should be born. As a christian, I will fulfil those du-

ties to my last breath. As a descendant of Saint Louis, I will know by his example how to respect myself, even were I in fetters. As the successor of Francis the First, I will at least have it to say with him, 'We have lost all excepting our honour!' »

Such is the account which has been uniformly given by the princes of the house of Bourbon, concerning this communication, which is said to have taken place on the 26th February, 1803. Buonaparte has indeed denied that he was accessory to any such transaction, and has said truly enough, that an endeavour to acquire an interest in the Bourbons' title by compromise, would have been an admission on his part that his own, flowing, as he alleged, from the people, was imperfect, and needed repairs. Therefore, he denied having taken any step which could, in its consequences, have inferred such an admission.

But, in the first place, it is not to be supposed that such a treaty would have been published by the Bourbon family, unless it had been proposed by Meyer; and it is equally unlikely that either Haugwitz or Meyer would have ventured on such a negotiation, excepting at the instigation of Buonaparte, who alone could make good the terms proposed on the one side, or derive advantage from the concessions sti-

pulated on the other. Secondly, without stopping to inquire how far the title which Buonaparte pretended to the supreme authority, was of a character incapable of being improved by a cession of the Comte de Provence's rights in his favour, it would still have continued an object of great political consequence to have obtained a surrender of the claims of the house of Bourbon, which were even yet acknowledged by a very considerable party within the kingdom. It was, therefore, worth while to venture upon a negotiation which might have had the most important results, although, when it proved fruitless, we can see strong reasons for Napoleon concealing and disowning his accession to a step, which might be construed as implying some sense of deficiency of his own title, and some degree of recognition of that of the exiled prince.

It may be remarked, that, up to this period, Napoleon had manifested no particular spleen towards the family of Bourbon. On the contrary, he had treated their followers with lenity, and spoken with decency of their own claims. But the rejection of the treaty with *Monsieur* Buonaparte, however moderately worded, has been reasonably supposed to have had a deep effect on his mind, and may have been one remote cause of a tragedy, for which it is impossible to find an adequate one—the

murder, namely, of the Duke d'Enghien. But, before we approach this melancholy part of Napoleon's history, it is proper to trace the events which succeeded the renewal of the war

CHAPTER IV.

Mutual Feelings of Napoleon and the British Nation, on the Renewal of the War.—First Hostile Measures on both sides.—England lays an Embargo on French Vessels in her Ports—Napoleon retaliates by detaining British Subjects in France—Effects of this unprecedented Measure.—Hanover and other Places occupied by the French.—Scheme of Invasion renewed.—Nature and extent of Napoleon's Preparations.—Defensive Measures of England.—Reflections.

THE bloody war which succeeded the short peace of Amiens originated, to use the words of the satirist, in high words, jealousies, and fears. There was no special or determinate cause of quarrel, which could be removed by explanation, apology, or concession.

The English nation were jealous, and from the strides which Buonaparte had made towards universal power, not jealous without reason, of the farther purposes of the French ruler, and demanded guarantees against the encroachments which they apprehended, and such guarantees he deemed it beneath his dignity to grant. The discussion of these ad-

verse claims had been unusually violent and intemperate; and as Buonaparte conceived the English nation to be his personal enemies, so they, on the other hand, began to regard his power as totally incompatible with the peace of Europe, and independence of Britain. To Napoleon, the English people, tradesmen and shopkeepers, as he chose to qualify them, seemed assuming a consequence in Europe, which was, he conceived, far beyond their due. He was affected by feelings similar to those with which Haman beheld Mordecai sitting at the king's gate;—all things availing him nothing, while Britain held such a high rank among the nations, without deigning to do him reverence or worship. The English people, on the other hand, regarded him as the haughty and proud oppressor, who had the will at least, if not the power, to root Britain out from among the nations, and reduce them to a state of ignominy and bondage.

When, therefore, the two nations again arose to the contest, it was like combatants whose anger against each other has been previously raised to the highest pitch by mutual invective. Each had recourse to the measures by which their enemy could be most prejudiced.

England had at her command the large means of annoyance arising out of her immense naval superiority, and took her measures with the decision which the emergency required.

Instant orders were dispatched to prevent the cession of such colonies as yet remained to be given up, according to the treaty of Amiens, and to seize by a *coup-de-main* such of the French settlements as had been ceded, or were yet occupied by her. France, on the other hand, in consequence of her equally great superiority by land, assembled upon her extensive line of sea-coast a very numerous army, with which she appeared disposed to make good her ruler's threats of invasion. At the same time, Buonaparte occupied without ceremony the territory of Naples, Holland, and such other states as Britain must have seen in his hands with feelings of keen apprehension, and thus made good the previous menaces of Talleyrand in his celebrated note

But besides carrying to the utmost extent all the means of annoyance which the ordinary rules of hostility afford, Napoleon, going beyond these, had recourse to strange and unaccustomed reprisals, unknown as yet to the code of civilized nature, and tending only to gratify his own resentment, and extend the evils of war, already sufficiently numerous.

The English had, as is the universal custom, laid an embargo on all French vessels in their ports, at the instant the war was proclaimed, and the loss to France was of course considerable Buonaparte took a singular mode of retaliating, by seizing on the persons of the

English of every description, who chanced to be at Paris, or travelling in the dominions of France, who, trusting to the laws of good faith hitherto observed by all civilized nations, expected nothing less than an attack upon their personal freedom. The absurd excuse at first set up for this extraordinary violation of humanity, at once, and of justice, was, that some of these individuals might be liable to serve in the English militia, and were therefore to be considered as prisoners of war. But this flimsy pretext could not have excused the seizing on the English of all ranks, conditions, and ages. The measure was adopted without the participation of the First Consul's ministers; at least we must presume so, since Talleyrand himself encouraged some individuals to remain after the British ambassador had left Paris, with an assurance of safety which he had it not in his power to make good. It was the vengeful start of a haughty temper, rendered irritable, as we have often stated, by uninterrupted prosperity, and resenting, of consequence, resistance and contradiction, with an acuteness of feeling approaching to frenzy.

The individuals who suffered under this capricious and tyrannical act of arbitrary power, were treated in all respects like prisoners of war, and confined to prison as such, unless they gave their parole to abide in certain towns

assigned them, and keep within particular limits.

The mass of individual evil occasioned by this cruel measure was incalculably great Twelve years, a large proportion of human life, were cut from that of each of these *détenus*, as they were called, so far as regarded settled plan, or active exertion. Upon many, the interruption fell with fatal influence, blighting all their hopes and prospects; others learned to live only for the passing day, and were thus deterred from habitual study or useful industry. The most tender bonds of affection were broken asunder by this despotic sentence of imprisonment, the most fatal inroads were made on family feelings by this long separation between children, and husbands, and wives—all the nearest and dearest domestic relations In short, if it was Buonaparte's desire to inflict the highest degree of pain on a certain number of persons, only because they were born in Britain, he certainly attained his end. If he hoped to gain any thing farther, he was completely baffled, and when he hypocritically imputes the sufferings of the *detenus* to the obstinacy of the English ministry, his reasoning is the same with that of a captain of Italian banditti, who murders his prisoner, and throws the blame of the crime on the friends of the deceased, who failed to send the

ransom at which he had rated his life. Neither is his vindication more reasonable, when he pretends to say that the measure was taken in order to prevent England, on future occasions, from seizing, according to ancient usage, on the shipping in her ports. This outrage must therefore be recorded as one of those acts of wanton wilfulness in which Buonaparte indulged his passion, at the expense of his honour, and, if rightly understood, of his real interest.

The detention of civilians, unoffending and defenceless, was a breach of those courtesies which ought to be sacred, as mitigating the horrors of war. The occupation of Hanover was made in violation of the Germanic Constitution. This patrimony of our kings had in former wars been admitted to the benefit of neutrality; a reasonable distinction being taken betwixt the Elector of Hanover, as one of the grand feudatories of the Empire, and the same person in his character of King of Great Britain; in which latter capacity only he was at war with France. But Buonaparte was not disposed to recognize these metaphysical distinctions; nor were any of the powers of Germany in a condition to incur his displeasure, by asserting the constitution and immunities of the empire. Austria had paid too deep a price for her former attempts to withstand the power of France, to permit her to extend her

opposition beyond a feeble remonstrance; and Prussia had too long pursued a temporizing and truckling line of politics, to allow her to break short with Napoleon, by endeavouring to merit the title her monarch once claimed,—of Protector of the North of Germany.

Every thing in Germany being thus favourable to the views of France, Mortier, who had already assembled an army in Holland, and on the frontiers of Germany, moved forward on Hanover. A considerable force was collected for resistance, under his Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge, and General Walmoden. It soon appeared, however, that, left to their own resources, and absolutely unsupported either by England or the forces of the Empire, the Electorate was incapable of resistance, and that any attempt at an ineffectual defence would only serve to aggravate the distresses of the country, by subjecting the inhabitants to the extremities of war. In compassion, therefore, to the Hanoverians, the Duke of Cambridge was induced to leave the hereditary dominions of his father's house, and General Walmoden had the mortification to find himself obliged to enter into a convention, by which the capital of the Electorate, and all its strong-holds, were to be delivered up to the French, and the Hanoverian army were to retire behind the Elbe, on condition not to serve

against France and her allies till previously exchanged.

The British government having refused to ratify this convention of Suhlingen, as it was termed, the Hanoverian army were summoned to surrender as prisoners of war;—hard terms, which, upon the determined resistance of Walmoden, were only thus far softened, that these tried and faithful troops were to be disbanded, and deliver up their arms, artillery, horses, and military stores. In a letter to the First Consul, Mortier declares that he granted these mitigated terms from respect to the misfortunes of a brave enemy, and mentions, in a tone of creditable feeling, the distress of General Walmoden, and the despair of the fine regiment of Hanoverian guards, when dismounting from their horses to surrender them up to the French.

At the same time that they occupied Hanover, the French failed not to make a further use of their invasion of Germany, by laying forced loans on the Hanseatic towns, and other encroachments.

The Prince Royal of Denmark was the only sovereign who showed an honourable sense of these outrages, by assembling in Holstein an army of thirty thousand men, but, being unsupported by any other power, he was soon glad to lay aside the attitude which he had as

sumed Austria accepted, as current payment, the declaration of France, that by her occupation of Hanover she did not intend any act of conquest, or annexation of territory, but merely proposed to retain the Electorate as a pledge for the isle of Malta, which the English, contrary, as was alleged, to the faith of treaties, refused to surrender. Prussia, naturally dissatisfied at seeing the aggressions of France extend to the neighbourhood of her own territories, was nevertheless obliged to rest contented with the same excuse.

The French ruler did not confine himself to the occupation of Hanover. Tarentum, and other seaports of the King of Naples's dominions, were seized upon, under the same pretext of their being a pledge for the restoration of Malta In fact, by thus quartering his troops upon neutral territories, by whom he took care that they should be paid and clothed, Napoleon made the war support itself, and spared France the burthen of maintaining a great proportion of his immense army, while large exactions, not only on the commercial towns, but on Spain, Portugal, and Naples, and other neutral countries, in the name of loans, filled his treasury, and enabled him to carry on the expensive plans which he meditated.

Any one of the separate manœuvres which we have mentioned would, before this eventful war, have been considered as a sufficient

object for a long campaign. But the whole united was regarded by Buonaparte only as side-blows, affecting Britain indirectly through the occupation of her monarch's family dominions, the embarrassment offered to her commerce, and the destruction of such independence as had been left to the continental powers. His great and decisive game remained to be played—that scheme of inv[illegible] which he had so strongly pledged himself in his angry dialogue with Lord Whitworth. Here, perhaps, if ever in his life, Buonaparte, from considerations of prudence, suffered the period to elapse which would have afforded the best chance for execution of his venturous project.

It must be in the memory of most who recollect the period, that the kingdom of Great Britain was seldom less provided against invasion than at the commencement of this second war, and that an embarkation from the ports of Holland, if undertaken instantly after the war had broken out, might have escaped our blockading squadrons, and have at least shown what a French army could have done on British ground, at a moment when the alarm was general, and the country in an unprepared state. But it is probable that Buonaparte himself was as much unprovided as England for the sudden breach of the treaty of Amiens—an event brought about more by the influence

of passion than of policy; so that its consequences were as unexpected in his calculations as in those of Great Britain. Besides, he had not diminished to himself the dangers of the undertaking, by which he must have staked his military renown, his power, which he held chiefly as the consequence of his reputation, perhaps his life, upon a desperate game, which, though he had already twice contemplated it, he had not yet found hardihood enough seriously to enter upon.

He now, however, at length bent himself, with the whole strength of his mind, and the whole force of his empire, to prepare for this final and decisive undertaking. The gun-boats in the Bay of Gibraltar, where calms are frequent, had sometimes in the course of the former war been able to do considerable damage to the English vessels of war, when they could not use their sails. Such small craft, therefore, were supposed the proper force for covering the intended descent. They were built in different harbours, and brought together by crawling along the French shore, and keeping under the protection of the batteries, which were now established on every cape, almost as if the sea-coast of the Channel on the French side had been the lines of a besieged city, no one point of which could with prudence be left undefended by cannon. Boulogne was pitched upon as the centre port,

from which the expedition was to sail. By incredible exertions, Buonaparte had rendered its harbour and roads capable of containing two thousand vessels of various descriptions. The smaller seaports of Vimereux, Ambleteuse, and Étaples, Dieppe, Havre, St-Valery, Caen, Gravelines, and Dunkirk, were likewise filled with shipping. Flushing and Ostend were occupied by a separate flotilla. Brest, Toulon, and Rochefort, were each the station of as strong a naval squadron as France had still the means to send to sea.

A land army was assembled of the most formidable description, whether we regard the high military character of the troops, the extent and perfection of their appointments, or their numerical strength. The coast, from the mouth of the Seine to the Texel, was covered with forces; and Soult, Ney, Davoust, and Victor, names that were then the pride and the dread of war, were appointed to command the Army of England (for that menacing title was once more assumed), and execute those manœuvres, planned and superintended by Buonaparte, the issue of which was to be the blotting out of Britain from the rank of independent nations.

Far from being alarmed at this formidable demonstration of force, England prepared for her resistance with an energy becoming her ancient rank in Europe, and far surpassing in

its efforts any extent of military preparation before heard of in her history. To nearly one hundred thousand troops of the line, were added eighty thousand and upwards of militia, which scarce yielded to the regulars in point of discipline. The volunteer force, by which every citizen was permitted and invited to add his efforts to the defence of the country, was far more numerous than during the last war, was better officered also, and rendered every way more effective. It was computed to amount to three hundred and fifty thousand men, who, if we regard the shortness of the time and the nature of the service, had attained considerable practice in the use and management of their arms. Other classes of men were embodied, and destined to act as pioneers, drivers of waggons, and in the like services. On a sudden, the land seemed converted to an immense camp, the whole nation into soldiers, and the good old King himself into a general-in-chief. All peaceful considerations appeared for a time to be thrown aside; and the voice, calling the nation to defend their dearest rights, sounded not only in Parliament, and in meetings convoked to second the measures of defence, but was heard in the places of public amusement, and mingled even with the voice of devotion—not unbecomingly surely, since to defend our country is to defend our religion.

Beacons were erected in conspicuous points, corresponding with each other, all around and all through the island; and morning and evening, one might have said, every eye was turned towards them to watch for the fatal and momentous signal. Partial alarms were given in different places, from the mistakes to which such arrangements must necessarily be liable; and the ready spirit which animated every species of troops where such signals called to arms, was of the most satisfactory description, and afforded the most perfect assurance, that the heart of every man was in the cause of his country.

Amidst her preparations by land, England did not neglect or relax her precautions on the element she calls her own. She covered the ocean with five hundred and seventy ships of war of various descriptions. Divisions of her fleet blocked up every French port in the Channel, and the army destined to invade our shores might see the British flag flying in every direction on the horizon, waiting for their issuing from the harbour, as birds of prey may be seen floating in the air above the animal which they design to pounce upon. Sometimes the British frigates and sloops of war stood in, and cannonaded or threw shells into Havre, Dieppe, Granville, and Boulogne itself. Sometimes the seamen and marines landed, cut out vessels, destroyed signal-posts, and dis-

mantled batteries. Such events were trifling, and it was to be regretted that they cost the lives of gallant men; but although they produced no direct results of consequence, yet they had their use in encouraging the spirits of our sailors, and damping the confidence of the enemy, who must at length have looked forward with more doubt than hope to the invasion of the English coast, when the utmost vigilance could not prevent their experiencing insults upon their own.

During this period of menaced attack and arranged defence, Buonaparte visited Boulogne, and seemed active in preparing his soldiers for the grand effort. He reviewed them in an unusual manner, teaching them to execute several manœuvres by night; and experiments were also made upon the best mode of arranging the soldiers in the flat-bottomed boats, and of embarking and disembarking them with celerity. Omens were resorted to for keeping up the enthusiasm which the presence of the First Consul naturally inspired. A Roman battle-axe was said to be found when they removed the earth to pitch Buonaparte's tent or barrack; and medals of William the Conqueror were produced, as having been dug up upon the same honoured spot. These were pleasant bodings, yet perhaps did not altogether, in the minds of the soldiers, counterbalance the sense of insecurity impressed on

them by the prospect of being packed together in these miserable chaloupes, and exposed to the fire of an enemy so superior at sea, that during the Chief Consul's review of the fortifications, their frigates stood in shore with composure, and fired at him and his suite as at a mark. The men who had braved the perils of the Alps and of the Egyptian deserts might yet be allowed to feel alarm at a species of danger which seemed so inevitable, and which they had no adequate means of repelling by force of arms.

A circumstance which seemed to render the expedition in a great measure hopeless, was the ease with which the English could maintain a constant watch upon their operations within the port of Boulogne. The least appearance of stir or preparation, to embark troops, or get ready for sea, was promptly sent by signal to the English coast, and the numerous British cruizers were instantly on the alert to attend their motions. Nelson had, in fact, during the last war, declared the sailing of a hostile armament from Boulogne to be a most forlorn undertaking, on account of cross tides and other disadvantages, together with the certainty of the flotilla being lost if there were the least wind west-north-west. « As for rowing, » he adds, « that is impossible.—It is perfectly right to be prepared for a mad government, » continued this incontestible judge of maritime possibili-

ties; «but with the active force which has been given me, I may pronounce it almost impracticable.»

Buonaparte himself continued to the last to affirm that he was serious in his attempts to invade Great Britain, and that the scheme was very practicable. He did not, however, latterly, talk of forcing his way by means of armed small craft and gun-boats, while the naval forces on each side were in their present degree of comparative strength, the allowed risk of miscarriage being as ten to one to that of success;—this bravade, which he had uttered to Lord Whitworth, involved too much uncertainty to be really acted upon. At times, long after, he talked slightingly to his attendants of the causes which prevented his accomplishing his project of invasion;[1] but when speaking seriously and in detail, he shows plainly that his sole hope of effecting the invasion was, by assembling such a fleet as should give him the temporary command of the Channel. This fleet was to consist of fifty vessels, which, dispatched from the various ports of France and Spain, were to rendezvous at Martinico, and, returning from thence to the British Channel, protect the flotilla, upon which were to embark one hundred and fifty

[1] Si de *légers dérangemens* n'avaient mis obstacle à mon entreprise de Boulogne, que pourrait être l'Angleterre aujourd'hui?—Las C[illegible] tome II. 3me partie, p. 335

thousand men.[1] Napoleon was disappointed in his combinations respecting the shipping; for, as it happened, Lord Cornwallis lay before Brest; Pellew observed the harbours of Spain; Nelson watched Toulon and Genoa; and it would have been necessary for the French and Spanish navy to fight their way through these impediments, in order to form a union at Martinico.

It is wonderful to observe how incapable the best understandings become of forming a rational judgment, where their vanity and self-interest are concerned, in slurring over the total failure of a favourite scheme. While talking of the miscarriage of this plan of invasion, Napoleon gravely exclaimed to Las Cases, « And yet the obstacles which made me fail were not of human origin—they were the work of the elements In the south, the sea undid my plans; in the north, it was the conflagration of Moscow, the snows and ice that destroyed me. Thus, water, air, fire, all nature in short, have been the enemies of a universal regeneration, commanded by Nature herself. The problems of Providence are inscrutable.»[2]

Independent of the presumptuousness of expressions, by which an individual being, of

[1] Mémoires écrits à Saint-Hélène sous la dictée de l'Empereur, tome II. p. 227.

[2] Las Cases, tome I. partie 2de, [illegible]8

the first-rate talents doubtless, but yet born of a woman, seems to raise himself above the rest of his species, and deem himself unconquerable save by elemental resistance, the inaccuracy of the reasoning is worth remarking. Was it the sea which prevented his crossing to England, or was it the English ships and sailors? He might as well have affirmed that the hill of Mount St John, and the wood of Soignies, and not the army of Wellington, were the obstacles which prevented him from marching to Brussels.

Before quitting the subject, we may notice, that Buonaparte seems not to have entertained the lest doubts of success, could he have succeeded in disembarking his army. A single general action was to decide the fate of England. Five days were to bring Napoleon to London, where he was to perform the part of William the Third; but with more generosity and disinterestedness. He was to call a meeting of the inhabitants, restore them what he calls their rights, and destroy the oligarchical faction. A few months would not, according to his account, have elapsed, ere the two nations, late such determined enemies, would have been identified by their principles, their maxims, their interests. The full explanation of this gibberish (for it can be termed no better, even proceeding from the lips of Napoleon) is to be found elsewhere, when he

spoke a language more genuine than that of the *Moniteur* and the bulletins. « England, » he said, « must have ended, by becoming an appendage to the France of *my* system. Nature has made it one of our islands, as well as Oleron and Corsica. »[1]

It is impossible not to pursue the train of reflexions which Buonaparte continued to pour forth to the companion of his exile, on the rock of Saint Helena. When England was conquered, and identified with France in maxims and principles, according to one form of expression, or rendered an appendage and dependency, according to another phrase, the reader may suppose that Buonaparte would have considered his mission as accomplished. Alas! it was not much more than commenced. « I would have departed from thence (from subjugated Britain) to carry the work of European regeneration (that is, the extension of his own arbitrary authority) from south to north, under the Republican colours, for I was then Chief Consul, in the same manner which I was more lately on the point of achieving it under the monarchical forms. »[2] When we find such ideas retaining hold of Napoleon's imagination, and arising to his tongue after his irretrievable fall, it is impossible to avoid ex-

[1] Las Cases, tome II partie 3me, p. 335

[2] Ibidem, tome II partie 2de, p 258

claiming, Did ambition ever conceive so wild a dream, and had so wild a vision ever a termination so disastrous and humiliating!

It may be expected that something should be here said, upon the chances which Britain would have had of defending herself successfully against the army of invaders. We are willing to acknowledge that the risk must have been dreadful; and that Buonaparte, with his genius and his army, must have inflicted severe calamities upon a country which had so long enjoyed the blessings of peace. But the people were unanimous in their purpose of defence, and their forces composed of materials to which Buonaparte did more justice when he came to be better acquainted with them. Of the three British nations, the English have since shown themselves possessed of the same steady valour which won the fields of Cressy and Azincourt, Blenheim and Minden—the Irish have not lost the fiery enthusiasm which has distinguished them in all the countries of Europe—nor have the Scots degenerated from the stubborn courage with which their ancestors for two thousand years maintained their independence against a superior enemy. Even if London had been lost, we would not, under so great a calamity, have despaired of the freedom of the country; for the war would in all probability have assumed that popular and national character which sooner or later wears

out an invading army. Neither does the confidence with which Buonaparte affirms the conviction of his winning the first battle, appear so certainly well-founded. This, at least, we know, that the resolution of the country was fully bent up to the hazard; and those who remember the period will bear us witness, that the desire that the French would make the attempt was a general feeling through all classes, because they had every reason to hope that the issue might be such as for ever to silence the threat of invasion.

CHAPTER V.

Disaffection begins to arise against Napoleon among the Soldiery.—Purpose of setting up Moreau against him.—Character of Moreau—Causes of his Estrangement from Buonaparte.—Pichegru.—The Duke d'Enghien.—George Cadoudal, Pichegru, and other Royalists, landed in France.—Desperate Enterprise of George—Defeated.—Arrest of Moreau—of Pichegru—and George.—Captain Wright.—Duke d'Enghien seized at Strasburg—hurried to Paris—transferred to Vincennes.—Tried by a Military Commission—Condemned—and Executed—Universal Horror of France and Europe.—Buonaparte's Vindication of his Conduct.—His Defence considered.—Pichegru found dead in his Prison—Attempt to explain his Death by charging him with Suicide.—Captain Wright found with his Throat cut.—A similar attempt made.—George and other Conspirators Tried—Condemned—and Executed.—Royalists silenced.—Moreau sent into Exile.

While Buonaparte was meditating the regeneration of Europe, by means of conquering first Britain, and then the Northern Powers, a course of opposition to his government, and disaffection to his person, was beginning to arise even among the soldiers themselves. The

acquisition of the Consulate for life was naturally considered as a death-blow to the Republic; and to that name many of the principal officers of the army, who had advanced themselves to promotion by means of the Revolution, still held a grateful attachment. The dissatisfaction of these military men was the more natural, as some of them might see in Buonaparte nothing more than a successful adventurer, who had raised himself high above the heads of his comrades, and now exacted their homage. As soldiers, they quickly passed from murmurs to threats; and at a festive meeting, which was prolonged beyond the limits of sobriety, a colonel of hussars proposed himself as the Brutus to remove this new Cæsar. Being expert at the use of the pistol, he undertook to hit his mark at fifty yards distance, during one of those reviews which were perpetually taking place in presence of the First Consul. The affair became known to the police, but was hushed up as much as possible by the address of Fouché, who saw that Buonaparte might be prejudiced by the bare act of making public that such a thing had been agitated, however unthinkingly.

The discontent spread wide, and was secretly augmented by the agents of the house of Bourbon; and, besides the constitutional opposition, whose voice was at times heard in the Legislative Body and the Tribunate, there

existed malcontents without doors, composed of two parties, one of whom considered Buonaparte as the enemy of public liberty, whilst the other regarded him as the sole obstacle to the restoration of the Bourbons; and the most eager partisans of both began to meditate on the practicability of removing him by any means, the most violent and the most secret not excepted. Those among the furious Republicans, or enthusiastic Royalists, who entertained such sentiments, excused them doubtless to their conscience, by Napoleon's having destroyed the liberties, and usurped the supreme authority, of the country; thus palliating the complexion of a crime which can never be vindicated.

These zealots, however, bore no proportion to the great body of Frenchmen, who, displeased with the usurpation of Buonaparte, and disposed to overthrow it, if possible, held themselves yet obliged to refrain from all crooked and indirect practices against his life. Proposing to destroy his power in the same way in which it had been built, the first and most necessary task of the discontented party was to find some military chief, whose reputation might bear to be balanced against that of Napoleon; and no one could claim such distinction excepting Moreau. If his campaigns were inferior to those of his great rival in the lightning-like brilliancy and celerity of their

operations, and in the boldness of combination on which they were founded, they were executed at smaller loss to his troops, and were less calculated to expose him to disastrous consequences if they chanced to miscarry. Moreau was no less celebrated for his retreat through the defiles of the Black Forest, in 1796, than for the splendid and decisive victory of Hohenlinden.

Moreau's natural temper was mild, gentle, and accessible to persuasion—a man of great abilities certainly, but scarcely displaying the bold and decisive character which he ought to possess, who, in such times as we write of, aspires to place himself at the head of a faction in the state. Indeed, it rather would seem that he was forced into that situation of eminence by the influence of general opinion, joined to concurring circumstances, than that he deliberately aspired to place himself there He was the son of a lawyer of Bretagne, and in every respect a man who had risen by the Revolution. He was not, therefore, naturally inclined towards the Bourbons; yet when Pichegru's communications with the exiled family, in 1795, became known to him by the correspondence which he intercepted, Moreau kept the secret until some months after, when Pichegru had, with the rest of his party, fallen under the Revolution of 18th Fructidor, which installed the Directory of Barras, Rewbel, and

La Réveillère. After this period, Moreau's marriage, with a lady who entertained sentiments favourable to the Bourbons, seems to have gone some length in deciding his own political opinions.

Moreau had lent Buonaparte his sword and countenance on 18th Brumaire; but he was soon dissatisfied with the engrossing ambition of the new ruler of France, and they became gradually estranged from each other. This was not the fault of Buonaparte, who, naturally desirous of attaching to himself so great a general, showed him considerable attention, and complained that it was received with coldness. On one occasion, a most splendid pair of pistols had been sent to the First Consul « They arrive in a happy time,» he said, and presented them to Moreau, who at that instant entered his presence-chamber. Moreau received the civility as one which he would willingly have dispensed with. He made no other acknowledgment than a cold bow, and instantly left the levee.

Upon the institution of the Legion of Honour, one of the Grand Crosses was offered to him. « The fool!» said Moreau, « does he not know that I have belonged to the ranks of honour for these twelve years?» Another pleasantry on this topic, upon which Buonaparte was very sensitive, was a company of officers, who dined together with Moreau,

voting a saucepan of honour to the general's cook, on account of his merits in dressing some particular dish. Thus, living estranged from Buonaparte, Moreau came to be gradually regarded as the head of the disaffected party in France, and the eyes of all those who disliked Napoleon or his government, were fixed upon him, as the only individual whose influence might be capable of balancing that of the Chief Consul.

Meantime the peace of Amiens being broken, the British government, with natural policy, resolved once more to avail themselves of the state of public feeling in France, and engage the partisans of royalty in a fresh attack upon the Consular government. They were probably in some degree deceived concerning the strength of that party, which had been much reduced under Buonaparte's management, and had listened too implicitly to the promises and projects of agents, who, themselves sanguine beyond what was warranted, exaggerated even their own hopes in communicating them to the British ministers. It seems to have been acknowledged, that little success was to be hoped for, unless Moreau could be brought to join the conspiracy. This, however, was esteemed possible, and notwithstanding the disagreement, personal as well as political, which had subsisted betwixt him and Pichegru, the latter seems to have undertaken to

become the medium of communication betwixt Moreau and the Royalists. Escaped from the deserts of Cayenne, to which he had been exiled, Pichegru had for some time found refuge and support in London, and there openly professed his principles as a Royalist, upon which he had for a long time acted in secret.

A scheme was in agitation for raising the Royalists in the west, where the Duke de Berri was to make a descent on the coast of Picardy, to favour the insurrection. The Duke d'Enghien, grandson of the Prince of Condé, fixed his residence under the protection of the Margrave of Baden, at the chateau of Ettenheim, with the purpose, doubtless, of being ready to put himself at the head of the Royalists in the east of France, or, if occasion should offer, in Paris itself. This prince of the house of Bourbon, the destined inheritor of the name of the great Condé, was in the flower of youth, handsome, brave, and high-minded. He had been distinguished for his courage in the emigrant army, which his grandfather commanded. He gained by his valour the battle of Bortsheim; and when his army, to whom the French Republicans showed no quarter, desired to execute reprisals on their prisoners, he threw himself among them to prevent their violence. «These men,» he said, «are Frenchmen—they are unfortunate—I place them under the guardianship of your honour and

your humanity.» Such was the princely youth, whose name must now be written in bloody characters in this part of Napoleon's history.

Whilst the French princes expected on the frontier the effect of commotions in the interior of France, Pichegru, Georgê Cadoudal, and about thirty other Royalists of the most determined character, were secretly landed in France, made their way to the metropolis, and contrived to find lurking-places invisible to the all-seeing police. There can be no reason to doubt that a part of those agents, and George in particular, saw the greatest obstacle of their enterprise in the existence of Buonaparte, and were resolved to commence by his assassination. Pichegru, who was constantly in company with George, cannot well be supposed ignorant of this purpose, although better befitting the fierce chief of a band of Chouans than the Conqueror of Holland.

In the mean time, Pichegru effected the desired communication with Moreau, then, as we have said, considered as the chief of the discontented military men, and the declared enemy of Buonaparte. They met at least twice; and it is certain that on one of these occasions Pichegru carried with him George Cadoudal, at whose person and plans Moreau expressed horror, and desired that Pichegru would not again bring that irrational savage into his company

The cause of his dislike we must naturally suppose to have been the nature of the measures George proposed, being the last to which a brave and loyal soldier like Moreau would willingly have resorted to, but Buonaparte, when pretending to give an exact account of what passed betwixt Moreau and Pichegru, represents the conduct of the former in a very different point of view Moreau, according to this account, informed Pichegru, that while the First Consul lived, he had not the slightest interest in the army, and that not even his own aides-de-camp would follow him against Napoleon, but, were Napoleon removed, Moreau assured them, all eyes would be fixed on himself alone—that he would then become First Consul—that Pichegru should be second, and was proceeding to make farther arrangements, when George broke in on their deliberations with fury, accused the generals of scheming their own grandeur, not the restoration of the King, and declared that, to chuse betwixt *blue* and *blue* (a phrase by which the Vendeans distinguished the Republicans), he would as soon have Buonaparte as Moreau at the head of affairs, and concluded by stating his own pretensions to be Third Consul at least According to this account, therefore, Moreau was not shocked at the atrocity of George's enterprise, of which he himself had been the first to admit the necessity, but only disgusted at the share which

the Chouan chief assorted to himself in the partition of the spoil. But we give no credit whatever to this story. Though nothing could have been so important to the First Consul at the time as to produce proof of Moreau's direct accession to the plot on his life, no such proof was ever brought forward; and therefore the statement, we have little doubt, was made up afterwards, and contains what Buonaparte might think probable, and desire that others should believe, not what he knew from certain information, or was able to prove by credible testimony.

The police was speedily alarmed, and in action. Notice had been received that a band of Royalists had introduced themselves into the capital, though it was for some time very difficult to apprehend them. George, meanwhile, prosecuted his attempt against the Chief Consul, and is believed at one time to have insinuated himself in the disguise of a menial into the Tuileries, and even into Buonaparte's apartment but without finding any opportunity to strike the blow, which his uncommon strength and desperate resolution might otherwise have rendered decisive. All the barriers were closed, and a division of Buonaparte's guards maintained the closest watch, to prevent any one escaping from the city. By degrees sufficient light was obtained to enable the government to make a communication to the public upon the existence and tendency of the con-

spiracy, which became more especially necessary, when it was resolved to arrest Moreau himself. This took place on the 15th February, 1804. He was seized without difficulty or resistance, while residing quietly at his country-house. On the day following, an order of the day, signed by Murat, then Governor of Paris, announced the fact to the citizens, with the additional information, that Moreau was engaged in a conspiracy with Pichegru, George, and others, who were closely pursued by the police.

The news of Moreau's imprisonment produced the deepest sensation in Paris; and the reports which were circulated on the subject were by no means favourable to Buonaparte. Some disbelieved the plot entirely, while others, less sceptical, considered the Chief Consul as making a pretext of the abortive attempt of Pichegru and George for the purpose of sacrificing Moreau, who was at once his rival in military fame, and the declared opponent of his government. It was even asserted that secret agents of Buonaparte in London had been active in encouraging the attempts of the original conspirators, for the sake of implicating a man whom the First Consul both hated and feared. Of this there was no proof; but these and other dark suspicions pervaded men's minds, and all eyes were turned with anxiety upon the issue of the legal

investigations which were about to take place.

Upon the 17th February, the Great Judge of Police, by a report which was communicated to the Senate, the Legislative Body, and the Tribunate, denounced Pichegru, George, and others, as having returned to France from their exile, with the purpose of overthrowing the government, and assassinating the Chief Consul, and implicated Moreau as having held communication with them. When the report was read in the Tribunate, the brother of Moreau arose, and, recalling the merits and services of his relative, complained of the cruelty of calumniating him without proof, and demanded for him the privilege of an open and public trial.

« This is a fine display of sensibility, » said Curée, one of the Tribunes, in ridicule of the sensation naturally produced by this affecting incident.

« It is a display of indignation,» replied the brother of Moreau, and left the assembly.

The public bodies, however, did what was doubtless expected of them, and carried to the foot of the Consular throne the most exaggerated expressions of their interest in the life and safety of him by whom it was occupied.

Meanwhile the vigilance of the police, and the extraordinary means employed by them, *accomplished the arrest of almost all the persons* concerned in the plot. A false friend

whom Pichegru had trusted to the highest degree, betrayed his confidence for a large bribe, and introduced the gendarmes into his apartment while he was asleep. They first secured the arms which lay beside him, and then his person, after a severe struggle. George Cadoudal, perhaps a yet more important capture, fell into the hands of the police soon after. He had been traced so closely, that at length he dared not enter a house, but spent many hours of the day and night in driving about Paris in a cabriolet. On being arrested, he shot one of the gendarmes dead, mortally wounded another, and had nearly escaped from them all. The other conspirators, and those accused of countenancing their enterprise, were arrested to the number of forty persons, who were of very different characters and condition; some followers or associates of George, and others belonging to the ancient nobility. Among the latter were Messrs Armand and Jules Polignac, Charles de la Rivière, and other Royalists of distinction. Chance had also thrown into Buonaparte's power a victim of another description. Captain Wright, the commander of a British brig of war, had been engaged in putting ashore on the coast of Morbihan, Pichegru and some of his companions. Shortly afterwards, his vessel was captured by a French vessel of superior force. Under pretence that his evidence

was necessary to the conviction of the French conspirators, he was brought up to Paris, committed to the Temple, and treated with a rigour which became a prelude to the subsequent tragedy.

It might have been supposed, that among so many prisoners, enough of victims might have been selected to atone with their lives for the insurrection which they were accused of meditating; nay, for the attempt which was alleged to be designed against the person of the First Consul. Most unhappily for his fame, Napoleon thought otherwise; and, from causes which we shall hereafter endeavour to appreciate, sought to give a fuller scope to the gratification of his revenge, than the list of his captives, though containing several men of high rank, enabled him to accomplish.

We have observed, that the residence of the Duke d'Enghien upon the French frontier was to a certain degree connected with the enterprise undertaken by Pichegru, so far as concerned the proposed insurrection of the Royalists in Paris. This we infer from the duke's admission, that he resided at Ettenheim in the expectation of having soon a part of importance to play in France.[1] This was perfectly

[1] The passage alluded to is in the Duke of Rovigo's (Savary's) Vindication of his own Conduct. At the same time, no traces of such an admission are to be found in the interrogations, as printed elsewhere. It is also said,

vindicated by his situation and connexions. But that the duke participated in, or countenanced in the slightest degree, the meditated attempt on Buonaparte's life, has never even been alleged, and is contrary to all the proof led in the case, and especially to the sentiments impressed upon him by his grandfather, the Prince of Condé.[1] He lived in great privacy,

that when the duke (then at Ettenheim) first heard of the conspiracy of Pichegru, he alleged that it must have been only a pretended discovery. « Had there been such an intrigue in reality, » he said, « my father and grandfather would have let me know something of the matter, that I might provide for my safety. » It may be added, that if he had been really engaged in that conspiracy, it is probable that he would have retired from the vicinity of the French territory on the scheme being discovered.

[1] A remarkable letter from the Prince of Condé to the Comte d'Artois, dated 24th January, 1802, contains the following passage, which we translate literally:—« The Chevalier de Roll will give you an account of what has passed here yesterday. A man of a very simple and gentle exterior arrived the night before, and having travelled, as he affirmed, on foot, from Paris to Calais, had an audience of me about eleven in the forenoon, and distinctly offered to rid us of the Usurper by the shortest method possible. I did not give him time to finish the details of his project, but rejected the proposal with horror, assuring him that you, if present, would do the same. I told him, we should always be the enemies of him who had arrogated to himself the power and the throne of our sovereign, until he should make restitution: that we had combated the Usurper by open force, and would do so again if opportunity offered; but that we would never employ that species of means which only became the Jacobin party; and if that

and amused himself principally with hunting. A pension allowed him by England was his only means of support.

On the evening of the 14th March, a body of French soldiers and gendarmes, commanded by Colonel Ordenner, acting under the direction of Caulaincourt, afterwards called Duke of Vicenza, suddenly entered the territory of Baden, a power with whom France was in profound peace, and surrounded the château in which the unfortunate prince resided. The descendant of Condé sprung to his arms, but was prevented from using them by one of his attendants, who represented the force of the assailants as too great to be resisted. The soldiers rushed into the apartment, and, presenting their pistols, demanded to know which was the Duke d'Enghien. « If you desire to arrest him, » said the duke, « you ought to have his description in your warrant. » — « Then we must seize on you all, » replied the officer in command;

faction should meditate such a crime, assuredly we would not be their accomplices. » This discourse the prince renewed to the secret agent in the presence of the Chevalier de Roll, as a confidential friend of the Comte d'Artois, and, finally, advised the man instantly to leave England, as, in case of his being arrested, the prince would afford him no countenance or protection. The person to whom the Prince of Condé addressed sentiments so worthy of himself and of his great ancestor, afterwards proved to be an agent of Buonaparte, dispatched to sound the opinions of the princes of the house of Bourbon, and if possible to implicate them in such a nefarious project as should justly excite public indignation against them.

and the prince, with his little household, was arrested and carried to a mill at some distance from the house, where he was permitted to receive some clothes and necessaries. Being now recognized, he was transferred, with his attendants, to the citadel of Strasburg, and presently afterwards separated from the gentlemen of his household, with the exception of his aide-de-camp, the Baron de St Jacques. He was allowed to communicate with no one. He remained a close prisoner for three days; but on the 18th, betwixt one and two in the morning, he was obliged to rise and dress himself hastily, being only informed that he was about to commence a journey. He requested the attendance of his valet-de-chambre; but was answered that it was unnecessary. The linen which he was permitted to take with him amounted to two shirts only, so nicely had his worldly wants been calculated and ascertained. He was transported with the utmost speed and secrecy towards Paris, where he arrived on the 20th, and, after having been committed for a few hours to the Temple, was transferred to the ancient Gothic castle of Vincennes, about four miles from the city, long used as a state prison, but whose walls never received a more illustrious or a more innocent victim. There he was permitted to take some repose; and, as if the favour had only been granted for the purpose of being withdrawn,

he was awaked at midnight, and called upon to sustain an interrogatory on which his life depended, and to which he replied with the utmost composure. On the ensuing night, at the same dead hour, he was brought before the pretended court. The law enjoined that he should have had a defender appointed to plead his cause. But none such was allotted him.[1]

The inquisitors before whom he was hurried formed a military commission of eight officers, having General Hullin as their president. They were, as the proceedings express it, named by Buonaparte's brother-in-law, Murat, then governor of Paris. Though necessarily exhausted with fatigue and want of rest, the Duke d'Enghien performed in this melancholy scene a part worthy of the last descendant of the great Condé. He avowed his name and rank, and the share which he had taken in the war against France, but denied all knowledge of Pichegru or of his conspiracy. The interrogations ended by his demanding an audience of the Chief Consul. «My name,» he said, «my rank, my sentiments, and the peculiar distress of my situation, lead me to hope that my request will not be refused.»

The military commissioners paused and hesitated—nay, though selected doubtless as fitted for the office, they were even affected by the whole behaviour, and especially by the in-

[1] See Appendix, p. 427.

trepidity, of the unhappy prince. But Savary, then chief of the police, stood behind the president's chair, and controlled their sentiments of compassion. When they proposed to further the prisoner's request of an audience of the First Consul, Savary cut the discussion short, by saying, that was inexpedient. At length they reported their opinion, that the Duke d'Enghien was guilty of having fought against the Republic, intrigued with England, and maintained intelligence in Strasburg, for the purpose of seizing the place;—great part of which allegations, and especially the last, was in express contradiction to the only proof adduced, theadmission, namely, of the prisoner himself. The report being sent to Buonaparte, to know his farther pleasure, the court received for answer their own letter, marked with the emphatic words, « Condemned to death. » Napoleon was obeyed by his satraps with Persian devotion. The sentence was pronounced, and the prisoner received it with the same intrepid gallantry which distinguished him through the whole of the bloody scene. He requested the aid of a confessor. « Would you die like a monk? » is said to have been the insulting reply. The duke, without noticing the insult, knelt down for a minute, and seemed absorbed in profound devotion.

« Let us go, » he said, when he arose from his knees. All was in readiness for the exe-

cution; and, as if to stamp the trial as a mere mockery, the grave had been prepared ere the judgment of the court was pronounced.[1] Upon quitting the apartment in which the pretended trial had taken place, the prince was conducted by torch-light down a winding stair, which seemed to descend to the dungeons of the ancient castle.

« Am I to be immured in an oubliette? » he said, naturally recollecting the use which had sometimes been made of those tombs for the living.—« No, Monseigneur, » answered the soldier he addressed, in a voice interrupted by sobs, « be tranquil on that subject. » The stair led to a postern, which opened into the castle ditch, where, as we have already said, a grave was dug, beside which were drawn up a party of the gendarmes d'élite. It was near six o'clock in the morning, and day had dawned. But as there was a heavy mist on the ground, several torches and lamps mixed their pale and ominous light with that afforded by the heavens,—a circumstance which seems to have given rise to the inaccurate report, that a lantern was tied to the button of the vic-

[1] Savary has denied this. It is not of much consequence. The illegal arrest—the precipitation of the mock trial—the disconformity of the sentence from the proof—the hurry of the execution—all prove that the unfortunate prince was doomed to die long before he was brought before the military commission.

tim, that his slayers might take the more certain aim. Savary was again in attendance, and had taken his place upon a parapet which commanded the place of execution. The victim was placed, the fatal word was given by the future Duke de Rovigo, the party fired, and the prisoner fell. The body, dressed as it was, and without the slightest attention to the usual decencies of sepulture, was huddled into the grave with as little ceremony as common robbers use towards the carcases of the murdered.

Paris learned with astonishment and fear the singular deed which had been perpetrated so near her walls. No act had ever excited more universal horror, both in France and in foreign countries, and none has left so deep a stain on the memory of Napoleon. If there were farther proof necessary of the general opinion of mankind on the subject, the anxiety displayed by Savary, Hullin, and the other subaltern agents in this shameful transaction, to diminish their own share in it, or transfer it to others, would be sufficient evidence of the deep responsibility to which they felt themselves subjected.

There is but justice, however, in listening to the defence which Buonaparte set up for himself when in Saint Helena, especially as it appeared perfectly convincing to Las Cases, his attendant, who, though reconciled to most

of his master's actions, had continued to regard the Duke d'Enghien's death as so great a blot upon his escutcheon, that he blushed even when Napoleon himself introduced the subject.[1]

His exculpation seems to have assumed a different and inconsistent character, according to the audience to whom it was stated. Among his intimate friends and followers, he appears to have represented the whole transaction as an affair not of his own device, but which was pressed upon him by surprise by his ministers. « I was seated, » he said, « alone, and engaged in finishing my coffee, when they came to announce to me the discovery of some new machination. They represented it was time to put an end to such horrible attempts, by washing myself in the blood of one amongst the Bourbons; and they suggested the Duke d'Enghien as the most proper victim. » Buonaparte proceeds to say, that he did not know exactly who the Duke d'Enghien was, far less that he resided so near France as to be only three leagues from the Rhine. This was explained. « In that case, » said Napoleon, « he ought to be arrested. » His prudent ministers had foreseen this conclusion. They had the whole scheme laid, and the orders ready

[1] The reasoning and sentiments of Buonaparte on this subject are taken from the work of Las Cases, tom. IV. partie 7me, p. 249, where they are given at great length.

drawn up for Buonaparte's signature; so that, according to this account, he was hurried into the enormity by the zeal of those about him, or perhaps in consequence of their private views and mysterious intrigues. He also charged Talleyrand with concealing from him a letter, written by the unfortunate prisoner, in which he offered his services to Buonaparte, but which was intercepted by the minister. If this had reached him in time, he intimates that he would have spared the prince's life. To render this statement probable, he denies generally that Joséphine had interested herself to the utmost to engage him to spare the duke; although this has been affirmed by the testimony of such as declared, that they received the fact from the Empress's own lips.

It is unfortunate for the truth of this statement, and the soundness of the defence which it contains, that neither Talleyrand, nor any human being save Buonaparte himself, could have the least interest in the death of the Duke d'Enghien. That Napoleon should be furious at the conspiracies of George and Pichegru, and should be willing to avenge the personal dangers he incurred; and that he should be desirous to intimidate the family of Bourbon, by « washing himself,» as he expresses it, « in the blood of one of their house,» was much in character. But that the sagacious Talley-

rand should have hurried on a cruel proceeding, in which he had no earthly interest, is as unlikely, as that, if he had desired to do so, he could have been able to elicit from Buonaparte the powers necessary for an act of so much consequence, without his master having given the affair, in all its bearings, the most full and ample consideration. It may also be noticed, that besides transferring a part at least of the guilt from himself, Buonaparte might be disposed to gratify his revenge against Talleyrand, by stigmatising him, from St Helena, with a crime the most odious to his new sovereigns of the house of Bourbon. Lastly, the existence of the letter above-mentioned has never been proved, and it is inconsistent with every thought and sentiment of the Duke d'Enghien. It is besides said to have been dated from Strasburg; and the duke's aide-de-camp, the Baron de St Jacques, has given his testimony that he was never an instant separated from his patron during his confinement in that citadel; and that the duke neither wrote a letter to Buonaparte nor to any one else. But, after all, if Buonaparte had actually proceeded in this bloody matter upon the instigation of Talleyrand, it cannot be denied, that, as a man knowing right from wrong, he could not hope to transfer to his counsellor the guilt of the measures which he executed at his recommendation. The murder, like

the rebellion of Absalom, was not less a crime, even supposing it recommended and facilitated by the unconscientious counsels of a modern Achitophel.

Accordingly, Napoleon has not chosen to trust to this defence; but, inconsistently with his pretence of being hurried into the measure by Talléyrand, he has, upon other occasions, broadly and boldly avowed that it was in itself just and necessary; that the Duke d'Enghien was condemned by the laws, and suffered execution accordingly under their sanction.

It is an easy task to show, that even according to the law of France, jealous and severe as it was in its application to such subjects, there existed no right to take the life of the duke. It is true he was an emigrant, and the law denounced the penalty of death against such of these as should return to France with arms in their hands. But the duke did not so return —nay, his returning at all was not an act of his own, but the consequence of violence exercised on his person. He was in a more favourable case than even those emigrants whom storms had cast on their native shore, and whom Buonaparte himself considered as objects of pity, not of punishment. He had indeed borne arms against France; but as a member of the house of Bourbon, he was not, and could not be accounted, a subject of Buonaparte, having left the country before his

name was heard of; nor could he be considered as in contumacy against the state of France, for he, like the rest of the royal family, was specially excluded from the benefits of the amnesty which invited the return of the less distinguished emigrants. The act by which he was trepanned, and brought within the compass of French power, not of French law, was as much a violation of the rights of nations, as the precipitation with which the pretended trial followed the arrest, and the execution the trial, was an outrage upon humanity. On the trial no witnesses were produced, nor did any investigation take place, saving by the interrogation of the prisoner. Whatever points of accusation, therefore, are not established by the admission of the duke himself, must be considered as totally unproved. Yet this unconscientious tribunal not only found their prisoner guilty of having borne arms against the Republic, which he readily admitted, but of having placed himself at the head of a party of French emigrants in the pay of England, and carried on machinations for surprising the city of Strasburg; charges which he himself positively denied, and which were supported by no proof whatsoever.

Buonaparte, well aware of the total irregularity of the proceedings in this extraordinary case, seems, on some occasions, to have wisely renounced any attempt to defend what

he must have been convinced was indefensible, and has vindicated his conduct upon general grounds, of a nature well worthy of notice. It seems that, when he spoke of the death of the Duke d'Enghien among his attendants, he always chose to represent it as a case falling under the ordinary forms of law, in which all regularity was observed, and where, though he might be accused of severity, he could not be charged with violation of justice. This was safe language to hearers from whom he was sure to receive neither objection nor contradiction, and is just an instance of an attempt, on the part of a consciously guilty party, to establish, by repeated asseverations, an innocence which was inconsistent with fact. But with strangers, from whom replies and argument might be expected, Napoleon took broader grounds. He alleged the death of the Duke d'Enghien to be an act of self-defence, a measure of state polity, arising out of the natural rights of humanity, by which a man, to save his own life, is entitled to take away that of another. « I was assailed, » he said, « on all hands by the enemies whom the Bourbons raised up against me; threatened with air-guns, infernal machines, and deadly stratagems of every kind. I had no tribunal on earth to which I could appeal for protection, therefore I had a right to protect myself; and by putting to death one of those whose followers threat-

ened my life, I was entitled to strike a salutary terror into the others.»

We have no doubt that, in this argument, which is in the original much extended, Buonaparte explained his real motives; at least we can only add to them the stimulus of obstinate resentment, and implacable revenge. But the whole resolves itself into an allegation of that state necessity, which has been justly called the Tyrant's plea, and which has always been at hand to defend, or rather to palliate, the worst crimes of sovereigns. The prince may be lamented, who is exposed, from civil disaffection, to the dagger of the assassin, but his danger gives him no right to turn such a weapon, even against the individual person by whom it is pointed at him. Far less could the attempt of any violent partisans of the house of Bourbon authorize the First Consul to take, by a suborned judgment, and the most precipitate procedure, the life of a young prince, against whom the accession to the conspiracies of which Napoleon complained had never been alleged, far less proved. In every point of view, the act was a murder; and the stain of the Duke d'Enghien's blood must remain indelibly upon Napoleon Buonaparte.

With similar sophistry, he attempted to daub over the violation of the neutral territory of Baden, which was committed for the purpose of enabling his emissaries to seize the person

of his unhappy victim. This, according to Buonaparte, was a wrong which was foreign to the case of the Duke d'Enghien, and concerned the sovereign of Baden alone. As that prince never complained of this violation, « the plea, » he contended, « could not be used by any other person. » This was merely speaking as one who has power to do wrong. To whom was the Duke of Baden to complain, or what reparation could he expect by doing so? He was in the condition of a poor man, who suffers injustice at the hands of a wealthy neighbour, because he has no means to go to law, but whose acquiescence under the injury cannot certainly change its character, or render that invasion just which is in its own character distinctly otherwise. The passage may be marked as showing Napoleon's unhappy predilection to consider public measures not according to the immutable rules of right and wrong, but according to the opportunities which the weakness of one kingdom may afford to the superior strength of another.

It may be truly added, that even the pliant argument of state necessity was far from justifying this fatal deed. To have retained the Duke d'Enghien a prisoner, as a hostage who might be made responsible for the Royalists' abstaining from their plots, might have had in it some touch of policy; but the murder of the young and gallant prince, in a way so secret

and so savage, had a deep moral effect upon the European world, and excited hatred against Buonaparte wherever the tale was told. In the well-known words of Fouché, the duke's execution was worse than a moral crime—it was a political blunder. It had this consequence most unfortunate for Buonaparte, that it seemed to stamp his character as bloody and unforgiving; and in so far prepared the public mind to receive the worst impressions, and authorized the worst suspicions, when other tragedies of a more mysterious character followed that of the last of the race of Condé.

The Duke d'Enghien's execution took place on the 21st March; on the 7th April following General Pichegru was found dead in his prison. A black handkerchief was wrapped round his neck, which had been tightened by twisting round a short stick inserted through one of the folds. It was asserted that he had turned this stick with his own hands, until he lost the power of respiring, and then, by laying his head on the pillow, had secured the stick in its position. It did not escape the public, that this was a mode of terminating life far more likely to be inflicted by the hands of others than those of the deceased himself. Surgeons were found, but men, it is said, of small reputation, to sign a report upon the state of the body, in which they affirm that Pichegru had died by suicide; yet as he must

have lost animation and sense so soon as he had twisted the stick to the point of strangulation, it seems strange he should not have then unclosed his grasp on the fatal tourniquet, which he used as the means of self-destruction. In that case the pressure must have relaxed, and the fatal purpose have remained unaccomplished. No human eye could see into the dark recesses of a state prison, but there were not wanting many who entertained a total disbelief of Pichegru's suicide. It was argued that the First Consul did not dare to bring before a public tribunal, and subject to a personal interrogatory, a man of Pichegru's boldness and presence of mind—it was said, also, that his evidence would have been decisively favourable to Moreau—that the citizens of Paris were many of them attached to Pichegru's person—that the soldiers had not forgotten his military fame—and, finally, it was reported, that in consideration of these circumstances, it was judged most expedient to take away his life in prison. Public rumour went so far as to name, as the agents in the crime, four of those Mamelukes, of whom Buonaparte had brought a small party from Egypt, and whom he used to have about his person as matter of parade. This last assertion had a strong impression on the multitude, who are accustomed to think, and love to talk, about the mutes and bowstrings of Eastern

despotism. But with well-informed persons, its improbability threw some discredit on the whole accusation. The state prisons of France must have furnished from their officials, enough of men as relentless and dexterous in such a commission as those Eastern strangers, whose unwonted appearance in these gloomy regions must have at once shown a fatal purpose, and enabled every one to trace it to Buonaparte.

A subsequent catastrophe, of nearly the same kind, increased by its coincidence the dark suspicions which arose out of the circumstances attending the death of Pichegru.

Captain Wright, from whose vessel Pichegru and his companions had disembarked on the French coast, had become, as we have said, a prisoner of war, his ship being captured by one of much superior force, and after a most desperate defence. Under pretext that his evidence was necessary to the conviction of Pichegru and George, he was brought to Paris, and lodged a close prisoner in the Temple. It must also be mentioned, that Captain Wright had been an officer under Sir Sydney Smith, and that the mind of Buonaparte was tenaciously retentive of animosity against those who had aided to withstand a darling purpose, or diminish and obscure the military renown, which was yet more dear to him. The treatment of Captain Wright was—must have been

severe, even if it extended no farther than solitary imprisonment; but reports went abroad, that torture was employed to bring the gallant seaman to such confessions as might suit the purposes of the French government. This belief became very general, when it was heard that Wright, like Pichegru, was found dead in his apartment, with his throat cut from ear to ear, the result, according to the account given by government, of his own impatience and despair. This official account of the second suicide committed by a state prisoner, augmented and confirmed the opinions entertained concerning the death of Pichegru, which it so closely resembled. The unfortunate Captain Wright was supposed to have been sacrificed, partly perhaps to Buonaparte's sentiments of petty vengeance, but chiefly to conceal, within the walls of the Temple, the evidence which his person would have exhibited in a public court of justice, of the dark and cruel practices by which confession was sometimes extorted.

Buonaparte always alleged his total ignorance concerning the fate of Pichegru and Wright, and affirmed upon all occasions, that they perished, so far as he knew, by their own hands, and not by those of assassins. No proof has ever been produced to contradict his assertion; and so far as he is inculpated upon these heads, his crime can be only matter of

strong suspicion. But it was singular that this rage for suicide should have thus infected the state prisons of Paris, and that both these men, determined enemies of the Emperor, should have adopted the resolution of putting themselves to death, just when that event was most convenient to their oppressor. Above all, it must be confessed, that, by his conduct towards the Duke d'Enghien, Buonaparte had lost that fairness of character to which he might otherwise have appealed, as in itself an answer to the presumptions formed against him. The man who, under pretext of state necessity, ventured on such an open violation of the laws of justice, ought not to complain if he is judged capable, in every case of suspicion, of sacrificing the rights of humanity to his passions or his interest. He himself has affirmed, that Wright died long before it was announced to the public, but has given no reason why silence was preserved with respect to the event. The Duke de Rovigo, also denying all knowledge of Wright's death, acknowledges that it was a dark and mysterious subject, and intimates his belief that Fouché was at the bottom of the tragedy. In Fouché's real or pretended Memoirs, the subject is not mentioned. We leave, in the obscurity in which we found it, a dreadful tale, of which the truth cannot, in all probability, be known, until the secrets of all hearts shall be laid open.

Rid of Pichegru, by his own hand or his jailer's, Buonaparte's government was now left to deal with George and his comrades, as well as with Moreau. With the first it was an easy task, for the Chouan chief retained, in the court of criminal justice before which he was conveyed, the same fearless tone of defiance which he had displayed from the beginning. He acknowledged that he came to Paris for the sake of making war personally on Napoleon, and seemed only to regret his captivity, as it had disconcerted his enterprise. He treated the judges with cool contempt, and amused himself by calling Thuriot, who conducted the process, and who had been an old Jacobin, by the name of Monsieur Tue-Roi. There was no difficulty in obtaining sentence of death against George and nineteen of his associates; amongst whom was Armand de Polignac, for whose life his brother affectionately tendered his own. Armand de Polignac, however, with seven others, were pardoned by Buonaparte; or rather banishment in some cases, and imprisonment in others, were substituted for a capital punishment. George and the rest were executed, and died with the most determined firmness.

The discovery and suppression of this conspiracy seems to have produced, in a great degree, the effects expected by Buonaparte. The Royal party became silent and submissive,

and, but that their aversion to the reign of Napoleon showed itself in lampoons, satires, and witticisms, which were circulated in their evening parties, it could hardly have been known to exist. Offers were made to Buonaparte to rid him of the remaining Bourbons, in consideration of a large sum of money; but with better judgment than had dictated his conduct of late, he rejected the proposal. His interest, he was now convinced, would be better consulted by a line of policy which should reduce the exiled family to a state of insignificance, than by any rash and violent proceedings which must necessarily draw men's attention, and, in doing so, were likely to interest them in behalf of the sufferers, and animate them against their powerful oppressor. With this purpose, the names of the exiled family were, shortly after this period, carefully suppressed in all periodical publications, and, with one or two exceptions, little allusion to their existence can be traced in the pages of the official journal of France; and unquestionably, the policy was wisely adopted towards a people so light, and animated so intensely with the interest of the moment, as the French, to whom the present is a great deal, the future much less, and the past nothing at all.

Though George's part of the conspiracy was disposed of thus easily, the trial of Moreau involved a much more dangerous task.

It was found impossible to procure evidence against him, beyond his own admission that he had seen Pichegru twice; and this admission was coupled with a positive denial that he had engaged to be participant in his schemes. A majority of the judges seemed disposed to acquit him entirely, but were cautioned by the president Hémart, that, by doing so, they would force the government upon violent measures. Adopting this hint, and willing to compromise matters, they declared Moreau guilty, but not to the extent of a capital crime. He was subjected to imprisonment for two years; but the soldiers continuing to interest themselves in his fate, Fouché, who about this time was restored to the administration of police, interceded warmly in his favour, and seconded the applications of Madame Moreau, for a commutation of her husband's sentence. His doom of imprisonment was therefore exchanged for that of exile; a mode of punishment safer for Moreau, considering the late incidents in the prisons of state; and more advantageous for Buonaparte, as removing entirely from the thoughts of the republican party, and of the soldiers, a leader, whose military talents brooked comparison with his own, and to whom the public eye would naturally be turned when any cause of discontent with their present government might incline them to look elsewhere. Buonaparte thus escaped from the

consequences of this alarming conspiracy; and, like a patient whose disease is brought to a favourable crisis by the breaking of an imposthume, he attained additional strength by the discomfiture of those secret enemies.

CHAPTER VI.

General indignation of Europe in consequence of the Murder of the Duke d'Enghien.—Russia complains to Talleyrand of the violation of Baden; and, along with Sweden, remonstrates in a Note laid before the German Diet—but without effect —Charges brought by Buonaparte against Mr Drake, and Mr Spencer Smith—who are accordingly dismissed from the Courts of Stutgard and Munich.—Seizure—imprisonment—and dismissal of Sir George Rumbold, the British Envoy at Lower Saxony.—Treachery attempted against Lord Elgin, by the Agents of Buonaparte—Details —Defeated by the exemplary Prudence of that Nobleman.—These Charges brought before the House of Commons, and peremptorily denied by the Chancellor of the Exchequer.

BUONAPARTE, as we have seen, gained a great accession of power by the event of Pichegru's conspiracy. But this was in some measure counterbalanced by the diminution of character which attached to the kidnapping and murdering the Duke d'Enghien, and by the foul suspicions arising from the mysterious fate of Pichegru and Wright. He possessed no longer the respect which might be claimed by a victor and legislator, but had distinctly shown that

either the sudden tempest of ungoverned passion, or the rankling feelings of personal hatred, could induce him to take the readiest means of wreaking the basest, as well as the bloodiest vengeance. Deep indignation was felt through every country on the Continent, though Russia and Sweden alone ventured to express their dissatisfaction with a proceeding so contrary to the law of nations. The court of St Petersburgh went into state mourning for the Duke d'Enghien, and while the Russian minister at Paris presented a note to M. Talleyrand, complaining of the violation of the Duke of Baden's territory, the Russian resident at Ratisbon was instructed to lay before the Diet of the Empire a remonstrance to the same effect. The Swedish minister did the same. The answer of the French minister was hostile and offensive. He treated with scorn the pretensions of Russia to interfere in the affairs of France and Germany, and accused that power of being desirous to rekindle the flames of war in Europe. This correspondence tended greatly to inflame the discontents already subsisting betwixt France and Russia, and was one main cause of again engaging France in war with that powerful enemy.

The Russian and Swedish remonstrance to the Diet produced no effect. Austria was too much depressed, Prussia was too closely leagued with France, to be influenced by it;

and there were none of the smaller powers who could be expected to provoke the displeasure of the First Consul, by seconding the complaint of the violation of the territory of Baden. The blood of the Duke d'Enghien was not, however, destined to sleep unavenged in his obscure dwelling. The Duke of Baden himself requested the matter might be left to silence and oblivion; but many of the German potentates felt as men, what they dared not, in their hour of weakness, resent as princes. It was a topic repeatedly and efficaciously resumed whenever an opportunity of resistance against the universal conqueror presented itself; and the perfidy and cruelty of the whole transaction continued to animate new enemies against him, until, in the issue, they became strong enough to work his overthrow. From the various and inconsistent pleas which Buonaparte set up in defence of his conduct, now attempting to justify, now to apologize for, now to throw on others, a crime which he alone had means and interest to commit, it is believed that he felt the death of the Duke d'Enghien to be the most reprehensible as well as the most impolitic act in his life.

Already aware of the unpopularity which attached to his late cruel proceedings, Buonaparte became desirous to counterbalance it by filling the public mind with a terrific idea of the schemes of England, which, in framing

and encouraging attempts upon his life, drove him to those unusual and extraordinary acts, which he desired to represent as measures of retaliation. Singular manœuvres were resorted to for the purpose of confirming the opinions which he was desirous to impress upon the world. The imprudence—so at least it seems—of Mr Drake, British resident at Munich enabled Buonaparte to make his charges against England with some speciousness. This agent of the British government had maintained a secret correspondence with a person of infamous character, called Méhée de la Touche, who, affecting the sentiments of a Royalist and enemy of Buonaparte, was in fact employed by the First Consul to trepan Mr Drake into expressions which might implicate the English ministers, his constituents, and furnish grounds for the accusations which Buonaparte made against them. It certainly appears that Mr Drake endeavoured, by the medium of De la Touche, to contrive the means of effecting an insurrection of the Royalists, or other enemies of Buonaparte, with whom his country was then at war; and in doing so, he acted according to the practice of all belligerent powers, who, on all occasions, are desirous to maintain a communication with such malcontents as may exist in the hostile nation. But, unless by the greatest distortion of phrase and expression, there arises out of the letters not the

slightest room to believe that Mr Drake encouraged the party with whom he supposed himself to be in correspondence, to proceed by the mode of assassination, or any others than are compatible with the law of nations, and acknowledged by civilized governments. The error of Mr Drake seems to have been, that he was not sufficiently cautious respecting the sincerity of the person with whom he maintained his intercourse. Mr Spencer Smith, the British envoy at Munich, was engaged in a similar intrigue, which appears also to have been a snare spread for him by the French government.

Buonaparte failed not to make the utmost use of these pretended discoveries, which were promulgated with great form by Régnier, who held the office of Grand Judge. He invoked the faith of nations, as if the Duke d'Enghien had been still residing in peaceable neutrality at Ettenheim, and exclaimed against assassination, as if his state dungeons could not have whispered of the death of Pichegru. The complaisant sovereigns of Munich and Stutgard readily ordered Smith and Drake to leave their courts; and the latter was forced to depart on foot, and by cross-roads, to avoid being kidnapped by the French gendarmes.

The fate which Mr Drake dreaded, and perhaps narrowly escaped, actually befel Sir George Rumbold, resident at the free German

city of Hamburgh, in the capacity of his British Majesty's envoy to the Circle of Lower Saxony. On the night of the 25th October, he was seized, in violation of the rights attached by the law of nations to the persons of ambassadors, as well as to the territories of neutral countries, by a party of the French troops, who crossed the Elbe for that purpose. The envoy, with his papers, was then transferred to Paris in the capacity of a close prisoner, and thrown into the fatal Temple. The utmost anxiety was excited even amongst Buonaparte's ministers, lest this imprisonment should be intended as a prelude to farther violence; and both Fouché and Talleyrand exerted what influence they possessed over the mind of Napoleon, to prevent the proceedings which were to be apprehended. The King of Prussia also extended his powerful interposition; and the result was, that Sir George Rumbold, after two days' imprisonment, was dismissed to England, on giving his parole not to return to Hamburgh. It seems probable, although the *Moniteur* calls this gentleman the worthy associate of Drake and Spencer Smith, and speaks of discoveries amongst his papers which were to enlighten the public on the policy of England, that nothing precise was alleged against him, even to palliate the outrage which the French ruler had committed.

The tenor of Buonaparte's conduct in an-

other instance, towards a British nobleman of distinction, though his scheme was rendered abortive by the sagacity of the noble individual against whom it was directed, is a striking illustration of the species of intrigue practised by the French police, and enables us to form a correct judgment of the kind of evidence upon which Buonaparte brought forward his calumnious accusation against Britain and her subjects.

The Earl of Elgin, lately ambassador of Great Britain at the Porte, had, contrary to the usage among civilized nations, been seized upon with his family as he passed through the French territory; and, during the period of which we are treating, he was residing upon his parole near Pau in the south of France, as one of the *détenus*. Shortly after the arrest of Moreau, George, etc., an order arrived for committing his lordship to close custody, in reprisal, it was said, of severities exercised in England on the French General Boyer. The truth was, that the affair of General Boyer had been satisfactorily explained to the French government. In the Parisian papers, on the contrary, his lordship's imprisonment was ascribed to barbarities which he was said to have instigated against the French prisoners of war in Turkey—a charge totally without foundation. Lord Elgin was, however, transferred to the strong castle of Lourde, situated on the

descent of the Pyrenees, where the commandant received him, though a familiar acquaintance, with the reserve and coldness of an entire stranger. Attempts were made by this gentleman and his lieutenant to exasperate the feelings which must naturally agitate the mind of a man torn from the bosom of his family, and committed to close custody in a remote fortress, where the accommodation was as miserable as the castle itself was gloomy, strong, and ominously secluded from the world. They failed, however, in extracting from their prisoner any expressions of violence or impatience, however warranted by the usage to which he was subjected.

After a few days' confinement, a sergeant of the guard delivered to Lord Elgin a letter, the writer of which informed him, that, being his fellow-prisoner, and confined in a secluded dungeon, he regretted he could not wait on his lordship, but that when he walked in the court-yard, he could have conversation with him at the window of his room. Justly suspecting this communication, Lord Elgin destroyed the letter; and while he gave the sergeant a louis-d'or, told him, that if he or any of his comrades should again bring him any secret letter or message, he would inform the commandant of the circumstance. Shortly afterwards, the commandant of the fortress,

in conversation with Lord Elgin, spoke of the prisoner in question as a person whose health was suffering for want of exercise; and next day his lordship saw the individual walking in the court-yard before his window. He manifested every disposition to engage his lordship in conversation, which Lord Elgin successfully avoided.

A few weeks afterwards, and not till he had been subjected to several acts of severity and vexation, Lord Elgin was permitted to return to Pau. But he was not yet extricated from the nets in which it was the fraudulent policy of the French government to involve him. The female, who acted as portress to his lordship's lodgings, one morning presented him with a packet, which she said had been left by a woman from the country, who was to call for an answer. With the same prudence which distinguished his conduct at Lourde, Lord Elgin detained the portress in the apartment, and found that the letter was from the state prisoner already mentioned; that it contained an account of his being imprisoned for an attempt to burn the French fleet; and detailed his plan as one which he had still in view, and which he held out in the colours most likely, as he judged, to interest an Englishman. The packet also covered letters to the Comte d'Artois, and other foreigners of distinction, which

Lord Elgin was requested to forward with his best convenience. Lord Elgin thrust the letters into the fire in presence of the portress, and kept her in the room till they were entirely consumed; explaining to her, at the same time, that such letters to him as might be delivered by any other channel than the ordinary post, should be at once sent to the governor of the town. His lordship judged it his farther duty to mention to the prefect the conspiracy detailed in the letter, under the condition, however, that no steps should be taken in consequence, unless the affair became known from some other quarter.

Some short time after these transactions, and when Buonaparte was appointed to assume the imperial crown (at which period there was hope of a general act of grace, which should empty the prisons), Lord Elgin's fellow-captive at Lourde, being, it seems, a real prisoner, as well as a spy, in hopes of meriting a share in this measure of clemency, made a full confession of all which he had done or designed to do against Napoleon's interest. Lord Elgin was naturally interested in this confession, which appeared in the *Moniteur*, and was a good deal surprised to see that a detail, otherwise minute, bore no reference to, or correspondence regarding, the plan of burning the Brest fleet. He lost no time in

writing an account of the particulars we have mentioned to a friend at Paris, by whom they were communicated to Monsieur Fargues, senator of the district of Bearn, whom these plots particularly interested as having his sénatorie for their scene. When Lord Elgin's letter was put into his hand, the senator changed countenance, and presently after expressed his high congratulation at what he called Lord Elgin's providential escape. He then intimated, with anxious hesitation, that the whole was a plot to entrap Lord Elgin; that the letters were written at Paris, and sent down to Bearn by a confidential agent, with the full expectation that they would be found in his lordship's possession. This was confirmed by the commandant of Lourde, with whom Lord Elgin had afterwards an unreserved communication, in which he laid aside the jailer, and resumed the behaviour of a gentleman. He imputed Lord Elgin's liberation to the favourable report which he himself and his lieutenant had made of the calm and dignified manner in which his lordship had withstood the artifices which they had been directed to use, with a view of working on his feelings, and leading him into some intemperance of expression against France or her ruler; which might have furnished a pretext for treating him with severity, and for implicating the

British government, in the imprudence of one of her nobles, invested with a diplomatic character.[1]

The above narrative forms a singularly luminous commentary on the practices imputed to Messrs Drake and Spencer, and subsequently to Sir George Rumbold; nor is it a less striking illustration of the detention of the unfortunate Captain Wright. With one iota less of prudence and presence of mind, Lord Elgin must have been entangled in the snare which was so treacherously spread for him. Had he even engaged in ten minutes, conversation with the villanous spy and incendiary, it would have been in the power of such a wretch to represent the import after his own pleasure. Or had his lordship retained the packet of letters even for half an hour in his possession, which he might have most innocently done, he would probably have been seized with them upon his person; and it must in that case have been impossible for him to repel such accusations, as Buonaparte would have no doubt founded on a circumstance so suspicious.

While Napoleon used such perfidious means, in order to attach, if possible, to a British am-

[1] This account is abstracted from the full details which Lord Elgin did us the honour to communicate in an authenticated manuscript.

bassador of such distinguished rank, the charge of carrying on intrigues against his person, the British ministers, in a tone the most manly and dignified, disclaimed the degrading charges which had been circulated against them through Europe. When the topic was introduced by Lord Morpeth into the British House of Commons, by a motion respecting the correspondence of Drake, the Chancellor of the Exchequer replied, « I thank the noble lord for giving me an opportunity to repel, openly and courageously, one of the most gross and most atrocious calumnies ever fabricated in one civilized nation to the prejudice of another. I affirm, that no power has been given, no instruction has been sent, by this government to any individual, to act in a manner contrary to the law of nations I again affirm, as well in my own name as in that of my colleagues, that we have not authorized any human being to conduct himself in a manner contrary to the honour of this country, or the dictates of humanity.»

This explicit declaration, made by British ministers in a situation where detected falsehood would have proved dangerous to those by whom it was practised, is to be placed against the garbled correspondence of which the French possessed themselves by means violently subversive of the law of nations;

and which correspondence was the result of intrigues that would never have existed but for the treacherous suggestions of their own agents.

CHAPTER VII.

Napoleon meditates a change of title from Chief Consul to Emperor.—A Motion to this purpose brought forward in the Tribunate—Opposed by Carnot—Adopted by the Tribunate and Senate.—Outline of the New System—Coldly received by the People.—Napoleon visits Boulogne, Aix-la-Chapelle, and the Frontiers of Germany, where he is received with respect.—The Coronation.—Pius VII. is summoned from Rome to the Ceremony at Paris.—Details—Reflections.—Changes that took place in Italy.—Napoleon appointed Sovereign of Italy, and Crowned at Milan.—Genoa annexed to France.

THE time seemed now propitious for Buonaparte to make the last remaining movement in the great game, which he had hitherto played with equal skill, boldness, and success. The opposing factions of the state lay in a great measure prostrate before him. The death of the Duke d'Enghien and of Pichegru had intimidated the Royalists, while the exile of Moreau had left the Republicans without a leader.

These events, while they greatly injured

Buonaparte's character as a man, extended, in a like proportion, the idea of his power, and of his determination to employ it to the utmost extremity against whosoever might oppose him. This moment, therefore, of general subinission and intimidation, was the fittest to be used for transmuting the military baton of the First Consul into a sceptre, resembling those of the ancient and established sovereignties of Europe; and it only remained, for one who could now dispose of France as he listed, to dictate the form and fashion of the new emblem of his sway.

The title of King most obviously presented itself, but it was connected with the claims of the Bourbons, which it was not Buonaparte's policy to recal to remembrance. That of Emperor implied a yet higher power of sovereignty, and there existed no competitor who could challenge a claim to it. It was a novelty also, and flattered the French love of change; and though, in fact, the establishment of an empire was inconsistent with the various oaths taken against royalty, it was not, in terms, so directly contradictory to them. As the re-establishment of a kingdom, so far it was agreeable to those who might seek, not indeed how to keep their vows, but how to elude, in words at least, the charge of having broken them. To Napoleon's own ear, the word King might sound as if it restricted his power within the

limits of the ancient kingdom; while that of Emperor might comprise dominions equal to the wide sweep of ancient Rome herself, and the bounds of the habitable earth alone could be considered as circumscribing their extent.

The main body of the nation being passive or intimidated, there was no occasion to stand upon much ceremony with the constitutional bodies, the members of which were selected and paid by Buonaparte himself, held their posts at his pleasure, had every species of advancement to hope if they promoted his schemes, and every evil, of which the least would be deprivation of office, to expect, should they thwart him.

On the 30th of April, 1804, Curée, an orator of no great note (and who was perhaps selected on that very account, that his proposal might be disavowed should it meet with unexpected opposition), took the lead in this measure, which was to destroy the slight and nominal remains of a free constitution which France retained under her present form of government. « It was time to bid adieu, » he said, « to political illusions. The internal tranquillity of France had been regained, peace with foreign states had been secured by victory. The finances of the country had been restored, its code of laws renovated and re-established. It was time to ascertain the possession of these blessings to the nation in

future, and the orator saw no mode of doing this, save rendering the supreme power hereditary in the person and family of Napoleon, to whom France owed such a debt of gratitude. This, he stated, was the universal desire of the army and of the people. He invited the Tribunate, therefore, to give effect to the general wish, and hail Napoleon Buonaparte by the title of Emperor, as that which best corresponded with the dignity of the nation.»

The members of the Tribunate contended with each other who should most enhance the merits of Napoleon, and prove, in the most logical and rhetorical terms, the advantages of arbitrary power over the various modifications of popular or limited governments. But one man, Carnot, was bold enough to oppose the full tide of sophistry and adulation. This name is unhappily to be read among the colleagues of Robespierre in the Revolutionary Committee, as well as amongst those who voted for the death of the misused and unoffending Louis XVI.; yet his highly honourable conduct in the urgent crisis now under discussion, shows that the zeal for liberty which led him into such excesses, was genuine and sincere; and that, in point of firmness and public spirit, Carnot equalled the ancient patriots whom he aspired to imitate. His speech was as temperate and expressive as it was eloquent. Buonaparte, he admitted, had saved France, and

saved it by the assumption of absolute power; but this he contended was only the temporary consequence of a violent crisis of the kind to which republics were subject, and the evils of which could only be stemmed by a remedy equally violent. The present head of the government was, he allowed, a dictator; but in the same sense in which Fabius, Camillus, and Cincinnatus, were so of yore, who retired to the condition of private citizens when they had accomplished the purpose for which temporary supremacy had been intrusted to them. The like was to be expected from Buonaparte, who, on entering on the government of the state, had invested it with republican forms, which he had taken a solemn oath to maintain, and which it was the object of Curée's motion to invite him to violate. He allowed that the various republican forms of France had been found deficient in stability, which he contended was owing to the tempestuous period in which they had been adopted, and the excited and irritable temper of men fired with political animosity, and incapable at the moment of steady or philosophical reflection; but he appealed to the United States of America, as an example of a democratical government, equally wise, vigorous, and permanent. He admitted the virtues and talents of the present governor of France, but contended that these attributes could not be rendered hereditary along with

the throne. He reminded the Tribunate that Domitian had been the son of the wise Vespasian, Caligula of Germanicus, and Commodus of Marcus Aurelius. Again he asked, whether it was not wronging Buonaparte's glory to substitute a new title to that which he had rendered so illustrious, and to invite and tempt him to become the instrument of destroying the liberties of the very country to which he had rendered such inestimable services? He then announced the undeniable proposition, that what services soever an individual might render to the state of which he was a member, there were bounds to public gratitude prescribed by honour as well as reason. If a citizen had the means of operating the safety, or restoring the liberty of his country, it could not be termed a becoming recompense to surrender to him that very liberty, the re-establishment of which had been his own work. Or what glory, he asked, could accrue to the selfish individual, who should claim the surrender of his country's independence in requital of his services, and desire to convert the state which his talents had preserved into his own private patrimony?

Carnot concluded his manly and patriotic speech by declaring, that though he opposed on grounds of conscience the alteration of government which had been proposed, he would, nevertheless, should it be adopted by the na-

tion, give it his unlimited obedience. He kept his word accordingly, and retired to a private station, in poverty most honourable to a statesman who had filled the highest offices of the state, and enjoyed the most unlimited power of amassing wealth.

When his oration was concluded, there was a contention for precedence among the time-serving speakers, who were each desirous to take the lead in refuting the reasoning of Carnot. It would be tedious to trace them through their sophistry. The leading argument turned upon the talents of Buonaparte, his services rendered to France, and the necessity there was for acknowledging them by something like a proportionate act of national gratitude. Their eloquence resembled nothing so nearly as the pleading of a wily procuress, who endeavours to persuade some simple maiden, that the services rendered to her by a liberal and gallant admirer can only be rewarded by the sacrifice of her honour. The speaking (for it could neither be termed debate nor deliberation) was prolonged for three days, after which the motion of Curée was adopted by the Tribunate, without one negative voice excepting that of the inflexible Carnot.

The Senate, to whom the Tribunate hastened to present their project of establishing despotism under its own undisguised title, hastened to form a senatus-consultum, which esta-

blished the new constitution of France. The outline,—for what would it serve to trace the minute details of a design sketched in the sand, and obliterated by the tide of subsequent events,—was as follows:—

1st, Napoleon Buonaparte was declared hereditary Emperor of the French nation. The empire was made hereditary, first in the male line of the Emperor's direct descendants. Failing these, Napoleon might adopt the sons or grandsons of his brothers, to succeed him in such order as he might point out. In default of such adoptive heirs, Joseph and Louis Buonaparte were, in succession, declared the lawful heirs of the empire. Lucien and Jérôme Buonaparte were excluded from this rich inheritance, as they had both disobliged Napoleon by marrying without his consent.

2d, The members of the Imperial family were declared Princes of the Blood, and by the decree of the Senate, the offices of Grand Elector, Archchancellor of the Empire, Archchancellor of State, High Constable, and grand Admiral of the Empire, were established as necessary appendages of the empire. These dignitaries, named of course by the Emperor himself, consisting of his relatives, connexions, and most faithful adherents, formed his Grand Council. The rank of Maréchal of the Empire was conferred upon seventeen of the most distinguished generals, comprehending Jourdan,

Augereau, and others, formerly zealous Republicans. Duroc was named Grand Maréchal of the Palace; Caulaincourt, Master of the Horse; Berthier, Grand Huntsman, and the Comte de Ségur, a nobleman of the old court, Master of Ceremonies.

Thus did republican forms, at length and finally, give way to those of a court; and that nation, which no moderate or rational degree of freedom would satisfy, now contentedly, or at least passively, assumed the yoke of a military despot. France, in 1792, had been like the wild elephant in his fits of fury, when to oppose his course is death; in 1804, she was like the same animal tamed and trained, who kneels down and suffers himself to be mounted by the soldier, whose business is to drive him into the throng of the battle.

Measures were taken, as on former occasions, to preserve appearances, by obtaining, in show at least, the opinion of the people, on this radical change of their system. Government, however, were already confident of their approbation, which, indeed, had never been refused to any of the various constitutions, however inconsistent, that had succeeded each other with such rapidity. Secure on this point, Buonaparte's accession to the Empire was proclaimed with the greatest pomp, without waiting to inquire whether the people approved of his promotion or otherwise. The proclama-

tion was coldly received, even by the populace, and excited little enthusiasm. It seemed, according to some writers, as if the shades of d'Enghien and Pichegru had been present invisibly, and spread a damp over the ceremony. The Emperor was recognized by the soldiery with more warmth. He visited the encampments at Boulogne, with the intention, apparently, of receiving such an acknowledgment from the troops as was paid by the ancient Franks to their monarchs, when they elevated them on their bucklers. Seated on an iron chair, said to have belonged to King Dagobert, he took his place between two immense camps, having before him the Channel and the hostile coasts of England. The weather, we have been assured, had been tempestuous, but no sooner had the Emperor assumed his seat, to receive the homage of his shouting host, than the sky cleared, and the wind dropt, retaining just breath sufficient gently to wave the banners. Even the elements seemed to acknowledge the Imperial dignity, all save the sea, which rolled as carelessly to the feet of Napoleon as it had formerly done towards those of Canute the Dane.

The Emperor, accompanied with his Empress, who bore her honours both gracefully and meekly, visited Aix-la-Chapelle, and the frontiers of Germany. They received the congratulations of all the powers of Europe, ex-

cepting England, Russia, and Sweden, upon their new exaltation; and the German princes, who had every thing to hope and fear from so powerful a neighbour, hastened to pay their compliments to Napoleon in person, which more distant sovereigns offered by their ambassadors.

But the most splendid and public recognition of his new rank was yet to be made, by the formal act of coronation, which, therefore, Napoleon determined should take place with circumstances of solemnity, which had been beyond the reach of any temporal prince, however powerful, for many ages. His policy was often marked by a wish to revive, imitate, and connect his own titles and interest with, some ancient observance of former days, as if the novelty of his claims could have been rendered more venerable by investing them with antiquated forms, or as men of low birth, when raised to wealth and rank, are sometimes desirous to conceal the obscurity of their origin under the blaze of heraldic honours. Pope Leo, he remembered, had placed a golden crown on the head of Charlemagne, and proclaimed him Emperor of the Romans. Pius VII., he determined, should do the same for a successor to much more than the actual power of Charlemagne. But though Charlemagne had repaired to Rome to receive inauguration from the hands of the Pontiff of that day, Napoleon

resolved that he who now owned the proud, and in protestant eyes profane, title of Vicar of Christ, should travel to France to perform the coronation of the successful chief, by whom the See of Rome had been more than once humbled, pillaged, and impoverished, but by whom also her power had been re-erected and restored, not only in Italy, but in France itself.

Humiliating as the compliance with Buonaparte's request must have seemed to the more devoted catholics, Pius VII. had already sacrificed, to obtain the Concordat, so much of the power and privileges of the Roman See, that he could hardly have been justified if he had run the risk of losing the advantages of a treaty so dearly purchased, by declining to incur some personal trouble, or, it might be termed, some direct self-abasement. The Pope, and the cardinals whom he consulted, implored the illumination of Heaven upon their councils; but it was the stern voice of necessity which assured them, that, except at the risk of dividing the church by a schism, they could not refuse to comply with Buonaparte's requisition. The Pope left Rome on the 5th November. He was everywhere received on the road with the highest respect, and most profound veneration; the Alpine precipices themselves had been secured by parapets wherever they could expose the holy

Father of the Catholic Church to danger, or even apprehension. Upon the 25th November, he met Buonaparte at Fontainebleau; and the conduct of the Emperor Napoleon was as studiously respectful towards him, as that of Charlemagne, whom he was pleased to call his predecessor, could have been towards Leo.

On the 2d December, the coronation took place in the ancient cathedral of Notre Dame, with the addition of every ceremony which could be devised to add to its solemnity. Yet we have been told that the multitude did not participate in the ceremonial with that eagerness which characterises the inhabitants of all capitals, but especially those of Paris, upon similar occasions. They had, within a very few years, seen so many exhibitions, processions, and festivals, established on the most discordant principles, which, though announced as permanent and unchangeable, had successively given way to newer doctrines, that they considered the splendid representation before them as an unsubstantial pageant, which would fade away in its turn. Buonaparte himself seemed absent and gloomy, till recalled to a sense of his grandeur by the voice of the numerous deputies and functionaries sent up from all the several departments of France, to witness the coronation. These functionaries had been selected with due attention to their political opinions; and many of them holding

offices under the government, or expecting benefits from the Emperor, made up, by the zealous vivacity of their acclamations, for the coldness of the good citizens of Paris.

The Emperor took his coronation oath, as usual on such occasions, with his hands upon the Scripture, and in the form in which it was repeated to him by the Pope. But in the act of coronation itself, there was a marked deviation from the universal custom, characteristic of the man, the age, and the conjuncture. In all other similar solemnities, the crown had been placed on the sovereign's head by the presiding spiritual person, as representing the Deity, by whom princes rule. But not even from the Head of the Catholic Church would Buonaparte consent to receive as a boon the golden symbol of sovereignty, which he was sensible he owed solely to his own unparalleled train of military and civil successes. The crown having been blessed by the Pope, Napoleon took it from the altar with his own hands, and placed it on his brows. He then put the diadem on the head of his Empress, as if determined to show that his authority was the child of his own actions. *Te Deum* was sung; the heralds (for they also had again come into fashion) proclaimed, « that the thrice glorious and thrice august Napoleon, Emperor of the French, was crowned and installed.» Thus concluded this remarkable

ceremony. Those who remember having beheld it, must now doubt whether they were waking, or whether fancy had framed a vision so dazzling in its appearance, so extraordinary in its origin and progress, and so ephemeral in its endurance.

The very day before the ceremony of coronation (that is, on the 1st of December), the senate had waited upon the Emperor with the result of the votes collected in the departments, which, till that time, had been taken for granted. Upwards of three millions five hundred thousand citizens had given their votes on this occasion; of whom only about three thousand five hundred had declared against the proposition. The vice-president, Neufchâteau, declared, « this report was the unbiassed expression of the people's choice. No government could plead a title more authentic. »

This was the established language of the day; but when the orator went farther, and mentioned the measure now adopted as enabling Buonaparte to guide into port the vessel of the *Republic*, one would have thought there was more irony than compliment in the expression.

Napoleon replied, by promises to employ the power which the unanimous consent of the senate, the people, and the army, had conferred upon him, for the advantage of that nation

which he himself, writing from fields of battle, had first saluted with the title of the Great. He promised, too, in name of his dynasty, that his children should long preserve the throne, and be at once the first soldiers in the army of France, and the first magistrates among her citizens.

As every word on such an occasion was scrupulously sifted and examined, it seemed to some that this promise, which Napoleon volunteered in behalf of children who had as yet no existence, intimated a meditated change of consort, since from his present Empress he had no longer any hope of issue. Others censured the prophetic tone in which he announced what would be the fate and conduct of unborn beings, and spoke of a reign, newly commenced, under the title of a dynasty, which is usually applied to a race of successive princes.

We pause for a moment to consider the act of popular accession to the new government; because there, if anywhere, we are to look for something like a legal right, in virtue of which Napoleon might claim obedience. He himself, when pleading his own cause after his fall, repeatedly rests his right to be considered and treated as a legitimate monarch, upon the fact that he was called to the crown by the voice of the people.

We will not stop to inquire how the registers, in which the votes of the citizens were enrolled,

were managed by the functionaries who had the charge of them;—it is only necessary to state in passing, that these returning officers were in general accessible to the influence of government, and that there was no possibility of instituting any scrutiny into the authenticity of the returns. Neither will we repeat, that instead of waiting for the event of the popular vote, he had accepted of the empire from the Senate, and had been proclaimed Emperor accordingly. Waiving those circumstances entirely, let it be remembered, that France is usually reckoned to contain upwards of thirty millions of inhabitants, and that three millions, five hundred thousand, only, gave their votes. This was not a third part, deducting women and children, of those who had a title to express their opinion, where it was to be held decisive of the greatest change which the state could undergo; and it must be allowed that the authority of so limited a portion of the people is far too small to bind the remainder. We have heard it indeed argued, that the question having been formally put to the nation at large, every one was under an obligation to make a specific reply; and they who did not vote, must be held to have acquiesced in the opinion expressed by the majority of such as did. This argument, being directly contrary to the presumption of law in all similar cases, is not more valid than the defence of the sol-

dier, who, accused of having stolen a necklace from an image of the Virgin, replied to the charge, that he had first asked the Madona's permission, and, receiving no answer, had taken silence for consent.

In another point of view, it must be remembered that this vote, by which Napoleon claimed the absolute and irredeemable cession of the liberties of France in his favour, was not a jot more solemn than those by which the people had previously sanctioned the Constitution of the year 1792, that of the year VIII., and that of the Consular Government. Now, either the vote upon all those occasions was binding and permanent, or it was capable of being denied and recalled at the pleasure of the people. If the former was the case, then the people had no right, in 1804, to resume the votes they had given, and the oaths they had sworn, to the first form of government in 1792. The others which they sanctioned in its stead were, in consequence, mere usurpations, and that now attempted the most flagrant of all, since three constitutions, each resting on the popular consent, were demolished, and three sets of oaths broken and discarded, to make room for the present model. Again, if the people, in swearing to one constitution, retained inalienably the right of substituting another whenever they thought proper, the Imperial Constitution remained at their mercy as much as those that

preceded it; and then on what could Buonaparte rest the inviolability of his authority, guarded with such jealous precaution, and designed to descend to his successors, without any future appeal to the people? The dynasty which he supposed himself to have planted was in that case not the oak-tree which he conceived it, but, held during the good pleasure of a fickle people, rather resembled the thistle, whose unsubstantial crest rests upon the stalk only so long as the wind shall not disturb it.

But we leave these considerations; nor do we stop to inquire how many, amid the three millions and upwards of voters, gave an unwilling signature, which they would have refused if they had dared, nor how many more attached no greater consequence to the act than to a piece of formal complaisance, which every government expected in its turn, and which bound the subject no longer than the ruler had means to enforce his obedience. Another and more formidable objection remains behind, which pervaded the whole pretended surrender by the French nation of their liberties, and rendered it void, null, and without force or effect whatsoever. It was, from the commencement, what jurists call a *pactum in illicito*:—the people gave that which they had no right to surrender, and Buonaparte accepted that which he had no title to take at their hands. In most instances of despotic

usurpation—we need only look at the case of Cæsar—the popular party have been made the means of working out their own servitude; the government being usurped by some demagogue who acted in their name, and had the art to make their own hands the framers of their own chains. But though such consent on the part of the people, elicited from an excess of partial confidence or of gratitude, may have rendered such encroachments on the freedom of the state more easy, it did not and could not render it in any case more legal. The rights of a free people are theirs to enjoy, but not theirs to alienate or surrender. The people are in this respect like minors, to whom law assures their property, but invests them with no title to give it away or consume it; the national privileges are an estate entailed from generation to generation, and they can neither be the subject of gift, exchange, nor surrender, by those who enjoy the usufruct or temporary possession of them. No man is lord even of his person, to the effect of surrendering his life or limbs to the mercy of another; the contract of the Merchant of Venice would now be held null from the beginning in any court of justice in Europe. But far more should the report of 1804, upon Buonaparte's election, be esteemed totally void, since it involved the cession on the part of the French people of that which ought to have been far more dear to them, and

held more inalienable, than the pound of flesh nearest the heart, or the very heart itself.

As the people of France had no right to resign their own liberties, and that of their posterity, for ever, so Buonaparte could not legally avail himself of their prodigal and imprudent cession. If a blind man give a piece of gold by mistake instead of a piece of silver, he who receives it acquires no legal title to the surplus value. If an ignorant man enter unwittingly into an illegal compact, his signature, though voluntary, is not binding upon him. It is true, that Buonaparte had rendered the highest services to France, by his Italian campaigns in the first instance, and afterwards by that wonderful train of success which followed his return from Egypt. Still, the services yielded by a subject to his native land, like the duty paid by a child to a parent, cannot render him creditor of the country, beyond the amount which she has legal means of discharging. If France had received the highest benefits from Buonaparte, she had in return raised him as high as any subject could be advanced, and had, indeed, in her reckless prodigality of gratitude, given, or suffered him to assume, the very despotic authority, which this compact of which we treat was to consolidate and sanction under its real name of Empire. Here, therefore, we close the argument; concluding the pretended vote of

the French people to be totally null, both as regarding the subjects who yielded their privileges, and the emperor who accepted of their surrender. The former could not give away rights which it was not lawful to resign, the latter could not accept an authority which it was unlawful to exercise.

An apology, or rather a palliation, of Buonaparte's usurpation, has been set up by himself and his more ardent admirers, and we are desirous of giving to it all the weight which it shall be found to deserve. They have said, and with great reason, that Buonaparte, viewed in his general conduct, was no selfish usurper, and that the mode in which he acquired his power was gilded over by the use which he made of it. This is true; for we will not underrate the merits which Napoleon thus acquired, by observing that shrewd politicians have been of opinion, that sovereigns who have only a questionable right to their authority, are compelled, were it but for their own sakes, to govern in such a manner as to make the country feel its advantage in submitting to their government. We grant willingly, that in much of his internal administration Buonaparte showed that he desired to have no advantage separate from that of France; that he conceived her interests to be connected with his own glory; that he expended his wealth in ornamenting the empire, and not upon ob-

jects more immediately personal to himself. We have no doubt that he had more pleasure in seeing treasures of art added to the Museum, than in hanging them on the walls of his own palace; and that he spoke truly, when asserting that he grudged Joséphine the expensive plants with which she decorated her residence at Malmaison, because her taste interfered with the prosperity of the public botanical garden of Paris. We allow, therefore, that Buonaparte fully identified himself with the country which he had rendered his patrimony; and that while it should be called by his name, he was desirous of investing it with as much external splendour, and as much internal prosperity, as his gigantic schemes were able to compass. No doubt it may be said, so completely was the country identified with its ruler, that as France had nothing but what belonged to its Emperor, he was in fact improving his own estate when he advanced her public works, and could no more be said to lose sight of his own interest, than a private gentleman does, who neglects his garden to ornament his park. But it is not fair to press the motives of human nature to their last retreat, in which something like a taint of self-interest may so often be discovered. It is enough to reply, that the selfishness which embraces the interests of a whole kingdom is of a kind so liberal, so extended, and so refined, as to be

closely allied to patriotism; and that the good intentions of Buonaparte towards that France, over which he ruled with despotic sway, can be no more doubted, than the affections of an arbitrary father, whose object it is to make his son prosperous and happy, to which he annexes as the only condition, that he shall be implicitly obedient to every tittle of his will. The misfortune is, however, that arbitrary power is in itself a faculty, which, whether exercised over a kingdom, or in the bosom of a family, is apt to be used with caprice rather than judgment, and becomes a snare to those who possess it, as well as a burthen to those over whom it extends. A father, for example, seeks the happiness of his son, while he endeavours to assure his fortunes, by compelling him to enter into a mercenary and reluctant marriage; and Buonaparte conceived himself to be benefiting as well as aggrandising France, when, preferring the splendour of conquest to the blessings of peace, he led the flower of her young men to perish in foreign fields, and finally was the means of her being delivered up, drained of her population, to the mercy of the foreign invaders, whose resentment his ambition had provoked.

Such are the considerations which naturally rise out of Napoleon's final and avowed assumption of the absolute power, which he had in reality possessed and exercised ever since

he had been created First Consul for life. It was soon after made manifest, that France, enlarged and increased in strength as she had been under his auspices, was yet too narrow a sphere for his domination. Italy afforded the first illustration of his grasping ambition.

The northern states of Italy had followed the example of France through all her change of models They had become republican in a Directorial form, when Napoleon's sword conquered them from the Austrians; had changed to an establishment similar to the Consular, when that was instituted in Paris by the 18th Brumaire; and were now destined to receive, as a king, him who had lately accepted and exercised with regal authority the office of their president.

The authorities of the Italian (late Cisalpine) Republic had a prescient guess of what was expected of them. A deputation appeared at Paris, to declare the absolute necessity which they felt, that their government should assume a monarchical and hereditary form. On the 17th March, they obtained an audience of ths Emperor, to whom they intimated the unanimous desire of their countrymen, that Napoleon, founder of the Italian Republic, should be monarch of the Italian Kingdom. He was to have power to name his successor, such being always a native of France or Italy. With

an affectation of jealous independence, however, the authors of this « humble petition and advice» stipulated, that the crowns of France and Italy should never, save in the present instance, be placed on the head of the same monarch. Napoleon might, during his life, devolve the sovereignty of Italy on one of his descendants, either natural or adopted; but it was anxiously stipulated, that such delegation should not be made during the period while France continued to occupy the Neapolitan territories, the Russians Corfu, and the British Malta.

Buonaparte granted the petition of the Italian States, and listened with indulgence to their jealous scruples. He agreed with them, that the separation of the crowns of France and Italy, which might be useful to their descendants, would be in the highest degree dangerous to themselves, and therefore he consented to bear the additional burthen which their love and confidence imposed, at least until the interest of his Italian subjects should permit him to place the crown on a younger head, who, animated by his spirit, should, he engaged, « be ever ready to sacrifice his life for the people over whom he should be called to reign, by Providence, by the constitution of the country, and by the will of Napoleon.» In announcing this new acquisition to the French

Senate, Buonaparte made use of an expression so singularly audacious, that to utter it required almost as much courage as to scheme one of his most daring campaigns. «The power and majesty of the French empire,» he said, «are surpassed by the moderation which presides over her political transactions.»

Upon the 11th April, Napoleon, with his Empress, set off to go through the form of coronation, as King of Italy. The ceremony almost exactly resembled that by which he had been inaugurated Emperor. The ministry of the Pope, however, was not employed on this second occasion, although, as Pius VII. was then on his return to Rome, he could scarcely have declined officiating, if he had been requested by Buonaparte to take Milan in his route for that purpose. Perhaps it was thought too harsh to exact from the Pontiff the consecration of a King of Italy, whose very title implied a possibility that his dominion might be one day extended, so as to include the patrimony of Saint Peter. Perhaps, and we rather believe it was the case, some cause of dissatisfaction had already occurred betwixt Napoleon and Pius VII. However this may be, the ministry of the Archbishop of Milan was held sufficient for the occasion, and it was he who blessed the celebrated iron crown, said to have girded the brows of the

ancient kings of the Lombards. Buonaparte, as in the ceremony at Paris, placed the ancient emblem on his head with his own hands, assuming and repeating aloud the haughty motto attached to it by its ancient owners, *Dieu me la donne; gare à qui la touche.*[1]

The new kingdom was, in all respects, modelled on the same plan with the French empire. An order, called « of the Iron Crown,» was established on the footing of that of the Legion of Honour. A large French force was taken into Italian pay, and Eugène Beauharnais, the son of Joséphine by her former marriage, who enjoyed and merited the confidence of his father-in-law, was created viceroy, and appointed to represent, in that character, the dignity of Napoleon.

Napoleon did not leave Italy without farther extension of his empire. Genoa, once the proud and the powerful, resigned her independence, and her Doge presented to the Emperor a request that the Ligurian Republic, laying down her separate rights, should be considered in future as a part of the French nation. It was but lately that Buonaparte had declared to the listening Senate, that the boundaries of France were permanently fixed, and

[1] God has given it me; Let him beware who would touch it.

should not be extended for the comprehension of future conquests. It is farther true, that, by a solemn alliance with France, Genoa had placed her arsenals and harbours at the disposal of the French government; engaged to supply her powerful ally with six thousand sailors, and ten sail of the line, to be equipped at her own expense; and that her independence, or such a nominal share of that inestimable privilege as was consistent with her connexion with this formidable power, had been guaranteed by France. But neither the charge of inconsistency with his own public declarations, nor consideration of the solemn treaty acknowledging the Ligurian Republic, prevented Napoleon from availing himself of the pretext afforded by the petition of the Doge. It was convenient to indulge the city and government of Genoa in their wish to become an integral part of the Great Nation. Buonaparte was well aware that, by recognizing them as a department of France, he was augmenting the jealousy of Russia and Austria, who had already assumed a threatening front towards him; but, as he visited the splendid city of the Dorias, and saw its streets of marble palaces, ascending from and surrounding its noble harbours, he was heard to exclaim, that such a possession was well worth the risks of war. The success of one mighty plan only

induced him to form another; and while he was conscious that he was the general object of jealousy and suspicion to Europe, Napoleon could not refrain from encroachments, which necessarily increased and perpetuated such hostile sentiments towards him.

CHAPTER VIII.

Napoleon addresses a Second Letter to the King of England personally—The folly and inconvenience of this Innovation discussed—Answered by the British Secretary of State to Talleyrand.—Alliance formed betwixt Russia and England.—Prussia keeps aloof, and the Emperor Alexander visits Berlin.—Austria prepares for War, and marches an Army into Bavaria—Her impolicy in prematurely commencing Hostilities, and in her Conduct to Bavaria.—Unsoldierlike Conduct of the Austrian General, Mack.—Buonaparte is joined by the Electors of Bavaria and Wirtemberg, and the Duke of Baden.—Skilful Manœuvres of the French Generals, and successive losses of the Austrians.—Napoleon violates the Neutrality of Prussia, by marching through Anspach and Bareuth.—Further Losses of the Austrian Leaders, and consequent disunion among them.—Mack is cooped up in Ulm—Issues a formidable Declaration on the 16th October—and surrenders on the following day.—Fatal Results of this Man's Poltroonery, want of Skill, and probable Treachery.

Buonaparte, Consul, had affected to give a direct testimony of his desire to make peace, by opening a communication immediately and personally with the King of Great Britain. Buonaparte, Emperor, had, according to his own interpretation of his proceedings, expiat-

ed by his elevation all the crimes of the Revolution, and wiped out for ever the memory of those illusory visions of liberty and equality, which had alarmed such governments as continued to rest their authority on the ancient basis of legitimacy. He had, in short, according to his own belief, preserved in his system all that the Republic had produced of good, and done away all the memory of that which was evil.

With such pretensions, to say nothing of his absolute power, he hastened to claim admission among the acknowledged princes of Europe; and a second time (27th January, 1805), by a letter addressed to King George III., personally, under the title of « Sir, my Brother, » endeavoured to prove, by a string of truisms,—on the preference of a state of peace to war, and on the reciprocal grandeur of France and England, both advanced to the highest pitch of prosperity,—that the hostilities between the nations ought to be ended.

We have already stated the inconveniences which must necessarily attach to a departure from the usual course of treating between states, and to the transference of the discussions usually intrusted to inferior and responsible agents, to those who are themselves at the head of the nation. But if Napoleon had been serious in desiring peace, and saw any reason for directly communicating with the

English king rather than with the English government, he ought to have made his proposal something more specific than a string of general propositions, which, affirmed on the one side, and undisputed on the other, left the question between the belligerent powers as undecided as formerly. The question was, not whether peace was desirable, but on what terms it was offered, or could be obtained. If Buonaparte, while stating, as he might have been expected to do, that the jealousies entertained by England of his power were unjust, had agreed, that for the tranquillity of Europe, the weal of both nations, and the respect in which he held the character of the monarch whom he addressed, Malta should remain with Britain in perpetuity, or for a stipulated period, it would have given a serious turn to his overture, which was at present as vague in its tendency, as it was unusual in the form.

The answer to his letter, addressed by the British Secretary of State to Talleyrand, declared, that Britain could not make a precise reply to the proposal of peace intimated in Napoleon's letter, until she had communicated with her allies on the Continent, and in particular with the Emperor of Russia.

These expressions indicated, what was already well known to Buonaparte, the darkening of another continental storm, about to be directed against his power. On this occasion,

Russia was the soul of the confederacy. Since the death of the unfortunate Paul had placed that mighty country under the government of a wise and prudent prince, whose education had been sedulously cultivated, and who had profited in an eminent degree by that advantage, her counsels had been dignified, wise, and moderate. She had offered her mediation betwixt the belligerent powers, which, accepted willingly by Great Britain, had been somewhat haughtily declined by France, whose ruler was displeased, doubtless, to find that power in the hands of a sharp-sighted and sagacious sovereign, which, when lodged in those of Paul, he might reckon upon as at his own disposal, through his influence over that weak and partial monarch.

From this time there was coldness betwixt the French and Russian governments. The murder of the Duke d'Enghien increased the misunderstanding. The Emperor of Russia was too high-spirited to view this scene of perfidy and violence in silence; and as he not only remonstrated with Buonaparte himself, but appealed to the German Diet on the violation of the territories of the empire, Napoleon, unused to have his actions censured and condemned by others, how powerful soever, seems to have regarded the Emperor Alexander with personal dislike. Russia and Sweden, and their monarchs, became the subjects of satire

and ridicule in the *Moniteur;* and, as every one knew, such arrows were never discharged without Buonaparte's special authority. The latter prince withdrew his ambassador from Paris, and in a public note, delivered to the French envoy at Stockholm, expressed his surprise at the « indecent and ridiculous insolencies which Monsieur *Napoleon Buonaparte* had permitted to be inserted in the *Moniteur.*» Gustavus was, it is true, of an irregular and violent temper, apt to undertake plans, to the achievement of which the strength of his kingdom was inadequate; yet he would scarcely have expressed himself with so little veneration for the most formidable authority in Europe, had he not been confident in the support of the Czar. In fact, on the 10th of January, 1805, the King of Sweden had signed a treaty of close alliance with Russia; and, as a necessary consequence, on the 31st of October following, he published a declaration of war against France, in terms personally insulting to Napoleon.

Russia and England, in the mean time, had engaged in an alliance, the general purpose of which was to form a league upon the Continent, to compel the French government to consent to the re-establishment of the balance of Europe. The objects proposed were briefly the independence of Holland and Switzerland; the evacuation of Hanover and the

north of Germany by the French troops; the restoration of Piedmont to the King of Sardinia; and the complete evacuation of Italy by the French. These were gigantic schemes, for which suitable efforts were to be made. Five hundred thousand men were to be employed; and Britain, besides affording the assistance of her forces by sea and land, was to pay large subsidies for supporting the armies of the coalition.

Great Britain and Russia were the animating sources of this new coalition against France; but it was impossible, considering the insular situation of the first of those powers, and the great distance of the second from the scene of action, that they alone, without the concurrence of the Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia, should be able to assail France with any prospect of making a successful impression. Every effort, therefore, was used to awaken those states to a sense of the daily repeated encroachments of Buonaparte, and of the extreme danger to which they were respectively exposed by the rapidly increasing extent of his empire.

But since the unsuccessful campaign of the year 1792, Prussia had observed a cautious and wary neutrality. She had seen, not perhaps without secret pleasure, the humiliation of Austria, her natural rival in Germany, and she had taken many opportunities to make acquisition

of petty objects of advantage, in consequence of the various changes upon the Continent; so that she seemed to find her own interest in the successes of France. It is imagined, also, that Buonaparte had found some of her leading statesmen not altogether inaccessible to influence of a different kind, by the liberal exercise of which he was enabled to maintain a strong interest in the Prussian councils. But the principles of these ministers were far from being shared by the nation at large. The encroachments on the German Empire intimately concerned the safety of Prussia, and the nation saw, in the decay of the Austrian influence, the creation and increase of a strong German party in favour of France, to whom Bavaria, Wirtemberg, and almost all the petty princes upon the Rhine and its vicinity, began now to look up with the devotion and reverence which had hitherto been paid to the great states of Austria and Prussia. The subjects of the Great Frederick also remembered his numerous victories, and, proud of the army which he had created and bequeathed to his successor, felt neither apprehension nor unwillingness at the thought of measuring forces with the Dictator of Europe. The councils, therefore, of Prussia were divided; and though those which were favourable to France prevailed so far as to prevent her immediately becoming a member of the coalition, yet, by increasing her army

to the war establishment, and marching forces towards the country which appeared about to become the scene of hostilities, Prussia gave plain intimation that the continuance of her neutrality depended upon the events of war.

To animate her councils, if possible, with a more decided spirit, Alexander visited the court of Berlin in person. He was received with the utmost distinction, and both the King of Prussia, and his beautiful and interesting queen, gave manifest tokens of the share they took personally in the success of the alliance. An oath was taken by the two sovereigns at the tomb of the Great Frederick, by which they are said to have devoted themselves to the liberation of Germany,—a vow which, though at a distant period, they amply redeemed. Still, whatever might be the personal opinions of the King of Prussia, the counsels of Haugwitz continued to influence his cabinet; and the Emperor withdrew from Berlin, to place himself at the head of his troops, while the Prussian monarch, assembling an army of observation, assumed the menacing air of a neutral who feels himself able to turn the scale in favour of either of the belligerent powers at his pleasure. This was not the moment for Buonaparte to take offence at these demonstrations, as the doing so might convert a doubtful friend into an avowed and determined enemy. But the dubious policy of Prussia was

not forgotten,—it was carefully treasured in Napoleon's memory, as that for which she was to be called to account at a future period. In the mean time he had the full advantage of her hesitating councils and doubtful neutrality.

Austria was more accessible to the application of the allies. Notwithstanding the disasters of the last two wars, the loss of a large portion of Italy, the disasters of Bellegarde, Alvinzi, and Wurmser, and the disastrous defeats of Marengo and Hohenlinden, the extent and military character of her population, amongst whom a short interval of peace was sufficient to recruit the losses of the most bloody war,—above all, the haughty determination of a cabinet remarkable for the tenacity with which they retain and act upon the principles which they have once adopted, induced her government to accede to the alliance betwixt Russia and Great Britain. She had not forgotten the successes which her generals and armies had obtained when fighting by the side of Suwarrow, and might hope to see once more renewed the victories of Trebia and of Novi She therefore increased her force in every quarter; and while the Archduke Charles took the command of eighty thousand men in Italy, on which country Austria always kept a wishful eye, eighty thousand more, destined to act upon the Lech, and it was hoped upon the Rhine, were placed under the charge of Gene

ral Mack, whose factitious and ill-merited reputation had, unfortunately for Austria, remained unabated, notwithstanding his miserable Neapolitan campaign in 1799. The Archduke Ferdinand, a prince of great courage and hopes, was the nominal commander of the last-mentioned army, while the real authority was lodged in this old and empty professor of tactics. To conclude this detail of preparation, the Archduke John was appointed to command in the Tyrol.

It remained only to try the event of negotiation, ere finally proceeding to military extremities. It was not difficult to state the causes of the war, which was now about to break out anew. By the peace of Lunéville, finally concluded between Austria and France, the independence of the Italian, Helvetian, and Batavian republics had been stipulated; but instead of such terms being complied with, Napoleon, rendering himself Grand Mediator of Switzerland and King of Italy, had at the same time filled Holland with troops, and occupied the whole three countries in such a manner, as made them virtually, and almost avowedly, the absolute dependencies of France.

Complaints on these heads, warmly urged by Austria, were sharply answered by France, who in her turn accused Austria of want of confidence, and of assuming arms in the midst of peace. The Emperor of Russia interfered,

and sent a special ambassador to Paris, with the purpose of coming, if possible, to an amicable accommodation, which might even yet preserve the tranquillity of Europe. But ere Novosiltzoff had reached his place of destination, the union of Genoa with the French empire was announced; an encroachment, which, joined to Napoleon's influence in Switzerland, rendered the whole north-western frontier of Italy completely open for the march of French armies, and precluded the possible hope of that fine country assuming any character of independence, even if, at a future time, its crown should be vested in a person different from the ruler of France.

Upon hearing of this new usurpation, made at the very time when Napoleon's steps towards the aggrandisement of his power were under challenge, Russia countermanded her ambassador; and Austria, after the exchange of some more angry notes, began her daring enterprise by marching a large army upon Bavaria. It would have been better, probably, had the Emperor Francis suspended this decisive measure, and continued to protract, if possible, the negotiation, until the Russian auxiliary armies, two in number, of fifty thousand men each, could have advanced to the assistance of their allies; or until a sense of the approaching crisis had removed the indecision in the Prussian councils, and induced the king to

join the coalition. Either of these events, and more especially both, might have given a very different turn to this disastrous campaign.

But Austria was not to be blamed only for precipitating the war—she exposed herself to censure by the mode in which she conducted it. Occupying Bavaria with numerous forces, the Elector was required to join the confederacy. Maximilian of Bavaria was not disinclined to unite his forces with those which proposed for their object the defence of Germany, but he pleaded that his son, now travelling in France, would be made responsible, should he join the coalition. « On my knees, » he said, in a letter to the Emperor Francis, « I implore you for permission to remain neutral. » His reasonable request was rejected, and the Elector was required to join the confederacy with a violence of urgency, both unjust and impolitic. He was farther given to understand, that his troops would not be permitted to remain as a separate army, but must be incorporated with those of Austria. These were terms so harsh, as to render even the precarious alliance of France preferable to submission. Maximilian, retreating from his capital of Munich to Wurtzburg, and withdrawing his army into Franconia, again endeavoured to negotiate for neutrality. It was again imperiously refused; and while the Austrian government insisted that the Elector should join them with his

whole forces, the Austrian troops were permitted to conduct themselves as in an enemy's country; requisitions were raised, and other measures resorted to, tending to show that the invaders remembered the ancient grudge which had so long subsisted between Bavaria and Austria. It was natural that the Bavarian prince, incensed at this treatment, should regard the allies as enemies, and wait the arrival of the French as liberators.

The military manœuvres of the Austrian army were not more able, than her conduct towards the neutral state of Bavaria was politic or just. There are two errors, equally fatal, into which a general of middling or inferior talent is apt to fall, when about to encounter with an adversary of genius. If he mixes presumption with his weakness of parts, he will endeavour to calculate the probable motions of his antagonist; and having, as he supposes, ascertained what they are likely to be, will attempt to anticipate and interrupt them, and thereby expose himself to some signal disaster, by mistaking the principle on which his enemy designs to act. Or, if intimidated by the reputation of the commander opposed to him, such a general is apt to remain passive and irresolute, until the motions of the enemy make his purpose evident, at a time when it is probably impossible to prevent his attaining it. It was left for General Mack, within the space

of a very brief campaign, to unite both characters; and fall first into errors of rashness and presumption, afterwards into those of indecision and cowardice.

It required little experience to know, that, after two singularly unfortunate wars, every precaution should have been taken to bring the Austrian troops into contact with their enemy, under such advantages of position and numbers as might counterbalance the feelings of discouragement with which the bravest soldiers must be affected, in consequence of a course of defeat and disaster so uniform, that there seemed to be a fate in it. In this point of view, the Austrian armies ought to have halted on their own territories, where the river Inn forms a strong and excellent line of defence, extending betwixt the Tyrol and the Danube, into which the Inn empties itself at Passau. Supposing Mack's large force concentrated, with this formidable barrier in front, it seems as if the Austrians might have easily maintained a defensive position until the armies of Russia appeared to support them.

If, determined upon the imperious and unjust aggression on Bavaria, Mack found it necessary to advance more to the westward than the line of the Inn, in order to secure the country of the Elector, the Lech, in its turn, offered him a position in which he might have awaited the Russians, though their junction

must necessarily have been protracted, in proportion to the extent of his advance. But it was the choice of this unlucky tactician to leave Bavaria also behind him, and, approaching the frontiers of France, to take possession of Ulm, Memmingen, and the line of the Iller and Danube, where he fortified himself with great care, as if to watch the defiles of the Black Forest. It can only be thought by those who judge most favourably of Mack's intentions, that, as the passes of that celebrated forest had been frequently the route by which the French invaded Germany, he had concluded it must therefore be by that road, and no other, that their approach on the present occasion was to be expected. Knowing with whom he had to contend, the Austrian general ought to have suspected the direct contrary; for Buonaparte's manœuvres were not more distinguished by talent, than by novelty and originality of design.

It is not to be supposed that this great confederacy took at unawares one who had so many reasons for being alert. The Austrian forces, though they had commenced the campaign so hastily, were not more early ready for the field, than were the immense armies of the French empire. The camps at Boulogne, so long assembled on the shores of the Channel, were now to be relieved from their inactivity; and, serious as the danger was in

which their assistance was required, Buonaparte was perhaps not displeased at finding a fair pretext to withdraw from the invasion to which he had hastily pledged himself. This formidable assemblage of troops, laying aside the appellation of the Army of England, was hereafter distinguished by that of the Grand Army. At the same time, the armies maintained in Holland, and in the North of Germany, were put into motion.

In this remarkable campaign Buonaparte commenced, for the first time, the system of issuing official bulletins, for the purpose of announcing to the French nation his accounts of success, and impressing upon the public mind what truths he desired them to know, and, at the same time, what falsehoods he was desirous they should believe. In every country, such official accounts will naturally have a partial character, as every government must desire to represent the result of its measures in as favourable a light as possible. Where there is a free press, however, the deception cannot be carried to extremity; imposture cannot be attempted, on a grand scale at least, where it can be contrasted with other sources of information, or refuted by arguments derived from evidence. But Buonaparte had the unlimited and exclusive privilege of saying what he pleased, without contradiction or commentary, and he was liberal in using a

license which could not be checked. Yet his bulletins are valuable historical documents, as well as the papers in the *Moniteur*, which he himself frequently composed or superintended. Much correct information there certainly is; and that which is less accurate is interesting, since it shows, if not actual truths, at least what Napoleon desired should be received as such, and so throws considerable light both on his schemes and on his character.

Buonaparte communicated to the Senate the approach of war, by a report, dated 22d September, in which, acquainting them with the cause of quarrel betwixt himself and the allied powers, he asked, and of course obtained, two decrees; one for ordering eighty thousand conscripts to the field, another for the organization of the National Guard. He then put himself at the head of his forces, and proceeded to achieve the destruction of Mack's army, not as at Marengo, by one great general battle, but by a series of grand manœuvres, and a train of partial actions necessary to execute them, which rendered resistance and retreat alike impossible. These manœuvres we can only indicate, nor can they perhaps be well understood without the assistance of the map.

While Mack expected the approach of the French upon his front, Buonaparte had formed the daring resolution to turn the flank of the

Austrian general, cut him off from his country and his resources, and reduce him to the necessity, either of surrender, or of giving battle without a hope of success. To execute this great conception, the French army was parted into six grand divisions. That of Bernadotte, evacuating Hanover which it had hitherto occupied, and traversing Hesse, seemed as if about to unite itself to the main army, which had now reached the Rhine on all points. But its real destination was soon determined, when, turning towards the left, Bernadotte ascended the river Maine, and at Wurtzburg formed a junction with the Elector of Bavaria, who, with the troops which had followed him into Franconia, immediately declared for the French cause.

The Elector of Wirtemberg and the Duke of Baden followed the same line of politics; and thus Austria had arrayed against her those very German princes, whom a moderate conduct towards Bavaria might perhaps have rendered neutral; France, at the outset of the contest, scarce having the power to compel them to join her standard. The other five columns of French troops, under Ney, Soult, Davoust, Vandamme, and Marmont, crossed the Rhine at different points, and entered Germany to the northward of Mack's position; while Murat, who made his passage at Kehl, approaching the Black Forest, manœuvred in

such a manner as to confirm Mack in his belief that the main attack was to come from that quarter. But the direction of all the other divisions intimated that it was the object of the French Emperor to move round the right wing of the Austrians, by keeping on the north or left side of the Danube, and then, by crossing that river, to put themselves in the rear of Mack's army, and interpose betwixt him and Vienna. For this purpose, Soult, who had crossed at Spires, directed his march upon Augsburg; while, to interrupt the communication betwixt that city and Ulm, the Austrian head-quarters, Murat and Lannes had advanced to Wertingen, where a smart action took place. The Austrians lost all their cannon, and it was said four thousand men—an ominous commencement of the campaign. The action would have been termed a battle, had the armies been on a smaller scale; but where such great numbers were engaged on either side, it did not rank much above a skirmish.

With the same purpose of disquieting Mack in his head-quarters, and preventing him from attending to what passed on his left wing and rear, Ney, who advanced from Stutgard, attacked the bridges over the Danube at Guntzburg, which were gallantly but fruitlessly defended by the Archduke Ferdinand, who had advanced from Ulm to that place. The Arch-

duke lost many guns, and nearly three thousand men.

In the mean time, an operation took place, which marked in the most striking manner the inflexible and decisive character of Napoleon's counsels, compared with those of the ancient courts of Europe. To accomplish the French plan, of interposing betwixt Mack and the supplies and reinforcements, both Austrian and Russian, which were in motion towards him, it was necessary that all the French divisions should be directed upon Nordlingen, and particularly that the division under Bernadotte, which now included the Bavarian troops, should accomplish a simultaneous movement in that direction. But there was no time for the last-mentioned general to get into the desired position, unless by violating the neutrality of Prussia, and taking the straight road to the scene of operations, by marching through the territories of Anspach and Bareuth, belonging to that power. A less daring general, a more timid politician than Napoleon, would have hesitated to commit such an aggression at such a moment. Prussia, undecided in her counsels, was yet known to be in point of national spirit hostilely disposed towards France; and a marked outrage of this nature was likely to raise the indignation of the people in general to a point which Haugwitz and his

party might be unable to stem. The junction of Prussia with the allies, at a moment so critical, might be decisive of the fate of the campaign, and well if the loss ended there.

Yet with these consequences before his eyes, Napoleon knew, on the other hand, that it was not want of pretexts to go to war which prevented Prussia from drawing the sword, but diffidence in the power of the allies to resist the arms and fortune of France. If, therefore, by violating the territory of Prussia, he should be able to inflict a sudden and terrible blow upon the allies, he reckoned truly that the court of Berlin would be more astounded at his success, than irritated at the means which he had taken to obtain it. Bernadotte received, therefore, the Emperor's commands to march through the territory of Anspach and Bareuth, which were only defended by idle protests and reclamations of the rights of neutrality. The news of this aggression gave the utmost offence at the Prussian court; and the call for war, which alone could right their injured honour, became almost unanimous through the nation. But while the general irritation, which Buonaparte of course foresaw, was thus taking place on the one side, the success which he had achieved over the Austrians acted on the other as a powerful sedative.

The spirit of enterprise had deserted Mack

as soon as actual hostilities commenced. With the usual fault of Austrian generals, he had extended his position too far, and embraced too many points of defence, rendering his communications difficult, and offering facilities for Buonaparte's favourite tactics, of attacking and destroying in detail the divisions opposed to him. The defeat at Guntzburg induced Mack at length to concentrate his army around Ulm; but Bavaria and Suabia were now fully in possession of the French and Bavarians; and the Austrian General Spangenberg, surrounded in Memmingen, was compelled to lay down his arms with five thousand men. The French had crossed the Rhine about the 26th September; it was now the 13th October, and they could scarcely be said to have begun the campaign, when they had made, on various points, not fewer than twenty thousand prisoners. Napoleon, however, expected that resistance from Mack's despair which no other motive had yet engaged him to offer; and he announced to his army the prospect of a general action. He called on his soldiers to revenge themselves on the Austrians for the loss of the plunder of London, of which, but for this new continental war, they would have been already in possession. He pointed out to them, that, as at Marengo, he had cut the enemy off from his reserves and resources, and he summoned them

to signalize Ulm by a battle, which should be yet more decisive.

No general action, however, took place, though several sanguinary affairs of a partial nature were fought, and terminated uniformly to the misfortune of the Austrians. In the mean time, disunion took place among their generals. The Archduke Ferdinand, Schwartzenberg, afterwards destined to play a remarkable part in this changeful history, with Collowrath and others, seeing themselves invested by toils which were daily narrowed upon them, resolved to leave Mack and his army, and cut their way into Bohemia at the head of the cavalry. The Archduke executed this movement with the greatest gallantry, but not without considerable loss. Indeed, the behaviour of the Austrian princes of the blood throughout these wars was such, as if Fate had meant to mitigate the disasters of the Imperial House, by showing forth the talents and bravery of their ancient race, and proving, that although Fortune frowned on them, Honour remained faithful to their line. Ferdinand, after much fighting, and considerable damage done and received, at length brought six thousand cavalry in safety to Egra, in Bohemia.

Meanwhile, Mack found himself, with the remains of his army, cooped up in Ulm, as Wurmser had been in Mantua. He publish-

ed an order of the day, which intimated an intention to imitate the persevering defence of that heroic veteran. He forbade the word surrender to be used by any one—he announced the arrival of two powerful armies, one of Austrians, one of Russians, whose appearance would presently raise the blockade—he declared his determination to eat horse-flesh rather than listen to any terms of capitulation. This bravado appeared on the 16th October, and the conditions of surrender were subscribed by Mack on the next day, having been probably in the course of adjustment when he was making these notable professions of resistance.

The course of military misconduct which we have traced, singular as it is, might be perhaps referred to folly or incapacity on the part of Mack, though it must be owned it was of that gross kind which civilians consider as equal to fraud. But another circumstance remains to be told, which goes far to prove that this once celebrated and trusted general had ingrafted the traitor upon the fool. The terms of capitulation, as subscribed on the 17th October, bore, that there should be an armistice until 26th October at midnight; and that if, during this space, an Austrian or Russian army should appear to raise the blockade, the army at Ulm should have liberty to join them, with their arms and baggage. This stipulation al-

lowed the Austrian soldiers some hope of relief, and in any event it was sure to interrupt the progress of Buonaparte's successes, by detaining the principal part of his army in the neighbourhood of Ulm, until the term of nine days was expired. But Mack consented to a revision of these terms, a thing which would scarcely have been proposed to a man of honour, and signed on the 19th a second capitulation, by which he consented to evacuate Ulm on the day following; thus abridging considerably, at a crisis when every minute was precious, any advantage, direct or contingent, which the Austrians could have derived from the delay originally stipulated. No reason has ever been alleged for this concession. Buonaparte, indeed, had given Mack an audience previous to the signing of this additional article of capitulation, and what arguments he then employed must be left to conjecture.

The effects of Mack's poltroonery, want of skill, and probable treachery, were equal to the results of a great victory. Artillery, baggage, and military stores, were given up to an immense extent. Eight general officers surrendered upon parole, upwards of 20,000 men became prisoners of war, and were marched into France. The numbers of the prisoners taken in this campaign were so great, that Buonaparte distributed them amongst the agriculturists, that their work in the fields might

make up for the absence of the conscripts, whom he had withdrawn from such labour. The experiment was successful; and from the docile habits of the Germans, and the good-humour of their French employers, this new species of servitude suited both parties, and went some length to soften the hardships of war. For not the field of battle itself, with its wounded and dead, is a more distressing sight to humanity and reflection, than prison-barracks and hulks, in which hundreds and thousands of prisoners are delivered up to idleness, and all the evils which idleness is sure to introduce, and not unfrequently to disease and death. Buonaparte meditated introducing this alteration into the usages of war upon a great scale, and thought of regimenting his prisoners for the purpose of labouring on public works. His jurists objected to the proposal as contrary to the law of nations. This scruple might have been avoided, by employing only volunteers, which would also have prevented the appearance of retrograding towards those barbarous times, when the captive of the sword became the slave of his victor. But national character would, in most instances, render the scheme impracticable. Thus, an attempt was afterwards made to dispose of the Spanish prisoners in a similar way, who in most cases made their escape, and in some rose upon and destroyed their task-masters. A French sol-

dier would, in like manner, make an indifferent serf to an English farmer; an English prisoner a still more intractable assistant to a French agriculturist. The advantages of comparative freedom would be in both cases counterbalanced, by a feeling of degradation in the personal subjection experienced.

When the general officers of the Austrians were admitted to a personal interview with the French Emperor, he behaved with courtesy to Klenau and others of reputation, whose character had become known to him in the Italian campaigns. But he complained of the politics of their court, which he said had forced him into war when he knew not what he was fighting for. He prophesied the fall of the house of Austria, unless his brother the Emperor hastened to make peace, and reprobated the policy which brought the uncivilized Russians to interfere in the decision of more cultivated countries than their own. Mack[1] had the impudence to reply, that the Emperor of Austria had been forced into the war by Russia. « Then, » said Napoleon, « you no longer exist as an independent power. » The

[1] It will be unnecessary again to mention this man's name, of which our readers are doubtless as much tired as we ourselves are. He was committed to a state prison, in a remote part of the Austrian dominions; and whether he died in captivity, or was set at liberty, we have not learned, nor are we anxious to know.

whole conversation appeared in the bulletin of the day, which also insinuates, with little probability, that the Austrian officers and soldiers concurred generally in blaming the alliance between their own Emperor and Alexander. From this we infer, that the union between those two powerful sovereigns was, even in the moment of this great success, a subject of apprehension to Buonaparte; whose official notes are sometimes expressed with generosity towards the vanquished, who had ceased to struggle, but always with an eager tone of reproach and offence towards those from whom an animated resistance was to be apprehended.

CHAPTER IX.

Position of the French Armies.—Napoleon advances towards Vienna.—The Emperor Francis leaves his Capital. —French enter Vienna on the 13th November.—Review of the French Successes in Italy and the Tyrol.—Schemes of Napoleon to force on a general Battle—He succeeds. Battle of Austerlitz is fought on the 2d December, and the combined Austro-Russian Armies completely defeated.—Interview betwixt the Emperor of Austria and Napoleon.—The Emperor Alexander retreats towards Russia.—Treaty of Presburgh signed on the 26th December—Its Conditions.—Fate of the King of Sweden —and of the Two Sicilies.

THE tide of war now rolled eastward, having surmounted and utterly demolished the formidable barrier which was opposed to it. Napoleon placed himself at the head of his central army. Ney, upon his right, was ready to repel any descent which might be made from the passes of the Tyrol. Murat, on his left, watched the motions of the Austrians, under the Archduke Ferdinand, who, refusing to join in the unworthy capitulation of Ulm, had cut their way into Bohemia, and there united themselves with other forces, either stationed in

that kingdom, or who had, like themselves, escaped thither. Lastly, the division of Augereau (who had recently advanced from France at the head of an army of reserve), occupying part of Suabia, served to protect the rear of the French army against any movement from the Vorarlberg; and at the same time menaced the Prussians, in case, acting upon the offence given by the violation of their territory, they should have crossed the Danube, and engaged in the war.

If, however, the weight of Prussia had been thrown into the scale with sufficient energy at this decisive moment, it would not probably have been any resistance which Augereau could have offered that could have saved Napoleon from a perilous situation, since the large armies of the new enemy would have been placed in his rear, and, of course, his communications with France entirely cut off. It was a crisis of the same kind which opened to Austria in the year 1813; but she was then taught wisdom by experience, and availed herself of the golden opportunity which Prussia now suffered to escape. Buonaparte had reckoned with accuracy upon the timid and fluctuating councils of that power. The aggression on their territories of Anspach and Bareuth was learned at Berlin; but then the news of the calamity sustained by the Austrians at Ulm succeeded these tidings almost

instantly, and while the first article of intelligence seemed to urge instant hostilities, the next was calculated to warn them against espousing a losing cause.

Thus trusting to the vacillating and timid policy of Prussia, Napoleon, covered on his flank and rear as we have stated, continued to push forward with his central forces towards Vienna, menaced repeatedly in the former wars, but whose fate seemed decided after the disaster of Ulm. It is true, that an army, partly consisting of Russians and partly of Austrians, had pressed forward to prevent that disgraceful calamity, and, finding that the capitulation had taken place, were now retreating step by step in front of the advancing French; but not exceeding forty-five thousand men, they were unable to make any effectual stand upon the Inn, the Traun, the Ens, or in any other position which might have covered Vienna. They halted, indeed, repeatedly, made a considerable show of resistance, and fought some severe though partial actions; but always ended by continuing their retreat, which was now directed upon Moravia, where the grand Russian army had already assembled, under the command of the Emperor Alexander, and were expecting still further reinforcements under General Buxhowden.

Some attempts were made to place Vienna in a state of defence, and the inhabitants were

called upon to rise in mass for that purpose. But as the fortifications were ancient and in disrepair, an effort at resistance could only have occasioned the destruction of the city. The Emperor Francis saw himself, therefore, under the necessity of endeavouring to provide for the safety of his capital by negotiation, and for that of his person by leaving it. On the 7th November, accordingly, he departed from Vienna for Brunn in Moravia, in order to place himself under the protection of the Russian forces.

On the same day, but late in the evening, Count Giulay arrived at Buonaparte's head-quarters, then established at Lintz, with a proposal for an armistice, previous to a general negotiation for peace. Napoleon refused to listen to the proposal, unless Venice and the Tyrol were put into his hands. These terms were too hard to be accepted. Vienna, therefore, was left to its fate; and that proud capital of the proud house of Austria remained an unresisting prize to the invader.

On the 13th November the French took possession of Vienna, where they obtained an immense quantity of military stores, arms, and clothing; a part of which spoils were bestowed by Napoleon on his ally the Elector of Bavaria, who now witnessed the humiliation of the Imperial House which had of late conducted itself so haughtily towards him. Ge-

neral Clarke was appointed Governor of Vienna; and by a change as rapid as if it had taken place on the stage, the new Emperor of France occupied Schœnbrun, the splendid palace of the long-descended Emperor of Austria. But though such signal successes had crowned the commencement of the campaign, it was necessary to defeat the haughty Russians, in whose aid the Emperor of Austria still confided, before the object of the war could be considered as attained. The broken and shattered remnant of the Austrian forces had rallied from different quarters around the yet untouched army of Alexander; and although the latter retreated from Brunn towards Olmutz, it was only with the purpose of forming a junction with Buxhowden, before they hazarded a general battle.

In the mean time, the French army following close on their back into Moravia, fought one or two partial actions, which, though claimed as victories, were so severely disputed as to make Napoleon aware that he had to do with a more obstinate enemy than he had of late encountered in the dispirited Austrians. He waited, therefore, until the result of his skilful combinations should have drawn around him the greatest force he could expect to collect, ere venturing upon an engagement, of which, if he failed to obtain a decisive victory, the consequences were likely to be fatal to him.

At this period, success had smiled on the French in Italy, and in the Tyrol, as well as in Germany. In the former country, it may be remembered, that the Archduke Charles, at the head of seventy-five or eighty thousand men, exclusive of garrisons, was opposed to Masséna, whose forces considerably exceeded that amount. The prince occupied the left bank of the Adige, with the purpose of maintaining a defensive warfare, until he should hear news of the campaign in Germany. Masséna, however, after some fighting, succeded in forcing the passage of the river at Verona, and in occupying the town of St Michael. This was on the 20th October. Soon afterwards, the account of the surrender at Ulm reached the Frenchman, and determined him on a general attack along the whole Austrian line, which was strongly posted near Caldiero. The assault took place on the 30th October, and was followed by a very desperate action, for the Austrians, confident in the presence of their favourite commander, fought with the greatest courage. They were, however, defeated; and a column of five thousand men, under general Hellinger, detached for the purpose of attacking the French in the rear, failed in their purpose, and, being themselves surrounded, were obliged to lay down their arms. The victors were joined by General St-Cyr, at the head of twenty-five thousand

men, who had evacuated the kingdom of Naples, upon a treaty of neutrality entered into with the king, and now came to join their countrymen in Lombardy.

In the midst of his own misfortunes, the Archduke Charles received the fatal intelligence of the capitulation of Ulm, and that the French were advancing in full march towards Vienna. To cover his brother's capital became a matter of more pressing necessity than to attempt to continue the defence of Italy, which circumstances rendered almost hopeless. He commenced his retreat, therefore, on the night of the 1st of November, determining to continue it through the mountain passes of Carinthia, and so on into Hungary. If he had marched by the Tyrol, he would have found Augereau in his front, with Ney and Marmont threatening his flanks, while Masséna, before whom he was now retreating, pressed on his rear.

The Archduke commenced this dispiriting and distressing movement, over nearly the same ground which he had passed while retreating before Buonaparte himself in 1797. He did not, however, as on that occasion, avail himself of the Tagliamento, or Palma Nova. His purpose was retreat, not defence; and, though pursued closely by Masséna, he halted no longer at these strong posts than was necessary to protect his march, and check the

vivacity of the French advance. He effected at length his retreat upon Laybach, where he received tidings from his brother the Archduke John, whose situation on the Tyrol was not more agreeable than his own in Italy; and who, like Charles himself, was desirous to escape into the vicinity of Hungary with what forces remained to him.

The distress of the Archduke John was occasioned by an army of French and Bavarians, commanded by Ney, who had penetrated into the Tyrol by paths deemed impracticable, taken the forts of Schwatz, Neustadt, and Inspruck itself, and placed the Archduke's army in the most precarious situation. Adopting a determination worthy of his birth, the Austrian prince resolved at all risks to effect a junction with his brother, and, though hard pressed by the enemy, he accomplished his purpose. Two considerable corps of Austrians, being left in an insulated situation by these movements of the two princes, were obliged to surrender. These were the divisions of Jellachich, in the Voralberg, and of the Prince of Rohan, in Lombardy. The whole of the north of Italy, with the Tyrol and all its passes, was left to the undisturbed and unresisted occupation of the French.

The army of the royal brothers had, however, become formidable by their junction, and was daily growing stronger. They were

in communication with Hungary, the brave inhabitants of which warlike country were universally rising in arms. They were also joined by volunteers from Croatia, the Tyrol, and all those wild and mountainous countries, which have so long supplied the Austrian army with the finest light troops in the world.

It might seem to counterbalance these advantages, that Masséna had also entered into communications with the French army of Germany at Clagenfurt, the capital of Carinthia. But having left great part of his troops in Italy, he had for the time ceased to be formidable to the Austrian princes, who now meditated advancing on the French grand army, which the audacity of its leader had placed in a situation extremely perilous to any other than French troops acting under the eye of their Emperor.

Nothing, it is true, could be more admirably conceived and satisfactorily accomplished than the succession of grand manœuvres, which, distinguishing the opening of the campaign, had produced the great, yet cheaply-purchased success of Ulm, and the capture of Vienna. Nor was the series of combination less wonderful, by which, clearing the Vorarlberg, the Tyrol, and the north of Italy of the enemy, Napoleon had placed almost all the subordinate divisions of his own army at his disposal, ready to assist him in the grand en-

terprise against the Austro-Russian forces. But he has been considered by military critics as having trusted too great a risk upon the precarious event of battle, when he crossed the Danube, and plunged into Moravia, where a defeat, or even a check, might have been attended with the most fatal consequences. The position of the Archdukes Charles and John; the organization of the Hungarian insurrection, which proceeded rapidly; the success of the Archduke Ferdinand, in raising a similar general levy in Bohemia, threatened alarming operations in the French rear; while Prussia, with the sword drawn in her hand, and the word *war* upon her lips, watched but the slightest waning of Buonaparte's star, to pronounce the word, and to strike a blow at the same moment.

Napoleon accordingly, though he had dared the risk, was perfectly sensible that as he had distinguished the earlier part of this campaign by some of the most brilliant manœuvres which military history records, it was now incumbent upon him, without delay, to conclude it by a great and decisive victory over a new and formidable enemy. He neglected, therefore, no art by which success could be insured. In the first place, it was necessary to determine the allies to immediate battle; for, situated in the heart of an enemy's country, with insurrection spreading wide and wider around him,

an immediate action was as desirable on his part, as delay would have been advantageous to his opponents.

Some attempts at negotiation were made by the Austrians, to aid which Haugwitz, the Prussian minister, made his appearance in the French camp with the offer of his master's mediation, but with the alternative of declaring war in case it was refused. To temporize with Prussia was of the last consequence, and the French Emperor found a willing instrument in Haugwitz. « The French and Austrian outposts,» said Napoleon, « are engaged; it is a prelude to the battle which I am about to fight—Say nothing of your errand to me at present—I wish to remain in ignorance of it. Return to Vienna, and wait the events of war.» Haugwitz, to use Napoleon's own expression, was no novice, and returned to Vienna without waiting for another hint; and doubtless the French Emperor was well pleased to be rid of his presence.

Napoleon next sent Savary to the Russian camp, under pretence of compliment to the Emperor Alexander, but in reality as a spy upon that monarch and his generals. He returned, having discovered, or affected to discover, that the Russian sovereign was surrounded by counsellors, whom their youth and rank rendered confident and presumptuous,

and who, he concluded, might be easily misguided into some fatal act of rashness.

Buonaparte acted on the hint, and upon the first movement of the Austro-Russian army in advance, withdrew his forces from the position they had occupied. Prince Dolgorucki, aide-de-camp of the Emperor Alexander, was dispatched by him to return the compliments which had been brought him. He too was, doubtless, expected to use his powers of observation, but they were not so acute as those of the old officer of police. Buonaparte, as if the interior of his camp displayed scenes which he did not desire Dolgorucki to witness, met the prince at the outposts, which the soldiers were in the act of hastily covering with field-works, like an army which seeks to shelter conscious weakness under entrenchments. Encouraged by what he thought he saw of the difficulties in which the French seemed to be placed, Dolgorucki entered upon politics, and demanded in plain terms the cession of the crown of Italy. To this proposal Buonaparte listened with a patience which seemed to be the effect of his present situation. In short, Dolgorucki carried back to his Imperial master the hastily-conceived opinion, that the French Emperor was retreating, and felt himself in a precarious posture. On this false ground the Russian council of war determined to act. Their plan was to extend their own

left wing, with the purpose of turning the right of the French army, and taking them upon the flank and rear.

It was upon the 1st December at noon that the Russians commenced this movement, by which, in confidence of success, they abandoned a chain of heights where they might have received an attack with great advantage, descended into ground more favourable to the enemy, and, finally, placed their left wing at too great a distance from the centre. The French general no sooner witnessed this rash manœuvre, than he exclaimed, « Before to-morrow is over, that army is my own. » In the mean time, withdrawing his outposts, and concentrating his forces, he continued to intimate a conscious inferiority, which was far from existing.

The two armies seem to have been very nearly of the same strength. For though the bulletin, to enhance the victory, makes the opposite army amount to 100,000 men, yet there were not actually above 50,000 Russians, and about 25,000 Austrians, in the field of battle. The French army might be about the same force. But they were commanded by Napoleon, and the Russians by Kutousof; a veteran soldier indeed, full of bravery and patriotism, and accustomed to war as it was waged against the Turks; but deficient in general talent, as well as in the alertness of mind necessary to

penetrate into and oppose the designs of his adversary, and, as is not unusual, obstinate in proportion to the narrowness of his understanding, and the prejudices of his education.

Meanwhile, Buonaparte, possessed of his enemy's plan by the demonstrations of the preceding day, passed the night in making his arrangements. He visited the posts in person, and apparently desired to maintain an incognito which was soon discovered. As soon as the person of the Emperor was recognized, the soldiers remembered that next day (2d December) was the anniversary of his coronation. Bunches of lighted hay, placed on the end of poles, made an extempore illumination, while the troops, with loud acclamations, protested they would present him on the following day with a bouquet becoming the occasion, and an old grenadier, approaching his person, swore that the Emperor should only have to combat with his eyes, and that, without his exposing his person, the whole colours and artillery of the Russian army should be brought to him to celebrate the festival of the morrow.

In the proclamation which Napoleon, according to his custom, issued to the army, he promises that he will keep his person out of the reach of fire; thus showing the full confidence, that the assurance of his personal safety would be considered as great an encouragement to

the troops, as the usual protestation of sovereigns and leaders, that they will be in the front, and share the dangers of the day. This is perhaps the strongest proof possible of the complete and confidential understanding which subsisted between Napoleon and his soldiers. Yet there have not been wanting those, who have thrown the imputation of cowardice on the victor of a hundred battles, and whose reputation was so well established amongst those troops who must be the best judges, that his attention to the safety of his person was requested by them, and granted by him, as a favour to his army.

The battle of Austerlitz, fought against an enemy of great valour but slender experience, was not of a very complicated character. The Russians, we have seen, were extending their line to surround the French flank. Marshal Davoust, with a division of infantry, and another of dragoons, was placed behind the convent of Raygern, to oppose the forces destined for this manœuvre, at the moment when they should conceive the point carried. Soult commanded the right wing; Lannes conducted the left, which last rested upon a fortified position called Santon, defended by twenty pieces of cannon. Bernadotte led the centre, where Murat and all the French cavalry were stationed. Ten battalions of the Imperial Guard, with ten of Oudinot's division, were kept in

reserve in the rear of the line, under the eye of Napoleon himself, who destined them, with forty field-pieces, to act wherever the fate of battle should render their services most necessary. Such were the preparations for this decisive battle, where three Emperors, each at the head of his own army, strove to decide the destinies of Europe. The sun rose with unclouded brilliancy; it was that sun of Austerlitz which Napoleon upon so many succeeding occasions apostrophised, and recalled to the minds of his soldiers. As its first beams rose above the horizon, Buonaparte appeared in front of the army, surrounded by his marshals, to whom he issued his last directions, and they departed at full gallop to their different posts.

The column detached from the left of the Austro-Russian army was engaged in a false manœuvre, and it was ill executed. The intervals between the regiments of which it consisted were suffered to become irregular, and the communications between this attacking column itself and the main body were not maintained with sufficient accuracy. When the Russians thought themselves on the point of turning the right flank of the French, they found themselves suddenly, and at unawares, engaged with Davoust's division, of whose position behind the convent of Raygern, they had not been aware. At the same time, Soult, at the head of the French right wing, rushed

forward upon the interval between the Austro Russian centre and left, caused by the march of the latter upon Raygern, and, completely intersecting their line, severed the left wing entirely from the centre

The Emperor of Russia perceived the danger, and directed a desperate attempt to be made upon Soult's division by the Russian Guards, for the purpose of restoring the communication with his left The French infantry were staggered by this charge, and one regiment completely routed But it was in such a crisis that the genius of Buonaparte triumphed Bessieres had orders to advance with the Imperial Guard, while the Russians were disordered with their own success The encounter was desperate, and the Russians displayed the utmost valour before they at length gave way to the discipline and steadiness of Buonaparte's veterans Their artillery and standards were lost, and Prince Constantine, the Emperor's brother, who fought gallantly at their head, was only saved by the speed of his horse

The centre of the French army now advanced to complete the victory, and the cavalry of Murat made repeated charges with such success, that the Emperors of Russia and Austria, from the heights of Austerlitz, beheld their centre and left completely defeated The fate of the right wing could no longer be protract-

ed, and it was disastrous even beyond the usual consequences of defeat. They had been actively pressed during the whole battle by Lannes, but now, the troops on their left being routed, they were surrounded on all sides, and, unable to make longer resistance, were forced down into a hollow, where they were exposed to the fire of twenty pieces of cannon. Many attempted to escape across a lake, which was partially frozen; but the ice proving too weak, gave way under them, or was broken by the hostile cannonade. This fatality renewed, according to Buonaparte's description, the appearance of the battle with the Turks at Aboukir, where so many thousand men, flying from the battle, perished by drowning. It was with the greatest difficulty, that, rallying the remains of their routed forces around them, and retiring in the best manner they could, the Emperors effected their personal retreat. Only the devoted bravery of the Russians, and the loyalty of the Austrian cavalry, who charged repeatedly to protect the retrograde movement, could have rendered it possible, since the sole passage to the rear lay along a causeway, extending between two lakes. The retreat was, however, accomplished, and the Emperors escaped without sustaining the loss in the pursuit which might have been expected. But in the battle, at least 20,000 men had remained, killed, wounded, and prisoners; and

forty standards, with a great proportion of the hostile artillery, were the trophies of Napoleon, whose army had thus amply redeemed their pledge. It was, however, at a high rate, that they had purchased the promised bouquet. Their own ranks had lost probably 5000 men, though the bulletin diminishes the numbers to two thousand five hundred.

The Austrian Emperor considered his last hope of successful opposition to Napoleon as extinguished by this defeat, and conceived, therefore, that he had nothing remaining save to throw himself upon the discretion of the victor. There were, indeed, some, who accused his councils of pusillanimity. It was said, that the levies of Prince Charles in Hungary, and of Prince Ferdinand in Bohemia, were in great forwardness—that the Emperors had still a considerable army under their own command—and that Prussia, already sufficiently disposed for war, would certainly not permit Austria to be totally overwhelmed. But it ought to be considered, on the other hand, that the new levies, however useful in a partisan war, could not be expected to redeem the loss of such a battle as Austerlitz—that they were watched by French troops, which, though inferior in number, were greatly more formidable in discipline—and that, as for Prussia, it was scarce rational to expect that she would interfere by arms, to save, in the hour of distress,

those to whom she had given no assistance, when such would probably have been decisive of the contest, and that in favour of the allies.

The influence of the victory on the Prussian councils was indeed soon made evident; for Count Haugwitz, who had been dismissed to Vienna till the battle should take place, now returned to Buonaparte's head-quarters, having changed the original message of defiance of which he was the bearer, into a handsome compliment to Napoleon upon his victory. The answer of Napoleon intimated his full sense of the duplicity of Prussia.—« This,» he said, « is a compliment designed for others, but Fortune had transferred the address to me.» It was, however, still necessary to conciliate a power, which had a hundred and fifty thousand men in the field; and a private treaty with Haugwitz assigned the Electorate of Hanover to Prussia, in exchange for Anspach, or rather as the price of her neutrality at this important crisis. Thus all hopes of Prussian interference being over, the Emperor Francis must be held justified in yielding to necessity, and endeavouring to secure the best terms which could be yet obtained, by submitting at discretion. His ally, Alexander, refused indeed to be concerned in a negotiation, which in the circumstances could not fail to be humiliating.

A personal interview took place betwixt the Emperor of Austria and Napoleon, to whose

camp Francis resorted almost in the guise of a suppliant. The defeated prince is represented as having thrown the blame of the war upon the English. « They are a set of merchants, » he said, « who would set the Continent on fire, in order to secure to themselves the commerce of the world. » The argument was not very logical, but the good prince in whose mouth it is placed, is not to be condemned for holding at such a moment the language which might please the victor. When Buonaparte welcomed him to his military hut, and said it was the only palace he had inhabited for nearly two months, the Austrian answered with a smile, « You have turned your residence, then, to such good account, that you ought to be content with it. »

The Emperor of Austria, having satisfied himself that he would be admitted to terms of greater or less severity, next stipulated for that which Alexander had disdained to request in his own person — the unmolested retreat of the Russians to their own country.

« The Russian army is surrounded, » said Napoleon, « not a man can escape me. But I wish to oblige their Emperor, and will stop the march of my columns, if your Majesty promises me that these Russians shall evacuate Germany, and the Austrian and Prussian parts of Poland.

« It is the purpose of the Emperor Alexander to do so »

The arrangement was communicated by Savary to the Russian Emperor, who acquiesced in the proposal to return with his army to Russia by regular marches No other engagement was required of Alexander than his word, and the respectful manner in which he is mentioned in the bulletins, indicates Buonaparte's desire to cultivate a good understanding with this powerful and spirited young monarch On the other hand, Napoleon has not failed to place in the Czar's mouth such compliments to himself as the following —« Tell your master,» said he to Savary, « that he did miracles yesterday—that this bloody day has augmented my respect for him—He is the predestined of Heaven—it will take a hundred years ere my army equals that of France » Savary is then stated to have found Alexander, despite of his reverse of fortune, a man of heart and head He entered into details of the battle

« You were inferior to us on the whole,» he said, « yet we found you superior on every point of action »

« That,» replied Savary, « arises from warlike experience, the fruit of sixteen years of glory This is the fortieth battle which the Emperor has fought »

« He is a great soldier,» said Alexander, « I

do not pretend to compare myself with him—this is the first time I have been under fire. But it is enough. I came hither to the assistance of the Emperor of Austria—he has no farther occasion for my services—I return to my capital.»

Accordingly, he commenced his march towards Russia, in pursuance of the terms agreed upon. The Russian arms had been unfortunate; but the behaviour of their youthful Emperor, and the marked deference shown towards him by Buonaparte, made a most favourable impression upon Europe at large.

The Austrian Monarch, left to his fate, obtained from Buonaparte an armistice a small part of the price was imposed in the shape of a military contribution of an hundred millions of francs, to be raised in the territories occupied by the French armies. The cessation of hostilities was to endure while Talleyrand on the one side, and Prince John of Lichtenstein on the other, adjusted the terms of a general pacification. Buonaparte failed not to propitiate the Austrian negotiator by the most extravagant praises in his bulletins, and has represented the Emperor of Austria as asking, «Why, possessing men of such distinguished talent, should the affairs of my cabinet be committed to knaves and fools?» Of this question we can only say, that if really asked by Francis,

which we doubt, he was himself the only person by whom it could have been answered.

The compliments to the Prince John of Lichtenstein, were intended to propitiate the public in favour of the treaty of peace, negotiated by a man of such talents. Some of his countrymen, on the other hand, accused him of selfish precipitation in the treaty, for the purpose of removing the scene of war from the neighbourhood of his own family estates. But what could the wisdom of the ablest negotiator, or the firmness of the most stubborn patriot, have availed, when France was to dictate terms, and Austria to receive them? The treaties of Campo Formio and Luneville, though granted to Austria by Napoleon in the hour of victory, were highly advantageous compared to that of Presburgh, which was signed on the 26th of December 1805, about a fortnight after the battle of Austerlitz. By this negotiation, Francis ceded to Bavaria the oldest possession of his house, the mountains of Tyrol and of the Voralberg, filled with the best, bravest, and most attached of his subjects, and which, by their geographical situation, had hitherto given Austria influence at once in Germany and Italy. Venice, Austria's most recent possession, and which had not been very honourably obtained, was also yielded up and added to the kingdom of Italy. She was again reduced to the solitary seaport of Trieste, in the Adriatic.

By the same treaty, the Germanic allies of Buonaparte were to be remunerated. Wirtemberg, as well as Bavaria, received large additions at the expense of Austria and of the other princes of the Empire, and Francis consented that both the Electors should be promoted to the kingly dignity, in reward of their adherence to the French cause. Other provisions there were, equally inconsistent with the immunities of the Germanic body, for which scarcely a shadow of respect was retained, save by an illusory clause or species of protest, by which Austria declared, that all the stipulations to which she consented were under reservation of the rights of the Empire. By the treaty of Presburgh Austria was said to have lost upwards of a million of square miles of territory, two millions and a half of subjects, and a revenue to the amount of ten millions and a half of florins. And this momentous surrender was made in consequence of one unfortunate campaign, which lasted but six months, and was distinguished by only one general action.

There were two episodes in this war, of little consequence in themselves, but important considered with reference to the alterations they produced in two of the ancient kingdoms of Europe, which they proved the proximate cause of re-modelling according to the new form of government which had been intro-

duced by Buonaparte, and sanctioned by the example of France.

The King of Sweden had been an ardent and enthusiastic member of the Anti-Gallican league. He was brave, enterprising, and chivalrous, and ambitious to play the part of his namesake and progenitor, Gustavus Adolphus, or his predecessor, Charles XII.; without, however, considering, that since the time of these princes, and partly in consequence of their wars and extensive undertakings, Sweden had sunk into a secondary rank in the great European family; and without reflecting, that when great enterprises are attempted without adequate means to carry them through, valour becomes Quixotic, and generosity ludicrous. He had engaged to join in a combined effort for the purpose of freeing Hanover, and the northern parts of Germany, from the French, by means of an army of English, Russians, and Swedes. Had Prussia acceded to the confederacy, this might have been easily accomplished; especially as Saxony, Hesse, and Brunswick, would, under her encouragement, have willingly joined in the war. Nay, even without the accession of Prussia, a diversion in the North, ably conducted and strongly supported, might have at least found Bernadotte sufficient work in Hanover, and prevented him from materially contributing, by his march

to the Danube, to the disasters of the Austrian army at Ulm. But by some of those delays and misunderstandings, which are so apt to disappoint the objects of a coalition, and disconcert enterprises attempted by troops of different nations, the forces designed for the north of Europe did not assemble until the middle of November, and then only in strength sufficient to undertake the siege of the Hanoverian fortress of Hamelen, in which Bernadotte had left a strong garrison. The enterprise, too tardy in its commencement, was soon broken off by the news of the battle of Austerlitz, and its consequences, and, being finally abandoned, the unfortunate King of Sweden returned to his own dominions, where his subjects received with unwillingness and terror a prince, who on many accounts had incurred the fatal and persevering resentment of Buonaparte. Machinations began presently to be agitated for removing him from the kingdom, as one with whom Napoleon could never be reconciled, and averting from Sweden, by such sacrifice, the punishment which must otherwise fall on the country, as well as on the king.

While the trifling attempt against Hamelen, joined to other circumstances, was thus preparing the downfall of the ancient dynasty of Sweden, a descent made by the Russians and English on the Neapolitan territories afforded

a good apology to Buonaparte for depriving the King of the Two Sicilies of his dominions, so far as they lay open to the power of France. Governed entirely by the influence of the queen, the policy of Naples [illegible] been of a fickle and insincere character. Repeatedly saved from the greatest [illegible] of dethronement, the king or his royal consort had never omitted an opportunity to resume arms against France, under the conviction, perhaps, that their ruin would no longer be deferred than whilst political considerations induced the French Emperor to permit their possession of their power. The last interference in their behalf had been at the instance of the Emperor Paul. After this period we have seen that their Italian dominions were occupied by French troops, who held Otranto, and other places in Calabria, as pledges (so they pretended) for the restoration of Malta.

But upon the breaking out of the war of 1805, it was agreed, by a convention entered into at Paris 21st of September, and ratified by the King of Naples on the 8th of October, that the French should withdraw their forces from the places which they occupied in the Neapolitan territories, and the king should observe a strict neutrality. Neither of the contracting parties was quite sincere. The French troops, which were commanded by St-Cyr, were, as we have seen, withdrawn from Naples, for the

purpose of reinforcing Masséna, in the beginning of the campaign of Austerlitz. Their absence would probably have endured no longer than the necessity which called them away. But the court of Naples was equally insincere; for no sooner had St-Cyr left the Neapolitan territories to proceed northward, than the king, animated by the opportunity which his departure afforded, once more raised his forces to the war establishment, and received with open arms an army, consisting of 12,000 Russian troops from Corfu, and 8000 British from Malta, who disembarked in his dominions.

Had this armament occupied Venice at the commencement of the war, they might have materially assisted in the campaign of the Archduke Charles against Masséna. The sending them in November to the extremity of the Italian peninsula, only served to seal the fate of Ferdinand the Fourth. On receiving the news of the armistice at Austerlitz, the Russians and the British re-embarked, and not long after their departure, a large French army, commanded by Joseph Buonaparte, approached, once more to enforce the doom passed against the royal family of Naples, that they should cease to reign. The king and queen fled from the storm which they had provoked. Their son, the prince royal, in whose favour they had abdicated, only made use of his temporary authority to surrender Gaeta, Pescara,

and Naples itself, with its castles, to the French general. In Calabria, however, whose wild inhabitants were totally disinclined to the French yoke, Count Roger de Damas and the Duke of Calabria attempted to make a stand. But their hasty and undisciplined levies were easily defeated by the French under General Régnier, and, nominally at least, almost the whole Neapolitan kingdom was subjected to the power of Joseph Buonaparte.

One single trait of gallantry illuminated the scene of universal pusillanimity. The Prince of Hesse Philipsthal, who defended the strong fortress of Gaeta in name of Ferdinand IV., refused to surrender it in terms of the capitulation. «Tell your general,» said he, in reply to the French summons, «that Gaeta is not Ulm, nor the Prince of Hesse General Mack!» The place was defended with a gallantry corresponding to these expressions, nor was it surrendered until the 17th of July, 1806, after a long siege, in which the brave governor was wounded. This heroic young prince only appeared on the public scene to be withdrawn from it by an untimely death, which has been ascribed to poison. His valour, however honourable to himself, was of little use to the royal family of Naples, whose deposition was determined on by Buonaparte, in order to place upon the throne one of his own family.

CHAPTER X.

Relative situations of France and England—Hostilities commenced with Spain, by the Stoppage, by Commodore Moore, of four Spanish Galleons, when three of their Escort were taken, and one blew up—Napoleon's Plan of Invasion stated and discussed—John Clerk of Eldin's great System of Breaking the Line, explained—Whether it could have been advantageously used by France?—The French Admiral, Villeneuve, forms a junction with the Spanish Fleet under Gravina—Attacked and defeated by Sir Robert Calder, with the Loss of two Ships of the Line—Nelson appointed to the Command in the Mediterranean—BATTLE OF TRAFALGAR fought on the 21st October, 1806—Particulars of the Force on each Side, and Details of the Battle—Death of Nelson—Behaviour of Napoleon on learning the Intelligence of this Signal Defeat—Villeneuve commits Suicide—Address of Buonaparte to the Legislative Body—Statement of Monsieur de Champagny on the Internal Improvements of France—Elevation of Napoleon's Brothers, Louis and Joseph, to the Thrones of Holland and Naples—Principality of Lucca conferred on Eliza, the eldest Sister of Buonaparte, and that of Guastalla on Pauline, the youngest—Other Alliances made by his Family—Reflections—Napoleon appoints a new Hereditary Nobility—The Policy of this Measure considered—Converts from the old Noblesse anxiously sought for and liberally rewarded—Confederation of the Rhine established, and Napoleon appointed Protector—The Emperor Francis lays aside the Imperial Crown of Germany, retaining only the Title of Emperor of Austria—Vacillating and Impolitic Conduct of Prussia.

THE triumphs of Napoleon had been greater

at this period of his reign, than had ever before been recorded in history as achieved by a single man. Yet even these, like every thing earthly, had their limit. Fate, while she seemed to assign him complete domination over the land, had vested in other hands the empire of the seas; and it frequently happened, that when his victorious eagles were flying their highest pitch upon the Continent, some conspicuous naval disaster warned the nations, that there was another element, where France had a rival and a superior.

It is true, that the repeated success of England, resembling almost that of the huntsman over his game, had so much diminished the French navy, and rendered so cautious such seamen as France had remaining, that the former country, unable to get opportunities of assailing the French vessels, was induced to have recourse to strange, and, as it proved, ineffectual means of carrying on hostilities. Such was the attempt at destroying the harbour of Boulogne, by sinking in the roads ships loaded with stones, and another scheme to blow up the French ships, by means of detonating machines to be affixed to them under water. The one, we believe, only furnished the inhabitants of Boulogne with a supply of useful building-stone; the other, from the raft on which the machines were conveyed, was

much ridiculed under the name of the catamaran expedition.[1]

Buonaparte, meanwhile, never lost sight of that combination of naval manœuvres, through means of which, by the time that the subjugation of Austria should permit the Grand Army to resume its destination for England, he hoped to assemble in the Channel such a superior fleet, as might waft his troops in safety to the devoted shores of Britain. The unbounded influence which he exercised over the court of Spain, seemed likely to facilitate this difficult enterprise. Yet, as from Spain the French Emperor derived large supplies of treasure, it would have been convenient for him, that, for a time at least, she should retain the mask of neutrality, while, in fact, she was contributing to serve France, and prejudice England, more effectually than if she had been in a state of avowed hostility with the latter power.

The British government determined to bring this state of things to a decided point, by stopping four galleons, or vessels loaded

[1] These implements of destruction were afterwards used against the British cruizers in America, and were judged formidable. But such desperate courage is necessary to attach the machine to the destined vessel, and the fate of the engineer, if discovered, is so certainly fatal, that, like fire-ships, petards, and similar inventions, liable to the same inconvenience, they do not appear likely to get into general use

with treasure, proceeding under an escort from the South Sea, and destined for Cadiz. The purpose of the English was only to detain these ships, as a pledge for the sincerity of the government of Spain, in observing a more strict neutrality than hitherto. But unhappily the British force, under Commodore Moore, amounted only to four frigates. Spanish honour rendered the admiral unwilling to strike the national flag to an equal strength, and an action ensued, in which three of the Spanish vessels were taken, and one unfortunately blew up, an accident greatly to be regretted. Mr Southey observes, with his usual sound sense and humanity, «Had a stronger squadron been sent (against the Spaniards), this deplorable catastrophe might have been saved—a catastrophe which excited not more indignation in Spain, than it did grief in those who were its unwilling instruments, in the British people, and in the British government.»

This action took place on the 5th of October, 1804; and as hostilities were of course immediately commenced betwixt Spain and Britain, Buonaparte, losing the advantages he derived from the neutrality of the former power, had now only to use the naval and military means which she afforded for the advancement of his own purposes. The Court of Spain devoted them to his service, with a pas-

sive complaisance of which we shall hereafter see the reward.

Napoleon persisted to the last in asserting, that he saw clearly the means of utterly destroying the English superiority at sea. This he proposed to achieve by evading the blockades of the several ports of France and Spain, which, while weather permitted, were each hermetically sealed by the presence of a British squadron, and by finally assembling in the Channel that overwhelming force, which, according to his statement, was to reduce England to a dependency on France, as complete as that of the Isle of Oleron. But men of the greatest talents must necessarily be liable to error, when they apply the principles of a science with which they are well acquainted upon one element, to the operations which are to be carried on by means of another. It is evident that he erred, when calculating his maritime combinations, in not sufficiently considering two most material differences betwixt them, and those which had exalted his glory upon land.

In the first place, as a landsman, Napoleon did not make sufficient allowance for the action of contrary winds and waves; as indeed it was perhaps his fault, even in land operations, where their influence is less essential, to admit too little consequence to the opposi-

tion of the elements. He complained, when at St Helena, that he could never get a seaman sufficiently emancipated from the technicality of his profession, to execute or enter into any of his schemes. « If I proposed, » he said, «any new idea, I had Gantheaume and all the marine department to contend with—Sir, that is impossible—Sir, the winds—the calms—the currents, will not permit it; and thus I was stopped short.» We believe little dread could have been entertained of the result of naval combinations, in which the influence of the winds and waves were not previously and accurately calculated; and that British seamen would have desired nothing more ardently, than that their enemies should have acted upon a system in which these casualties were neglected, even if that system had been derived from the genius of Napoleon.

But, secondly, there was this great difference betwixt the land and the sea service, to which (the vehemence of his wishes, doubtless, overpowering his judgment) Buonaparte did not give sufficient weight. Upon land, the excellence of the French troops, their discipline, and the enthusiasm arising from uninterrupted success, might be safely reckoned upon as likely to bear down any obstacle which they might unexpectedly meet with, in the execution of the movements which they were commanded to undertake. The situa-

tion of the French seamen was diametrically the contrary. Their only chance of safety consisted in their being able to elude a rencontre with a British squadron, even of very inferior force. So much was this the case at the period of which we treat, that Linois, their admiral in the East Indian seas, commanding an eighty-four gun ship, and at the head of a considerable squadron of ships of war, was baffled and beaten off in the Straits of Malacca by a squadron of merchant vessels belonging to the British East India Company, although built of course for traffic, and not for war, and, as usual in war time, very imperfectly manned.

Yet, notwithstanding the great and essential difference which we have pointed out between the French navy and their land forces, and that the former was even more inferior to that of England than the continental troops in general were to the French soldiers, it is evident that Buonaparte, when talking of ships of the line, was always thinking of battalions. Thus he imagines that the defeat of the Nile might have been prevented, had the headmost vessels of the French line, instead of remaining at anchor, slipped their cables, and borne down to the assistance of those which were first attacked by the British. But in urging this, the leading principle of the manœuvre of breaking the line, had totally escaped the French Emperor. It was the boast of the patriotic

sage,[1] who illustrated and recommended this most important system of naval tactics, that it could serve the purpose of a British fleet only. The general principle is briefly this: By breaking through the line, a certain number of ships are separated from the rest, which the remainder must either abandon to their fate by sailing away, or endeavour to save by bearing down, or doubling as it were, upon the assailants, and engaging in a close and general engagement. Now, this last alternative is what Buonaparte recommends,—what he would certainly have practised on land,—and what he did practise, in order to extricate his right wing, at Marengo. But the relative superiority of the English navy is so great, that,

[1] The late JOHN CLERK of Eldin, a name never to be mentioned by Britons without respect and veneration, since, until his systematic Essay upon Naval Tactics appeared, the breaking of the line (whatever professional jealousy may allege to the contrary) was never practised on decided and defined principle. His suavity, nay, simplicity of manner, equalled the originality of his genius. This trifling tribute is due from one, who, honoured with his regard from boyhood, has stood by his side, while he was detailing and illustrating the system which taught British seamen to understand and use their own force, at an age so early, that he can remember having been guilty of abstracting from the table some of the little cork models by which Mr Clerk exemplified his manœuvres, unchecked but by his good humoured raillery, when he missed a supposed line-of-battle ship, and complained that the demonstration was crippled by its absence.

while it is maintained, a close engagement with an enemy in the least approaching to equality, is equivalent to a victory; and to recommend a plan of tactics which should render such a battle inevitable, would be, in other words, advising a French admiral to lose his whole fleet, instead of sacrificing those ships which the English manœuvre had cut off, and crowding sail to save such as were yet unengaged.

Under this consciousness of inferiority, the escape of a Spanish or French squadron, when a gale of wind forced, from the port in which they lay, the British blockading vessels, was a matter, the ultimate success of which depended not alone on the winds and waves, but still more upon the chance of their escaping any part of the hostile navy, with whom battle, except with the most exorbitant superiority on their side, was certain and unavoidable defeat. Their efforts to comply with the wishes of the Emperor of France, were therefore so partially conducted, so insulated, and so ineffectual, that they rather resembled the children's game of Hide and Seek, than any thing like a system of regular combination. A more hasty and less cautious compliance with Napoleon's earnest wishes to assemble a predominant naval force, would have only occasioned the total destruction of the combined fleets at an earlier period than when it actually took place.

Upon this desultory principle, and seizing

the opportunity of the blockading squadron being driven by weather from the vicinity of their harbour, a squadron of ten French vessels escaped from Rochefort on the 11th of January, 1806; and another, under Villeneuve, got out of Toulon on the 18th by a similarly favourable opportunity. The former, after rendering some trifling services in the West Indies, was fortunate enough to regain the port from which they had sailed, with the pride of a party who have sallied from a besieged town, and returned into it without loss. Villeneuve also regained Toulon without disaster, and, encouraged by his success, made a second sortie upon the 18th of March, having on board a large body of troops, designed, it was supposed, for a descent upon Ireland or Scotland. He made, however, towards Cadiz, and formed a junction there with the Spanish fleet under Gravina. They sailed for the West Indies, where the joint squadrons were able to possess themselves of a rock called Diamond, which is scarce to be discovered on the map; and with this trophy, which served at least to show they had been actually out of harbour, they returned with all speed to Europe. As for executing manœuvres, and forming combinations, as Napoleon's plans would lead us to infer was the purpose of their hurried expedition, they attempted none, save of that kind which the hare executes when the

hound is at his heels. Nelson, they were aware, was in full pursuit of them, and to have attempted any thing which involved a delay, or gave a chance of his coming up with them, was to court destruction. They were so fortunate as to escape him, though very narrowly, yet did not reach their harbours in safety.

On the 23d July, the combined fleets fell in with Sir Robert Calder, commanding a British squadron. The enemy amounted to twenty sail of the line, three fifty-gun ships, and four frigates, and the British to fifteen sail of the line, and two frigates only. Under this disparity of force, nevertheless, the English admiral defeated the enemy, and took two ships of the line; yet such was the opinion in both countries of the comparative superiority of the British navy, that the French considered their escape as a kind of triumph. Buonaparte alone grumbled against Villeneuve, for not having made use of his advantages, for so it pleased him to term an engagement in which two ships of the line were lost; whilst the English murmured at the inadequate success of Sir Robert Calder, against an enemy of such superior strength, as if he had performed something less than his duty. A court-martial ratified, to a certain extent, the popular opinion; though it may be doubted whether impartial posterity will concur in the justice of the censure which was passed upon the gallant admi-

ral. At any other period of our naval history, the action of the 23d of July would have been rated as a distinguished victory.

The combined fleets escaped into Vigo, where they refitted, and, venturing to sail from that port, they proceeded to Ferrol, united themselves with the squadron which was lying there, and continued their course for Cadiz, which they entered in safety. This did not consist with the plans of Buonaparte, who would have had the whole naval force united at Brest, to be in readiness to cover the descent upon England. « General terror was spread, » he said, « throughout that divided nation, and never was England so near to destruction. » Of the general terror, few of the British, we believe, remember any thing, and of the imminent danger we were not sensible. Had the combined fleets entered the British Channel, instead of the Mediterranean, they would have found the same admiral, the same seamen, nay, in many instances the same ships, to which Villeneuve's retreat into Cadiz gave the trouble of going to seek him there.

When the certainty was known that the enemy's fleets were actually in Cadiz, Nelson was put at the head of the British naval force in the Mediterranean, which was reinforced with an alertness and secrecy that did the highest honour to the Admiralty. Villeneuve, in the mean time, had, it is believed, his mas-

ter's express orders to put to sea; and if he had been censured for want of zeal in the action off Cape Finisterre with Calder, he was likely, as a brave man, to determine on running some risk to prove the injustice of his Emperor's reproaches. Cadiz also, being strictly blockaded by the English, the fleets of France and Spain began to be in want of necessaries. But what principally determined the French admiral on putting to sea, was his ignorance of the reinforcements received by the English, which, though they left Nelson's fleet still inferior to his own, yet brought them nearer to an equality than, had he been aware of it, would have rendered their meeting at all desirable to Villeneuve. It was another and especial point of encouragement, that circumstances led him to disbelieve the report that Nelson commanded the British fleet. Under the influence of these united motives, and confiding in a plan of tactics which he had formed for resisting the favourite mode of attack practised by the English, the French admiral sailed from Cadiz on the 19th October, 1805, in an evil hour for himself and for his country.

The hostile fleets were not long of meeting, and the wind never impelled along the ocean two more gallant armaments. The advantage of numbers was greatly on the side of Villeneuve. He had thirty-three sail of the line, and seven large frigates; Nelson only twenty-

seven line-of-battle ships, and three frigates. The inferiority of the English in number of men and guns was yet more considerable. The combined fleet had four thousand troops on board, many of whom, excellent rifle-men, were placed in the tops. But all odds were compensated by the quality of the British sailors, and the talents of Nelson.

Villeneuve showed no inclination to shun the eventful action. His disposition was singular and ingenious. His fleet formed a double line, each alternate ship being about a cable's length to the windward of her second a-head and a-stern, and thus the arrangement represented the chequers of a draught-board, and seemed to guard against the operation of cutting the line, as usually practised by the British. But Nelson had determined to practise the manœuvre in a manner as original as the mode of defence adopted by Villeneuve. His order for sailing was in two lines, and this was also the order for battle. An advanced squadron of eight of the fastest sailing two-deckers, was to cut off three or four of the enemies' line, a-head of their centre; the second in command, Admiral Collingwood, was to break in upon the enemy about the twelfth ship from the rear, and Nelson himself determined to bear down on the centre. The effect of these manœuvres must of course be a close and general action; for the rest, Nelson knew

he could trust to the determination of his officers and seamen. To his admirals and officers he explained in general, that his object was a close and decisive engagement; and that if, in the confusion and smoke of the battle, signals should not be visible, the captain would never do wrong who laid his ship alongside of the enemy.

With such dispositions on either side, the two gallant fleets met on the memorable 21st of October. Admiral Collingwood, who led the van, went down on the enemy with all his sails set, and, disdaining to furl them in the usual manner, cut the sheets, and let his canvas fly loose in the wind, as if he needed it no longer after it had borne him amidst the thickest of the enemy. Nelson ran his vessel, the Victory, on board the French Redoutable, the Téméraire, a second British ship, fell on board the same vessel on the other side; another enemy's ship fell on board of the Téméraire, and the action was fiercely maintained betwixt these four vessels, which lay as close as if they had been moored together in some friendly harbour. While the Victory thus engaged the Redoutable on the starboard, she maintained from her larboard guns an incessant fire on the Bucentaur and the colossal Santa Trinidad, a vessel of four decks. The example of the admiral was universally followed by the British captains; they broke into the

enemy's line on every side, engaged two or three ships at the same time, and maintained the battle at the very muzzles of the cannon. The superiority which we have claimed for our countrymen was soon made manifest. Nineteen ships of the line were captured, two were first-rate vessels, none were under seventy-four guns. Four ships of the line were taken, in a subsequent action, by Sir Richard Strachan. Seven out of the vessels which escaped into Cadiz were rendered unserviceable. The whole combined fleet was almost totally destroyed.

It is twenty years and upwards since that glorious day. But the feelings of deep sorrow, mingled with those of exultation, with which we first heard the tidings of the battle of Trafalgar, still agitate our bosoms, as we record, that Nelson, the darling of Britain, bought with his life this last and decided triumph over his country's enemies. A Briton himself in every word and thought, the discharge of a sailor's duty, according to his idea, was a debt involving every feat which the most exalted bravery could perform, and every risk which the extremity of danger could present. The word to which he attached such an unlimited meaning, was often in his mouth; the idea never, we believe, absent from his mind. His last signal intimated that England expected every man to do his *duty*. His first words on

entering the action were, « I thank the great Disposer of events for this great opportunity of doing my *duty*;» and with his last departing breath, he was distinctly heard to repeat the same pious and patriotic sentiment, « I thank God I have done my duty.»[1] That DUTY was indeed performed, even to the utmost extent of his own comprehensive interpretation of the phrase. The good servant of his country slept not before his task was fulfilled, for, by the victory in which he fell, the naval force of the enemy was altogether destroyed, and the threat of invasion silenced for ever.

It is a remarkable coincidence, that Mack's surrender having taken place on the 20th October, Napoleon was probably entering Ulm in triumph upon the very day, when the united remains of his maritime force, and the means on which, according to his own subsequent account, he relied for the subjugation of England, were flying, striking, and sinking, before the banners of Nelson. What his feelings may have been on learning the news, we have no certain means of ascertaining. The Memoirs

[1] See, for these and other particulars of the battle of Trafalgar, Southey's *Life of Nelson*, a work already repeatedly quoted It is the history of a hero, in the narrative of which are evinced at once the judgment and fidelity of the historian, with the imagination of the poet It well deserves to be, what already it is, the text book of the British navy

of Fouché say, upon the alleged authority of Berthier, that his emotion was extreme, and that his first exclamation was, « I cannot be everywhere! » implying, certainly, that his own presence would have changed the scene. The same idea occurs in his conversations with Las Cases. It may be greatly doubted, however, whether Napoleon would have desired to have been on board the best ship in the French navy on that memorable occasion; and it seems pretty certain, that his being so could have had no influence whatever on the fate of the day. The unfortunate Villeneuve dared not trust to his master's forgiveness. « He ought, » so Buonaparte states it, « to have been victorious, and he was defeated. » For this, although the mishap which usually must attend one out of the two commanders who engage in action, Villeneuve felt there was no apology to be accepted, or even offered, and the brave but unhappy seaman committed suicide. Buonaparte, on all occasions, spoke with disrespect of his memory, nor was it a sign of his judgment in nautical matters, that he preferred to this able, but unfortunate admiral, the gasconading braggart, Latouche Treville.[1]

[1] This admiral commanded at Toulon in 1804, and having stolen out of harbour with a strong squadron, when the main body of the English fleet was out of sight, had the satisfaction to see three vessels, under Rear-Admiral Campbell, retreat before his superior force. This unusual

The unfortunate event of the battle of Trafalgar was not permitted to darken the brilliant picture, which the extraordinary campaign of Ulm and Austerlitz enabled the victor to present to the empire which he governed, and which detailed his successes in the full-blown pride of conquest. « His armies, » he said, addressing the Legislative Body, the session of which he opened with great pomp on 2d March, 1806, « had never ceased to conquer, until he commanded them to cease to combat. His enemies were humbled and confounded—the royal house of Naples had ceased to reign *for ever*—(the term was too comprehensive)—the entire peninsula of Italy now made a part of the Great Empire—his generosity had permitted the return of the defeated Russians to their own country, and had re-established the throne of Austria, after punishing her by the

circumstance so elated Monsieur Latouche Treville, that he converted the affair into a general pursuit of the whole British fleet, and of Nelson himself, who, he pretended, fled before him. Nelson was so much nettled at his effrontery, that he wrote to his brother, « You will have seen Latouche's letter, how he chased me and how I run. I keep it, and if I take him, by God, he shall eat it. » Latouche escaped this punishment by dying of the fatigue incurred by walking so often up to the signal-post at Sepet, to watch for the momentary absence of the blockading squadron, which he pretended dared not face him. This man Buonaparte considered as the boast of the French navy.

privation of a part of her dominions.» Trafalgar was then touched upon. « A tempest,» he said, « had deprived him of some few vessels, after a combat imprudently entered into;» —and thus he glossed over a calamitous and decisive defeat, in which so many of his hopes were shipwrecked.

When a sovereign has not sufficient greatness of mind to acknowledge his losses, we may, without doing him wrong, suspect him of exaggerating his successes. Those of France, in her external relations, were indeed scarcely capable of being over-estimated. But when Monsieur de Champagny, on the 5th March following, made a relation of the internal improvements of France under the government of Buonaparte, he seems to have assumed the merit of those which only existed upon paper, and of others which were barely commenced, as well as of some that were completed. All was of course ascribed to the inspiring genius of the Emperor, to whose agency France was indebted for all her prosperity. The credit of the good city of Paris was restored, and her revenue doubled—agriculture was encouraged, by the draining of immense morasses—mendicity was abolished. Beneficial results, apparently inconsistent with each other, were produced by his regulations—the expenses of legal proceedings were abridged, and the appointments of the judges were raised. Im-

mense and most expensive improvements, which, in other countries, or rather under other sovereigns, are necessarily reserved for times of peace, were carried on by Napoleon during the most burdensome wars against entire Europe. Forty millions had been expended on public works, of which eight great canals were quoted with peculiar emphasis, as opening all the departments of the empire to the influence of internal navigation. To conclude, the Emperor had established three hundred and seventy schools—had restored the rites of religion—reinforced public credit by supporting the Bank—reconciled jarring factions—diminished the public imposts—and ameliorated the condition of every existing Frenchman. To judge from the rapturous expressions of Monsieur de Champagny, the Emperor was already the subject of deserved adoration: it only remained to found temples and raise altars.

Much of this statement was unquestionably the exaggeration of flattery, which represented every thing as commenced as soon as it had been resolved upon by the sovereign, every thing finished as soon as it was begun. Other measures there were, which, like the support afforded to the Bank, merely repaired injuries which Napoleon himself had inflicted. The credit of this commercial establishment had been shaken, because, in setting off for the campaign, Napoleon had stripped it of the re-

serve of specie laid up to answer demands; and it was restored, because his return with victory had enabled him to replace what he had borrowed. Considering that there was no small hazard of his being unable to remedy the evil which he had certainly occasioned, his conduct on the occasion scarcely deserves the name of a national benefit.

Some part of this exaggeration might even deceive Napoleon. It is one of the great disadvantages of despotism, that the sovereign himself is liable to be imposed upon by false representations of this nature; as it is said the Empress Catherine was flattered by the appearance of distant villages and towns in the desert places of her empire, which were, in fact, no more than painted representations of such objects, upon the plan of those that are exhibited on the stage, or are erected as points of view in some fantastic pleasure gardens. It was a part of Buonaparte's character to seize with ready precision upon general ideas of improvement. Wherever he came, he formed plans of important public works, many of which never existed but in the bulletin. Having issued his general orders, he was apt to hold them as executed. It was impossible to do all himself, or even to overlook with accuracy those to whom the details were committed. There were, therefore, many magnificent schemes commenced, under feelings of the moment,

which were left unfinished for want of funds, or perhaps because they only regarded some points of local interest, and there were many adopted that were forgotten amid the hurry of affairs, or postponed till the moment of peace, which was never to appear during his reign.

But with the same frankness with which history is bound to censure the immeasurable ambition of this extraordinary man, she is bound also to record that his views towards the improvement of his empire were broad, clear-sighted, and public-spirited; and we think it probable, that, had his passion for war been a less predominant point of his character, his care, applied to the objects of peace, would have done as much for France, as Augustus did for Rome. Still it must be added, that, having bereft his country of her freedom, and proposing to transmit the empire, like his own patrimony, to his heirs, the evil which he had done to France was as permanent as his system of government, while the benefits which he had conferred on her, to whatever extent they might have been realized, must have been dependent upon his own life, and the character of his successor.

But as such reflections had not prevented Napoleon from raising the fabric of supreme power, to the summit of which he had ascended, so they did not now prevent him from surrounding and strengthening it with such addi-

tional bulwarks as he could find materials for erecting, at the expense of the foes whom he subdued. Sensible of the difficulty, or rather the impossibility, of retaining all power in his own hands, he now bent himself so to modify and organize the governments of the countries adjacent, that they should always be dependent upon, France; and to insure this point, he determined to vest immediate relations of his own with the supreme authority in those states, which, under the name of allies, were to pay to France the same homage in peace, and render her the same services in war, which ancient Rome exacted from the countries which she had subdued. Germany, Holland, and Italy, were each destined to furnish an appanage to the princes born of the Imperial blood of Napoleon, or connected with it by matrimonial alliances. In return for these benefits, Buonaparte was disposed to subject his brothers to the ordinary monarchical restrictions, which preclude princes nearly connected with the throne, from forming marriages according to their own private inclinations, and place them in this respect entirely at the devotion of the monarch, and destined to form such political alliances as may best suit his views. They belonged, he said, in the decree creating them, entirely to the country, and must therefore lay aside every sentiment of individual feeling, when the public weal required such a sacrifice

Two of Napoleon's brothers resisted this species of authority. The services which Lucien had rendered him, upon the 18th Brumaire, although without his prompt assistance that daring adventure might have altogether failed, had not saved him from falling under the Imperial displeasure. It is said that he had disapproved of the destruction of the Republic, and that, in remonstrating against the murder of the Duke d'Enghien, he had dared to tell his brother, that such conduct would cause the people to cast himself and his kindred into the common sewer, as they had done the corpse of Marat. But Lucien's principal offence consisted in his refusing to part with his wife, a beautiful and affectionate woman, for the purpose of forming an alliance more suited to the views of Napoleon. He remained, therefore, long in a private situation, notwithstanding the talent and decision which he had evinced on many occasions during the Revolution, and was only restored to his brother's favour and countenance, when, after his return from Elba, his support became again of importance. Jérôme, the youngest brother of the family, incurred also for a time his brother's displeasure, by having formed a matrimonial connexion with an American lady of beauty and accomplishments. Complying with the commands of Napoleon, he was at a later period restored to his favour, but at present he

too was in disgrace. Neither Lucien nor Jérôme were therefore mentioned in the species of entail, which, in default of Napoleon's naming his successor, destined the French Empire to Joseph and Louis in succession; nor were the former called upon to partake in the splendid provisions, which, after the campaign of Austerlitz, Napoleon was enabled to make for the other members of his family.

Of these establishments, the most princely were the provinces of Holland, which Napoleon now converted into a kingdom, and conferred upon Louis Buonaparte. This transmutation of a republic, whose independence was merely nominal, into a kingdom, which was completely and absolutely subordinate, was effected by little more than an expression of the French Emperor's will that such an alteration should take place. The change was accomplished without attracting much attention; for the Batavian Republic was placed so absolutely at Buonaparte's mercy, as to have no power whatever to dispute his pleasure. They had followed the French Revolution through all its phases; and under their present constitution, a Grand Pensionary, who had the sole right of presenting new laws for adoption, and who was accountable to no one for the acts of his administration, corresponded to the First Consul of the French Consular Government. This office-bearer was now to assume the name of

King, as his prototype had done that of Emperor; but the king was to be chosen from the family of Buonaparte.

On the 18th March, 1806, the secretary of the Dutch Legation at Paris arrived at the Hague, bearing a secret commission. The States-General were convoked—the Grand Pensionary was consulted—and finally, a deputation was sent to Paris, requesting that the Prince Louis Napoleon should be created hereditary King of Holland. Buonaparte's assent was graciously given, and the transaction was concluded.

It is indeed probable, that though the change was in every degree contradictory of their habits and opinions, the Dutch submitted to it as affording a prospect of a desirable relief from the disputes and factions which then divided their government. Louis Buonaparte was of a singularly amiable and gentle disposition. Besides his near relationship to Napoleon, he was married to Hortensia, the daughter of Joséphine, step-child of course to the Emperor, and who was supposed to share a great proportion of his favour. The conquered States of Holland, no longer the High and Mighty, as they had been accustomed to style themselves, hoped, in adopting a monarch so nearly and intimately connected with Buonaparte, and received from his hand, that they might be permitted to enjoy the protection of

France, and be secured against the subaltern oppression exercised over their commerce and their country. The acceptance of Louis as their king, they imagined, must establish for them a powerful protector in the councils of that autocrat, at whose disposal they were necessarily placed. Louis Buonaparte was therefore received as King of Holland. How far the prince and his subjects experienced fulfilment of the hopes which both naturally entertained, belongs to another page of this history.

Germany also was doomed to find more than one appanage for the Buonaparte family. The effect of the campaign of Ulm and Austerlitz had been almost entirely destructive of the influence which the house of Austria had so long possessed in the south-west districts of Germany. Stripped of her dominions in the Vorarlberg and the Tyrol, as she had formerly been of the larger portion of the Netherlands, she was flung far back from that portion of Germany bordering on the right of the Rhine, where she had formerly exercised so much authority, and often, it must be confessed, with no gentle hand.

Defeated and humbled, the Emperor of Austria was no longer able to offer any opposition to the projects of aggrandizement which Napoleon meditated in those confines of the empire which lay adjacent to the Rhine and

to France, of which that river had been declared the boundary; nor indeed to his scheme of entirely new-modelling the empire itself.

Prussia, however, remained a party interested, and too formidable, from her numerous armies and high military reputation, to be despised by Napoleon. He was indeed greatly dissatisfied with her conduct during the campaign, and by no means inclined either to forget or to forgive the menacing attitude which the Court of Berlin had assumed, although finally determined by the course of events to abstain from actual hostility. Yet notwithstanding these causes of irritation, Napoleon still esteemed it more politic to purchase Prussia's acquiescence in his projects by a large sacrifice to her selfish interests, than to add her to the number of his avowed enemies. She was therefore to be largely propitiated at the expense of some other state.

We have already noticed the critical arrival of Haugwitz, the prime-minister of Prussia, at Vienna, and how the declaration of war against France, with which he was charged, was exchanged for a friendly congratulation to Napoleon by the event of the battle of Austerlitz. Napoleon was no dupe to the versatility of the Prussian cabinet; but the Archduke Ferdinand had rallied a large army in Bohemia—his brother Charles was at the

head of a yet larger in Hungary—Alexander, though defeated, refused to enter into any treaty, and retained a menacing attitude, and, victor as he was, Buonaparte could not wish to see the great and highly-esteemed military force of Prussia thrown into the scale against him. He entered, therefore, into a private treaty with Haugwitz, whom he found on this, as on former occasions, much devoted to the French interest. By this agreement, Prussia was to cede to France, or rather to place at her disposal, the territories of Anspach and Bareuth, and, by way of indemnification, was to have the countenance of France in occupying Hanover, from which the French troops had been withdrawn to join the Grand Army.

The conduct of the Prussian minister,—for with him, rather than with his court, the fault lay,—was at once mean-spirited and unprincipled. He made his country surrender to France that very territory which the French armies had so recently violated; and he accepted as an indemnification the provinces belonging to the King of Britain, with whom Prussia was so far from having any quarrel, that she had been on the point of making common cause with her against the aggressions of France; and which provinces had been seized by France in violation of the rights of neutrality claimed by the Elector of

Hanover, as a member of the Germanic Body. Such gross and complicated violations of national law and justice have often carried with them their own punishment, nor did they fail to do so in the present instance.

Those states, Anspach and Bareuth, with Clèves, which had been ceded by Bavaria, were united into what was called the Grand Duchy of Berg, which was conferred as an appanage upon Joachim Murat. Originally a soldier of fortune, and an undaunted one, Murat had raised himself to eminence in the Italian campaigns. On the 18th Brumaire, he commanded the party which drove the Council of Five Hundred out of their hall. In reward for this service, he obtained the command of the Consular Guard, and the hand of Marie Annonciade, afterwards called Caroline, sister of Napoleon. Murat was particularly distinguished as a cavalry officer; his handsome person, accomplished horsemanship, and daring bravery at the head of his squadrons, procured him the title of *Le Beau Sabreur*. Out of the field of battle he was but a weak man, liable to be duped by his own vanity, and the flattery of those around him. He affected a theatrical foppery in dress, which rather evinced a fantastic love of finery than good taste; and hence he was sometimes called King Franconi, from the celebrated mountebank of that name. His wife

Caroline was an able woman, and well versed in political intrigue. It will presently be found that they arose to higher fortunes than the Grand Duchy of Berg. Meantime, Murat was invested with the hereditary dignity of Grand Admiral of France; for it was the policy of Buonaparte to maintain the attachment of the new princes to the Great Nation, were it but by wearing some string or tassel of his own imperial livery.

The fair territories of Naples and Sicily were conferred upon Joseph; the former in possession, the latter in prospect. He was a good man, who often strove to moderate the fits of violence to which his brother gave way. In society, he was accomplished and amiable, fond of letters, and, though not possessed of any thing approaching his brother's high qualifications, had yet good judgment as well as good inclinations. Had he continued King of Naples, it is probable he might have been as fortunate as Louis, in conciliating the respect of his subjects; but his transference to Spain was fatal to his reputation. In conformity with the policy which we have noticed, the King of Naples was to continue a high feudatory of the Empire, under the title of the Vice-Grand Elector.

The principality of Lucca had been already conferred on Eliza, the eldest sister of Buonaparte, and was now augmented by the districts

of Massa-Carara and Gafagnana. She was a woman of a strong and masculine character, which did not, however, prevent her giving way to the feminine weakness of encouraging admirers, who, it is said, did not sigh in vain.

The public opinion was still less favourable to her younger sister Pauline, who was one of the most beautiful women in France, and perhaps in Europe. Leclerc, her first husband, died in the fatal expedition to St Domingo, and she was afterwards married to the Prince Borghese. Her encouragement of the fine arts was so little limited by the ordinary ideas of decorum, that the celebrated Canova was permitted to model from her person a naked Venus, the most beautiful, it is said, of his works.[1] Scandal went the horrible length of imputing to Pauline an intrigue with her own brother, which we willingly reject as a crime too hideous to be even mentioned, far less imputed to any one, without the most satisfactory evidence. The gross and guilty enormities practised by the ancient Roman emperors do not belong to the character of Buonaparte, though such foul aspersions have been cast upon him by those who were willing to repre

[1] It is said, that being asked by a lady how she could submit to such an exposure of her person, she conceived that the question only related to physical inconvenience, and answered it by assuring her friend that the apartment was properly aired.

sent him as in all respects the counterpart of Tiberius or Caligula. Pauline Borghese received the principality of Guastalla, in the distribution of honours among the family of Napoleon.

At this period, also, Buonaparte began first to display a desire of engrafting his own family upon the ancient dynasties of Europe, with whom he had been so long at war, and the ruin of most of whom had contributed to his elevation. The Elector of Bavaria had to repay the patronage which raised him to the rank of king, and enlarged his territories with the fine country of the Tyrol, by forming an alliance which should mix his ancient blood with that of the family connexions of the fortunate soldier. Eugène Beauharnais, Viceroy of Italy, the son of Joséphine by her first husband, and now the adopted son of Napoleon, was wedded to the eldest daughter of the King of Bavaria. Eugène was deservedly favoured by his father-in-law, Napoleon. He was a man of talents, probity, and honour, and displayed great military skill, particularly during the Russian campaign of 1812. Stéphanie Beauharnais, the niece of Joséphine, was married about the same time to the Hereditary Prince of Baden, son to the reigning Duke, the neutrality of whose territories had been violated in the seizure of the Duke d'Enghien.

These various kingdoms and principalities,

erected in favour of his nearest relations, imposed on the mind a most impressive image of Buonaparte's unlimited authority, who distributed crowns among his kinsfolks as ordinary men give vails to their domestics. But the sound policy of his conduct may be greatly doubted. We have elsewhere stated the obvious objections to the transference of cities and kingdoms from hand to hand, with as little ceremony as the circulation of a commercial bill payable to the holder. Authority is a plant of a slow growth, and to obtain the full veneration which renders it most effectual, must have risen by degrees in the place which it overshadows and protects. Suddenly transferred to new regions, it is apt to pine and to perish. The theoretical evils of a long-established government are generally mitigated by some practical remedy, or those who suffer by them have grown callous from habit. The reverse is the case with a newly-established domination, which has no claim to the veneration due to antiquity, and to which the subjects are not attached by the strong though invisible chains of long habit.

Fox, in his own nervous language, has left his protest against the principle adopted at this time in Europe, of transferring the subjects of one prince to another by way of equivalents, and under the pretext of general arrangement. « The wildest schemes,» he remarked, « that

were ever before broached, would not go so far to shake the foundations of all established government, as this new practice. There must be in every nation a certain attachment of the people to its form of government, without which no government could exist. The system, then, of transferring the subjects of one prince to another, strikes at the foundation of every government, and the existence of every nation.»

These observations apply generally to violent alterations upon the European system; but other and more special objections arise to Buonaparte's system of erecting thrones in Holland, in Naples, and all through Europe, for the members of his own family. It was particularly impolitic, as marking too strongly his determination to be satisfied with nothing less than the dominion of the world; for while he governed France in his own person, the disposing of other countries to his brothers and near relations, feudatories of France, and his dependents as well by blood as by allegiance, what else could be expected than that the independence of such kingdoms must be merely nominal, and their monarchs bound to act in every respect as the agents of Buonaparte's pleasure? This, indeed, was their most sacred duty, according to his own view of the matter, and he dilated upon it to Las Cases while at St Helena. The following passage

contains an express avowal of the principles on which he desired and expected his brothers to regulate the governments intrusted to them:—

« At another time the Emperor recurred to the subject of his relations, the little aid he had received from them, the embarrassment and mischief which they had caused him. He dwelt especially on that false idea upon their part, that when once placed at the head of a state, they ought to identify themselves with it to such an extent, as to prefer its interests to those of the common country. He agreed, that the source of this sentiment might be in some degree honourable, but contended that they made a false and hurtful application of it, when, in their whims of absolute independence, they considered themselves as in an isolated posture, not observing that they made only parts of a great system, the movements of which it was their business to aid, and not to thwart.»[1]

This is explaining in few words the principle on which Napoleon established these subsidiary monarchies, which was not for the benefit of the people of whom they were respectively composed, but for the service of France, or more properly of himself, the sole moving principle by which France was govern-

[1] Las Cases, tome VII. p. 194

ed. In devolving the crown of Holland on the son of Louis, after the abdication of Louis, he repeats the same principle as a fundamental condition of its tenure. «Never forget,» he said, «that in the situation to which my political system, and the interest of my empire have called you, your *first* duty is towards ME, your *second* towards France. All your other duties, even those towards the people whom I have called you to govern, rank after these.»

When Napoleon censures his delegate princes for preferring the interest of the kingdoms which he had assigned them, instead of sacrificing it to him and his government, he degrades them into mere puppets, which might indeed bear regal titles and regal attendance, but, entirely dependent on the will of another, had no choice save to second the views of an ambition, the most insatiable certainly that ever reigned in a human breast.

This secret did not remain concealed from the Dutch, from the Neapolitans, or other foreigners, subjected to these pageant monarchs, and as it naturally incensed them against Napoleon's government, so it prevented the authority which he had delegated from obtaining either affection or reverence, and disposed the nations who were subjected to it to take the first opportunity of casting the yoke aside.

The erection of these kindred monarchies

was not the only mode by which Napoleon endeavoured to maintain an ascendancy in the countries which he had conquered, and which he desired to retain in dependence upon France, though not nominally or directly making parts of the French empire. Buonaparte had already proposed to his council the question, whether the creation of Grandees of the Empire, a species of nobility whose titles were to depend, not on their descent, but on their talents and services to the state, was to be considered as a violation of the laws of liberty and equality. He was universally answered in the negative; for, having now acquired a hereditary monarch, it seemed a natural, if not an indispensable consequence, that France should have peers of the kingdom, and great officers of the crown. Such an establishment, according to Buonaparte's view, would at once place his dignity on the same footing with those of the other courts of Europe (an assimilation to which he attached a greater degree of consequence than was consistent with policy), and by blending the new nobles of the empire with those of the ancient kingly government would tend to reconcile the modern state of things with such relics of the old court as yet existed.

From respect, perhaps, to the republican opinions which had so long predominated, the titles and appanages of these grand feudatories were not chosen within the bounds of

France herself, but from provinces which had experienced the sword of the ruler. Fifteen dukedoms, grand fiefs, not of France, but of the French empire, which extended far beyond France itself, were created by the fiat of the Emperor. The income attached to each amounted to the fifteenth part of the revenue of the province, which gave title to the dignitary. The Emperor invested with these endowments those who had best served him in war and in state affairs. Princedoms also were erected, and while mareschals and ministers were created Dukes, the superior rank of Prince was bestowed on Talleyrand, Bernadotte, and Berthier, by the titles of Beneventum, Ponte-Corvo, and Neufchâtel.

The transformation of republican generals and ancient Jacobins into the peerage of a monarchical government, gave a species of incongruity to this splendid masquerade, and more than one of the personages showed not a little awkwardness in supporting their new titles. It is true, the high degree of talent annexed to some of the individuals thus promoted, the dread inspired by others, and the fame in war which many had acquired, might bear them out against the ridicule which was unsparingly heaped upon them in the saloons frequented by the ancient noblesse; but, whatever claims these dignitaries had to the respect of the public, had been long theirs, and re-

ceived no accession from their new honours and titles.

In this, and on similar occasions, Napoleon overshot his aim, and diminished to a certain extent his reputation, by seeming to set a value upon honours, titles, and ceremonies, which, if matters of importance to other courts, were certainly not such as *he* ought to have rested his dignity upon. Ceremonial is the natural element of a long-established court, and etiquette and title are the idols which are worshipped there. But Buonaparte reigned by his talents and his sword. Like Mezentius in the Æneid, he ought to have acknowledged no other source of his authority.[1] It was imprudent to appear to attach consequence to points, which even his otherwise almost boundless power could not attain, since his nobility and his court-ceremonial must still retain the rawness of novelty, and could no more possess that value, which, whether real or imaginary, has been generally attached to ancient institutions and long descent, than the Emperor could, by a decree of his complaisant Senate, have given his modern coinage the value which antiquaries attach to ancient medals. It was imprudent to descend to a strife in which he must necessarily be overcome,

[1] Dextra mihi deus, et telum, quod missile libro,
Nunc adsint — —

Æneidos Lib. X.

for where power rests in a great measure on public opinion, it is diminished in proportion to its failure in objects aimed at, whether of greater or less consequence. This half-feudal half-oriental establishment of grand feudatories, with which Buonaparte now began to decorate the structure of his power, may be compared to the heavy Gothic devices with which modern architects sometimes overlay the front of their buildings, where they always encumber what they cannot ornament, and sometimes overload what they are designed to support.

The system of the new Noblesse was settled by an Imperial edict of Napoleon himself, which was communicated to the Senate 30th March, 1806, not for the purpose of deliberation or acceptance, but merely that, like the old Parliament of Paris, they might enter it upon their register.

The court of Buonaparte now assumed a character of the strictest etiquette, in which these important trifles, called by a writer on the subject the «Superstitions of Gentlemen Ushers,» were treated as matters of serious import, and sometimes occupied the thoughts of Napoleon himself, and supplied the place of meditated conquest, and the future destruction or erection of kingdoms.

The possessors of ancient titles, tempted by revival of the respect paid to birth and rank,

did not fail to mingle with those whose nobility rested on the new creation. The Emperor distinguished these ancient minions of royalty with considerable favour, as, half-blushing for their own apostacy in doing homage to Buonaparte in the palace of the Bourbons, half-sneering at the maladroit and awkward manners of their new associates, they mingled among the men of new descent, and paid homage to the monarch of the day, «because,» as one of them expressed himself to Madame de Staël, «one must serve some one or other.» Buonaparte encouraged these nobles of the ancient ante-chambers, whose superior manners seemed to introduce among his courtiers some traits of the former court, so inimitable for grace and for address, and also because he liked to rank among his retainers, so far as he could, the inheritors of those superb names which ornamented the history of France in former ages. But then he desired to make them exclusively his own, nothing less than complete and uncompromising conversion to his government would give satisfaction. A baron of the old noblesse, who had become a counsellor of state, was in 1810 summoned to attend the Emperor at Fontainebleau.

«What would you do,» said the Emperor, «should you learn that the Comte de Lille was this instant at Paris?»

« I would inform against him, and have him arrested,» said the candidate for favour, « the law commands it »

« And what would you do if appointed a judge on his trial?» demanded the Emperor again.

« I would condemn him to death,» said the unhesitating noble, « the law denounces him »

« With such sentiments you deserve a prefecture,» said the Emperor, and the catechumen, whose respect for the law was thus absolute, was made Prefect of Paris.

Such converts were searched for, and, when found, were honoured, and rewarded, and trusted For the power of recompensing his soldiers, statesmen, and adherents, the conquered countries were again the Emperor's resource National domains were reserved to a large amount throughout those countries, and formed funds, out of which gratifications and annuities were, at Napoleon's sole pleasure, assigned to the generals, officers, and soldiers of the French army, who might in this way be said to have all Europe for their paymaster. Thus every conquest increased his means of rewarding his soldiers, and that army, which was the most formidable instrument of his ambition, was encouraged and maintained at the expense of those states which had suffered most from his arms.

We have not yet concluded the important changes introduced into Europe by the consequences of the fatal campaign of Austerlitz. The Confederation of the Rhine, which withdrew from the German Empire so large a portion of its princes, and, transferring them from the influence of Austria, placed them directly and avowedly under the protection of France, was an event which tended directly to the dissolution of the Germanic League, which had subsisted since the year 800, when Charlemagne received the Imperial Crown from Pope Leo the Third.

By the new Federation of the Rhine, the courts of Wirtemberg and Bavaria, of Hesse d'Armstadt, with some petty princes of the right bank of the Rhine, formed among themselves an alliance offensive and defensive, and renounced their dependence upon the Germanic Body, of which they declared they no longer recognized the constitution. The reasons assigned for this league had considerable weight. It was urged that the countries governed by these princes were, in every case of war betwixt France and Austria, exposed to all the evils of invasion, from which the Germanic Body had no longer power to defend them. Therefore, being obliged to seek for more effectual protection from so great an evil, they placed themselves directly under the guardianship of France. Napoleon, on his part,

did not hesitate to accept the title of Protector of the Confederation of the Rhine. It is true, that he had engaged to his subjects that he would not extend the limits of his empire beyond that river, which he acknowledged as the natural boundary of France; but this engagement was not held to exclude the sort of seigniorie attached to the new Protectorate, in virtue of which he plunged the German States who composed the Confederacy into every war in which France herself engaged, and at pleasure carried their armies against other German States, their brethren in language and manners, or transferred them to more distant climates, to wage wars in which they had no interest, and to which they had received no provocation. It was also a natural consequence, that a number of inferior members of the empire, who had small tenures under the old constitutions, having no means of defence excepting their ancient rights, were abolished in their capacity of imperial feudatories, and reduced from petty sovereigns to the condition of private nobles. This, though certainly unjust in the abstract principle, was not in practice an inconvenient result of the great change introduced.

The military contingents, which the Confederation placed, not perhaps in words, but certainly in fact, at the disposal of their Protector, not less than sixty thousand men, were

of a character and in a state of military organization very superior to those which they had formerly furnished to the Germanic Body. These last, much fewer in number, were seldom in a complete state of equipment, and were generally very inferior in discipline. But Napoleon not only exacted that the contingents furnished under this new federation should be complete in numbers, and perfect in discipline and appointments, but, imparting to them, and to their officers, a spark of his own military ardour, he inspired them with a spirit of bravery and confidence which they had been far from exhibiting when in the opposite ranks. No troops in his army behaved better than those of the Confederacy of the Rhine. But the strength which the system afforded to Napoleon was only temporary, and depended on the continuance of the power by which it was created. It was too arbitrary, too artificial, and too much opposed both to the interests and national prejudices of the Germans, not to bear within it the seeds of dissolution. When the tide of fortune turned against Buonaparte after the battle of Leipsic, Bavaria hastened to join the allies for the purpose of completing his destruction, and the example was followed by all the other princes of the Rhine. It fared with Napoleon and the German Confederation, as with a necromancer and the demon whom for a certain term he has bound to his service,

and who obeys him with fidelity during the currency of the obligation; but, when that is expired, is the first to tear his employer to pieces.

Francis of Austria, seeing the empire, of which his house had been so long the head, going to pieces like a parting wreck, had no other resource than to lay aside the Imperial Crown of Germany, and to declare that league dissolved which he now saw no sufficient means of enforcing. He declared the ties dissevered which bound the various princes to him as Emperor, to each other as allies; and although he reserved the Imperial title, it was only as the sovereign of Austria, and his other hereditary states.

France became therefore in a great measure the successor to the influence and dignity of the Holy Roman Empire, as that of Germany had been proudly styled for a thousand years; and the Empire of Napoleon gained a still nearer resemblance to that of Charlemagne. At least France succeeded to the Imperial influence exercised by Austria and her empire over all the south-western provinces of that powerful district of Europe. In the eastern districts, Austria, stunned by her misfortunes and her defeats, was passive and unresisting. Prussia, in the north of Germany, was halting between two very opposite sets of counsellors; one of which, with too much confidence in the

military resources of the country, advised war with France, for which the favourable opportunity had been permitted to escape; while the other recommended, that, like the jackall in the train of the lion, Prussia should continue to avail herself of the spoils which Napoleon might permit her to seize upon, without presuming to place herself in opposition to his will. In either case, the course recommended was sufficiently perilous; but to vacillate, as the cabinet of Berlin did, betwixt the one and the other, inferred almost certain ruin.

While Napoleon thus revelled in augmented strength, and increased honours, Providence put it once more, and for the last time, in his power, to consolidate his immense empire by a general peace, maritime as well as upon the Continent.

CHAPTER XI.

Death of Pitt—He is succeeded by Fox as Prime Minister.—Circumstances which led to Negotiation with France.—The Earl of Lauderdale is sent to Paris as the British Negotiator.—Negotiation is broken off in consequence of the Refusal of England to cede Sicily to France, and Lord Lauderdale leaves Paris.—Reasonings on the Stability of Peace, had Peace been obtained.—Prussia—her Temporizing Policy—She takes alarm—An attempt made by her to form a Confederacy in opposition to that of the Rhine, is defeated by the Machinations of Napoleon.—Strong and general disposition of the Prussians to War—Legal Murder of Palm, a bookseller, by authority of Buonaparte, aggravates this feeling.—The Emperor Alexander again visits Berlin.—Prussia begins to arm in August, 1806, and, after some Negotiation, takes the Field in October, under the Duke of Brunswick.—Impolicy of the Plans of the Campaign.—Details.—Action fought, and lost by the Prussians, at Saalfeld—Followed by the decisive Defeat of Auerstadt, or Jena, on the 13th October—Particulars of the Battle—Duke of Brunswick mortally wounded—Consequences of this total Defeat.—All the strong places in Prussia given up without resistance.—Buonaparte takes possession of Berlin on the 25th.—Explanation of the different Situations of Austria and Prussia after their several Defeats.—Reflections on the Fall of Prussia.

The death of William Pitt was accelerated by the campaign of Ulm and Austerlitz, as his

health had been previously injured by the defeat of Marengo. Great as he was as a statesman, ardent in patriotism, and comprehensive in his political views, it had been too much the habit of that great minister, to trust, for some re-establishment of the balance of power on the Continent, to the exertions of the ancient European governments, whose efforts had gradually become fainter and fainter, and their spirits more and more depressed, when opposed to the power of Buonaparte, whose blows, like the thunderbolt, seemed to inflict inevitable ruin wherever they burst. But, while resting too much hope on coalitions, placing too much confidence in foreign armies, and too little considering, perhaps, what might have been achieved by our own, had sufficient numbers been employed on adequate objects, Pitt maintained with unabated zeal the great principle of resistance to France, unless France should be disposed to show, that, satisfied with the immense power which she possessed, her Emperor was willing to leave to the rest of Europe such precarious independence, as his victorious arms had not yet bereft them of.

The British prime minister was succeeded, upon his death, by the statesman to whom, in life, he had waged the most uniform opposition. Charles Fox, now at the head of the British government, had uniformly professed to believe it possible to effect a solid and last-

ing peace with France, and, in the ardour of debate, had repeatedly thrown on his great adversary the blame that such had not been accomplished. When he himself became possessed of the supreme power of administration, he was naturally disposed to realize his predictions, if Napoleon should be found disposed to admit a treaty upon any thing like equal terms. In a visit to Paris during the peace of Amiens, Mr Fox had been received with great distinction by Napoleon. The private relations betwixt them were therefore of an amicable nature, and gave an opening for friendly intercourse.

The time, too, appeared favourable for negotiation; for whatever advantages had been derived by France from her late triumphant campaign on the Continent were, so far as Britain was concerned, neutralized and outbalanced by the destruction of the combined fleets. All possibility of invasion, which appears before this event to have warmly engrossed the imagination of Napoleon, seemed at an end and for ever. The delusion which represented a united navy of fifty sail of the line triumphantly occupying the British Channel, and escorting an overpowering force to the shores of England, was dispelled by the cannon of 21st October. The gay dreams, which painted a victorious army marching to London, reforming the state of England by the destruction of her aristocracy, and reducing

her to her natural condition, as Napoleon termed it, of such a dependency on France as the island of Oleron or of Corsica, were gone. After the battle of Trafalgar, all hopes were extinguished that the fair provinces of England could in any possible event have been cut up into new fiefs of the French empire. It was no longer to be dreamed, that *Dotations*, as they were termed, might be formed upon the Royal Exchange for the payment of annuities by hundreds of thousands, and by millions, for rewarding the soldiers of the Great Nation. To work purses for the French officers, that they might be filled with British gold, had of late been a favourite amusement among the fair ladies of France; but it was now evident that they had laboured in vain. All these hopes and projects were swallowed up in the billows which entombed the wrecks of Trafalgar.

In a word, if Austria had fallen in the contest of 1805, Britain stood more pre-eminent than ever; and it might have been rationally expected, that the desire of war on the part of Napoleon should have ended, when every prospect of bringing that war to the conclusive and triumphant termination which he meditated, had totally disappeared. The views of the British cabinet, also, we have said, were now amicable, and an incident occurred for opening a negotiation, under circumstances which

seemed to warrant the good faith of the English ministers.

A person pretending to be an adherent of the Bourbons, but afterwards pretty well understood to be an agent of the French government, acting upon the paltry system of espionage which had infected both their internal and exterior relations, obtained an audience of Mr Fox, for the purpose, as he pretended, of communicating to the British minister a proposal for the assassination of Buonaparte. It had happened, that Mr Fox, in conversation with Napoleon, while at Paris, had indignantly repelled a charge of this kind, which the latter brought against some of the English ministry. « Clear your head of that nonsense, » was said to be his answer, with more of English bluntness than of French politeness. Perhaps Buonaparte was desirous of knowing whether his practice would keep pace with his principles, and on this principle had encouraged the spy. Fox, as was to be expected, not only repelled with abhorrence the idea suggested by this French agent, but caused it to be communicated to the French Emperor; and this gave rise to a negotiation for peace. Lord Yarmouth, and afterwards Lord Lauderdale, acted for the British government; Champagny and general Clarke for the Emperor of France. Napoleon, who, like most foreigners, had but an inaccurate idea of the internal structure of the British constitution had expected to find a French

party in the bosom of England, and was surprised to find that a few miscreants of the lowest rank, whom he had been able to bribe, were the only English who were accessible to foreign influence; and that the party which had opposed the war with France in all its stages were nevertheless incapable of desiring to see it cease on such terms as were dishonourable to the country.

The French commissioners made several concessions, and even intimated, in verbal conference with Lord Yarmouth, that they would be content to treat upon the principle of *uti possidetis*, that is, of allowing each party to retain such advantages as she had been able to gain by her arms during the war. But when the treaty was farther advanced, the French negotiators resisted this rule, and showed themselves disposed to deny that they had ever assented to it.

They were indeed willing to resign a long-contested point, and consented that the island of Malta, with the Cape of Good Hope, and other possessions in the East and West Indies, should remain under the dominion of Great Britain. But then they exacted the surrender of Sicily and Naples, proposing that Ferdinand should be indemnified at the expense of Spain by the cession of the Balearic Isles. Britain could not implicitly consent to this last proposition, either in policy, or in justice to her un-

fortunate ally. Naples was indeed occupied by the French, and had received Joseph Buonaparte as her king; but the insular situation of Sicily rendered it easy for Britain to protect that rich island, which was still in the possession of its legitimate monarch. The principle of *uti possidetis* was therefore in favour of the English, so far as Sicily was concerned, as it was in that of the French in the case of Naples. The English envoy, for this reason, refused an ultimatum, in which the cession of Sicily was made an indispensable article. Lord Lauderdale, at the same time, demanded his passports, which, however, he did not receive for several days, as if there had been some hopes of renewing the treaty.

Buonaparte was put to considerable inconvenience by the shrewdness and tenacity of the noble negotiator, and had not forgotten them when, in 1815, he found himself on board the Bellerophon, commanded by a relation of the noble earl. It is indeed probable, that had Mr Fox lived, the negotiation might have been renewed. That eminent statesman, then in his last illness, was desirous to accomplish two great objects—peace with France, and the abolition of the slave trade. But although Buonaparte's deference for Fox might have induced him to concede some of the points in dispute, and although the British statesman's desire of peace might have made

him relinquish others on the part of England, still, while the two nations retained their relative power and positions, the deep jealousy and mutual animosity which subsisted between them would probably have rendered any peace which could have been made a mere suspension of arms—a hollow and insincere truce, which was almost certain to give way on the slightest occasion. Britain could never have seen with indifference Buonaparte making one stride after another towards universal dominion; and Buonaparte could not long have borne with patience the neighbourhood of our free institutions and our free press; the former of which must have perpetually reminded the French of the liberty they had lost, while the latter was sure to make the Emperor, his government, and his policy, the daily subject of the most severe and unsparing criticism. Even the war with Prussia and Russia, in which Napoleon was soon afterwards engaged, would in all probability have renewed the hostilities between France and England, supposing them to have been terminated for a season by a temporary peace. Yet Napoleon always spoke of the death of Fox as one of the fatalities on which his great designs were shipwrecked; which makes it the more surprising that he did not resume intercourse with the administration formed under his auspices, and who might have been supposed to be animated by his

principles even after his decease. That he did not do so may be fairly received in evidence to show, that peace, unless on terms which he could dictate, was not desired by him.

As the conduct of Prussia had been fickle and versatile during the campaign of Austerlitz, the displeasure of Napoleon was excited in proportion against her. She had, it is true, wrenched from him an unwilling acquiescence in her views upon Hanover. By the treaty which Haugwitz had signed at Vienna, after the battle of Austerlitz, it was agreed that Prussia should receive the Electoral dominions of the King of England, his ally, instead of Anspach, Bareuth, and Neufchâtel, which she was to cede to France. The far superior value of Hanover was to be considered as a boon to Prussia, in guerdon of her neutrality. But Napoleon did not forgive the hostile disposition which Prussia had manifested, and it is probable he waited with anxiety for the opportunity of inflicting upon her condign chastisement. He continued to maintain a large army in Swabia and Franconia, and, by introducing troops into Westphalia, intimated, not obscurely, an approaching rupture with his ally. Meantime, under the influence of conflicting councils, Prussia proceeded in a course of politics which rendered her odious for her

rapacity, and contemptible for the short-sighted views under which she indulged it.

It was no matter of difficulty for the Prussian forces to take possession of Hanover, which, when evacuated by Bernadotte and his army, lay a prey to the first invader, with the exception of the fortress of Hamelen, still occupied by a French garrison. The Electorate, the hereditary dominions of the King of Great Britain, with whom Prussia was at profound peace, was accordingly seized upon, and her cabinet pretended to justify that usurpation by alleging, that Hanover, having been transferred to France by the rights of war, had been ceded to the Prussian government in exchange for other districts. At the same time, an order of the Prussian monarch shut his ports in the Baltic against the admission of British vessels. These measures, taken together, were looked upon by England as intimating determined and avowed hostility, and Fox described, in the House of Commons, the conduct of Prussia, as a compound of the most hateful rapacity with the most contemptible servility. War was accordingly declared against her by Great Britain; and her flag being banished from the ocean by the English cruizers, the mouth of the Elbe and the Prussian seaports were declared in a state of blockade, and her trade was subjected to a corresponding degree of distress.

Meantime, it was the fate of Prussia to find, that she held by a very insecure tenure that very Electorate, the price of her neutrality at Austerlitz, and which was farther purchased at the expense of war with England. Her ministers, while pressing France to confirm the cession of Hanover, had the mortification to discover that Napoleon, far from regarding the Prussian right in it as indefeasible, was in fact negotiating for a general peace, upon the condition, amongst others, that the Electorate should be restored to the King of England, its hereditary sovereign. While the disclosure of this double game showed Frederick William upon what insecure footing he held the premium assigned to Prussia by the treaty of Vienna, farther discovery of the projects of France seemed to impel him to change the pacific line of his policy.

Hitherto the victories of Napoleon had had for their chief consequences the depression of Austria, and the diminution of that power which was the natural and ancient rival of the house of Brandenburg. But now, when Austria was thrust back to the eastward, and deprived of her influence in the south-west of Germany, Prussia saw with just alarm that France was assuming that influence herself, and that, unless opposed, she was likely to become as powerful in the north of Germany, as she had rendered herself in the south-

western circles. Above all, Prussia was alarmed at the Confederacy of the Rhine, an association which placed under the direct influence of France so large a proportion of what had been lately component parts of the Germanic Empire. The dissolution of the Germanic Empire itself was an event no less surprising and embarrassing; for, besides all the other important points, in which the position of Prussia was altered by the annihilation of that ancient confederacy, she lost thereby the prospect of her own monarch being, upon the decline of Austria, chosen to wear the imperial crown, as the most powerful member of the federation.

One way remained to balance the new species of power which France had acquired by these innovations on the state of Europe. It was possible, by forming the northern princes of the German empire into a league of the same character with the Confederacy of the Rhine, having Prussia instead of France for its protector, to create such an equilibrium as might render it difficult or dangerous for Buonaparte to use his means, however greatly enlarged, to disturb the peace of the north of Europe. It was, therefore, determined in the Prussian cabinet to form a league on this principle.

This proposed Northern Confederacy, however, could not well be established without

communication with France; and Buonaparte, though offering no direct opposition to the formation of a league, sanctioned by the example of the Rhine, started such obstacles to the project in detail, as were likely to render its establishment on an effectual footing impossible. It was said by his ministers, that Napoleon was to take the Hanseatic towns under his own immediate protection; that the wise prince who governed Saxony showed no desire to become a member of the proposed Confederacy; and that France would permit no power to be forced into such a measure. Finally, the Landgrave of Hesse Cassel, who was naturally reckoned upon as an important member of the proposed Northern League, was tampered with to prevail upon him to join the Confederacy of the Rhine, instead of that which was proposed to be formed under the protectorate of Prussia. This prince, afraid to decide which of these powerful nations he should adhere to, remained in a state of neutrality, notwithstanding the offers of France; and, by doing so, incurred the displeasure of Napoleon, from which in the sequel he suffered severely.

By this partial interruption and opposition, Napoleon rendered it impossible for Prussia to make any effectual efforts for combining together those remaining fragments of the German empire, over which her military power

and geographical position gave her natural influence. This disappointment, with the sense of having been outwitted by the French government, excited feelings of chagrin and resentment in the Prussian cabinet, which corresponded with the sentiments expressed by the nation at large. In the former, the predominant feeling was, despite for disappointed hopes, and a desire of revenge on the sovereign and state by whom they had been overreached; in the latter, there prevailed a keen and honourable sense that Prussia had lost her character through the truckling policy of her administration.

Whatever reluctance the cabinet of Berlin had shown to enter into hostilities with France, the court and country never appear to have shared that sensation. The former was under the influence of the young, beautiful, and high-spirited queen, and of Louis of Prussia, a prince who felt with impatience the decaying importance of that kingdom, which the victories of the Great Frederick had raised to such a pitch of glory. These were surrounded by a numerous band of noble youths, impatient for war, as the means of emulating the fame of their fathers; but ignorant how little likely were even the powerful and well-disciplined forces of Frederick, unless directed by his genius, to succeed in opposition to troops not inferior to themselves, and conducted by a

leader who had long appeared to chain victory to his chariot wheels. The sentiments of the young Prussian noblesse were sufficiently indicated, by their going to sharpen their sabres on the threshold of La Forêt, the ambassador of Napoleon, and the wilder frolic of breaking the windows of the ministers supposed to be in the French interest. The queen appeared frequently in the uniform of the regiment which bore her name, and sometimes rode herself at their head, to give enthusiasm to the soldiery. This was soon excited to the highest pitch; and had the military talents of the Prussian generals borne any correspondence to the gallantry of the officers and soldiers, an issue to the campaign might have been expected far different from that which took place. The manner in which the characters of the queen, the king, and Prince Louis, were treated in the *Moniteur*, tended still more to exasperate the quarrel; for Napoleon's studious and cautious exclusion from the government paper of such political articles as had not his own previous approbation, rendered him in reason accountable for all which appeared there.

The people of Prussia at large were clamorous for war. They, too, were sensible that the late versatile conduct of their cabinet had exposed them to the censure, and even the scorn of Europe; and that Buonaparte

seeing the crisis ended, in which the firmness of Prussia might have preserved the balance of Europe, retained no longer any respect for those whom he had made his dupes, but treated with total disregard the remonstrances, which, before the advantages obtained at Ulm and Austerlitz, he must have listened to with respect and deference.

Another circumstance of a very exasperating character took place at this time. One Palm, a bookseller at Nuremberg, had exposed to sale a pamphlet, containing remarks on the conduct of Napoleon, in which the Emperor and his policy were treated with considerable severity. The bookseller was seized upon for this offence by the French gendarmes, and transferred to Braunau, where he was brought before a military commission, tried for a libel on the Emperor of France, found guilty, and shot to death in terms of his sentence. The murder of this poor man, for such it literally was, whether immediately flowing from Buonaparte's mandate, or the effect of the furious zeal of some of his officers, excited deep and general indignation.

The constitution of many of the states in Germany is despotic; but nevertheless, the number of independent principalities, and the privileges of the free towns, have always insured to the nation at large the blessings of a free press, which, much addicted as they are

to literature, the Germans value as it deserves. The cruel effort now made to fetter this unshackled expression of opinion was, of course, most unfavourable to his authority by whom it had been commanded. The thousand presses of Germany continued on every possible opportunity to dwell on the fate of Palm, and, at the distance of six or seven years from his death, it might be reckoned among the leading causes which ultimately determined the popular opinion against Napoleon. It had not less effect at the time when the crime was committed; and the eyes of all Germany were turned upon Prussia, as the only member of the late Holy Roman League, by whom the progress of the public enemy of the liberties of Europe could be arrested in its course

Amidst the general ferment of the public mind, Alexander once more appeared in person at the court of Berlin, and, more successful than on the former occasion, prevailed on the King of Prussia at length to unsheath the sword. The support of the powerful hosts of Russia was promised; and, defeated by the fatal field of Austerlitz in his attempt to preserve the south-east of Germany from French influence, Alexander now stood forth to assist Prussia as the Champion of the North. An attempt had indeed been made through means of d'Oubril, a Russian envoy at Paris, to obtain a general peace for Europe, in concurrence

with that which Lord Lauderdale was endeavouring to negotiate on the part of Britain; but the treaty entirely miscarried.

While Prussia thus declared herself the enemy of France, it seemed to follow as a matter of course, that she should become once more the friend of Britain, and, indeed, that power lost no time in manifesting an amicable disposition on her part, by recalling the order which blockaded the Prussian ports, and annihilated her commerce. But the cabinet of Berlin evinced, in the moment when about to commence hostilities, the same selfish insincerity which had dictated all their previous conduct. While sufficiently desirous of obtaining British money to maintain the approaching war, they showed great reluctance to part with Hanover, an acquisition made in a manner so unworthy; and the Prussian minister, Lucchesini, did not hesitate to tell the British ambassador, Lord Morpeth, that the fate of the Electorate would depend upon the event of arms.

Little good could be augured from the interposition of a power, who, pretending to arm in behalf of the rights of nations, refused to part with an acquisition which she herself had made, contrary to all the rules of justice and good faith. Still less was a favourable event to be hoped for, when the management of the war was intrusted to the same inca-

pable or faithless ministers, who had allowed every opportunity to escape of asserting the rights of Prussia, when, perhaps, her assuming a firm attitude might have prevented the necessity of war altogether. But the resolution which had been delayed, when so many favourable occasions were suffered to escape unemployed, was at length adopted with an imprudent precipitation, which left Prussia neither time to adopt the wisest warlike measures, nor to look out for those statesmen and generals by whom such measures could have been most effectually executed.

About the middle of August, Prussia began to arm. Perhaps there are few examples of a war declared with the almost unanimous consent of a great and warlike people, which was brought to an earlier and more unhappy termination. On the 1st of October, Knobelsdorff, the Prussian envoy, was called upon by Talleyrand to explain the cause of the martial attitude assumed by his state. In reply, a paper was delivered, containing three propositions, or rather demands. First, That the French troops which had entered the German territory should instantly re-cross the Rhine. Secondly, That France should desist from presenting obstacles to the formation of a league in the northern part of Germany, to comprehend all the states, without exception, which had not been included in

the Confederation of the Rhine. Thirdly, that negotiations should be immediately commenced, for the purpose of detaching the fortress of Wesel from the French empire, and for the restitution of three abbeys, which Murat had chosen to seize upon as a part of his Duchy of Berg. With this manifesto was delivered a long explanatory letter, containing severe remarks on the system of encroachment which France had acted upon. Such a text and commentary, considering their peremptory tone, and the pride and power of him to whom they were addressed in such unqualified terms, must have been understood to amount to a declaration of war. And yet, although Prussia, in common with all Europe, had just reason to complain of the encroachments of France, and her rapid strides to universal empire, it would appear that the two first articles in the king's declaration, were subjects rather of negotiation than grounds of an absolute declaration of war; and that the fortress of Wesel, and the three abbeys, were scarce of importance enough to plunge the whole empire into blood for the sake of them.

Prussia, indeed, was less actually aggrieved than she was mortified and offended. She saw she had been outwitted by Buonaparte in the negotiation of Vienna; that he was juggling with her in the matter of Hanover; that

she was in danger of beholding Saxony and Hesse withdrawn from her protection, to be placed under that of France; and under a general sense of these injuries, though rather apprehended than really sustained, she hurried to the field. If negotiations could have been protracted till the advance of the Russian armies, it might have given a different face to the war; but in the warlike ardour which possessed the Prussians, they were desirous to secure the advantages which, in military affairs, belong to the assailants, without weighing the circumstances which, in their situation, rendered such precipitation fatal.

Besides, such advantages were not easily to be obtained over Buonaparte, who was not a man to be amused by words when the moment of action arrived. Four days before the delivery of the Prussian note to his minister, Buonaparte had left Paris, and was personally in the field collecting his own immense forces, and urging the contribution of those contingents which the Confederate Princes of the Rhine were bound to supply. His answer to the hostile note of the King of Prussia was addressed, not to that monarch, but to his own soldiers. « They have dared to demand, » he said, « that we should retreat at the first sight of their army. Fools! could they not reflect how impossible they found it to destroy Paris, a task incomparably more easy than to tarnish the honour of the Great

Nation. Let the Prussian army expect the same fate which they encountered fourteen years ago, since experience has not taught them, that while it is easy to acquire additional dominions and increase of power, by the friendship of France, her enmity, on the contrary, which will only be provoked by those who are totally destitute of sense and reason, is more terrible than the tempests of the ocean.»

The King of Prussia had again placed at the head of his armies the Duke of Brunswick. In his youth, this general had gained renown under his uncle Prince Ferdinand. But it had been lost in the retreat from Champagne in 1792, where he had suffered himself to be out-manœuvred by Dumourier and his army of conscripts.[1] He was seventy-two years old, and is said to have added the obstinacy of age to others of the infirmities which naturally attend it. He was not communicative, nor accessible to any of the other generals, excepting Mollendorf; and this generated a disunion of councils in the Prussian camp, and the personal dislike of the army to him by whom it was commanded.

The plan of the campaign, formed by this ill-fated Prince, seems to have been singularly injudicious, and the more so, as it is censurable on exactly the same grounds as that of

[1] See Vol II p 66.

Austria in the late war. Prussia could not expect to have the advantage of numbers in the contest. It was therefore her obvious policy to procrastinate and lengthen out negotiation, until she could have the advantage of the Russian forces. Instead of this, it was determined to rush forward towards Franconia, and oppose the Prussian army alone to the whole force of France, commanded by their renowned Emperor.

The motive, too, was similar to that which had determined Austria to advance as far as the banks of the Iller. Saxony was in the present campaign, as Bavaria in the former, desirous of remaining neuter, and the hasty advance of the Prussian armies was designed to compel the Elector Augustus to embrace their cause. It succeeded accordingly, and the sovereign of Saxony united his forces, though reluctantly, with the left wing of the Prussians, under Prince Hohenloe. The conduct of the Prussians towards the Saxons bore the same ominous resemblance to that of the Austrians to the Bavarians. Their troops behaved in the country of Saxony more as if they were in the land of a tributary than an ally, and while the assistance of the good and peaceable prince was sternly exacted, no efforts were made to conciliate his good-will, or soothe the pride of his subjects. In their behaviour to the Saxons in general, the Prussians showed too much of the haughty spirit that goes before a fall.

The united force of the Prussian army, with its auxiliaries, amounted to one hundred and fifty thousand men, confident in their own courage, in the rigid discipline which continued to distinguish their service, and in the animating recollections of the victorious career of the Great Frederick. There were many generals and soldiers in their ranks who had served under him; but, amongst that troop of veterans, Blucher alone was destined to do distinguished honour to the school.

Notwithstanding these practical errors, the address of the Prussian king to his army was in better taste than the vaunting proclamation of Buonaparte, and concluded with a passage, which, though its accomplishment was long delayed, nevertheless proved at last prophetic. —« We go,» said Frederick William, « to encounter an enemy, who has vanquished numerous armies, humiliated monarchs, destroyed constitutions, and deprived more than one state of its independence, and even of its very name. He has threatened a similar fate to Prussia, and proposes to reduce us to the dominion of a strange people, who would suppress the very name of Germans. The fate of armies, and of nations, is in the hands of the Almighty; but constant victory, and durable prosperity, are never granted save to the cause of justice.»

While Buonaparte assembled in Franconia

an army considerably superior in number to that of the Prussians, the latter occupied the country in the vicinity of the river Saale, and seemed, in doing so, to renounce all the advantage of making the attack on the enemy ere he had collected his forces. Yet to make such an attack was, and must have been, the principal motive of their hasty and precipitate advance, especially after they had secured its primary object, the accession of Saxony to the campaign. The position which the Duke of Brunswick occupied was indeed very strong as a defensive one, but the means of supporting so large an army were not easily to be obtained in such a barren country as that about Weimar; and their magazines and dépôts of provisions were injudiciously placed, not close in the rear of the army, but at Naumburg, and other places, upon their extreme left, and where they were exposed to the risk of being separated from them. It might be partly owing to the difficulty of obtaining forage and subsistence, that the Prussian army was extended upon a line by far too much prolonged to admit of mutual support. Indeed, they may be considered rather as disposed in cantonments than as occupying a military position; and as they remained strictly on the defensive, an opportunity was gratuitously afforded to Buonaparte to attack their divisions in detail; of which he did not fail to

avail himself with his usual talent. The head-quarters of the Prussians, where were the king and Duke of Brunswick, were at Weimar; their left, under Prince Hohenloe, were at Schleitz; and their right extended as far as Muhlhausen, leaving thus a space of ninety miles betwixt the extreme flanks of their line.

Buonaparte, in the mean time, commenced the campaign, according to his custom, by a series of partial actions fought on different points, in which his usual combinations obtained his usual success; the whole tending to straiten the Prussians in their position, to interrupt their communications, separate them from their supplies, and compel them to fight a decisive battle from necessity, not choice, in which dispirited troops, under baffled and outwitted generals, were to encounter with soldiers who had already obtained a foretaste of victory, and who fought under the most renowned commanders, the combined efforts of the whole being directed by the master spirit of the age.

Upon the 8th October, Buonaparte gave vent to his resentment in a bulletin, in which he complained of having received a letter of twenty pages, signed by the King of Prussia, being, as he alleged, a sort of wretched pamphlet, such as England engaged hireling authors to compose at the rate of five hundred

pounds sterling a-year. « I am sorry, » he said, « for my brother, who does not understand the French language, and has certainly never read that rhapsody. » The same publication contained much in ridicule of the queen and Prince Louis. It bears evident marks of Napoleon's own composition, which was as singular, though not so felicitous, as his mode of fighting; but it was of little use to censure either the style or the reasoning of the lord of so many legions. His arms soon made the impression which he desired upon the position of the enemy.

The French advanced, in three divisions, upon the dislocated and extended disposition of the large but ill-arranged Prussian army. It was a primary and irretrievable fault of the Duke of Brunswick, that his magazines, and reserves of artillery and ammunition, were placed at Naumburg, instead of being close in the rear of his army, and under the protection of his main body. This ill-timed separation rendered it easy for the French to interpose betwixt the Prussians and their supplies, providing they were able to clear the course of the Saale.

With this view the French right wing, commanded by Soult and Ney, marched upon Hof. The centre was under Bernadotte and Davoust, with the guard commanded by Murat. They moved on Saalburg and Schleitz.

The left wing was led by Augereau against Coburg and Saalfeld. It was the object of this grand combined movement to overwhelm the Prussian right wing, which was extended farther than prudence permitted; and, having beaten this part of the army, to turn their whole position, and possess themselves of their magazines.' After some previous skirmishes, a serious action took place at Saalfeld, where Prince Louis of Prussia commanded the advanced guard of the Prussian left wing.

In the ardour and inexperience of youth, the brave prince, instead of being contented with defending the bridge on the Saale, quitted that advantageous position, to advance with unequal forces against Lannes, who was marching upon him from Graffenthal. If bravery could have atoned for imprudence, the battle of Saalfeld would not have been lost. Prince Louis showed the utmost gallantry in leading his men when they advanced, and in rallying them when they fled. He was killed fighting hand to hand with a French subaltern, who required him to surrender, and, receiving a sabre-wound for reply, plunged his sword into the prince's body. Several of his staff fell around him.

The victory of Saalfeld opened the course of the Saale to the French, who instantly advanced on Naumburg. Buonaparte was at Gera, within half a day's journey from the

latter city, whence he sent a letter to the King of Prussia, couched in the language of a victor (for victorious he already felt himself by his numbers and position), and seasoned with the irony of a successful foe. He regretted his good brother had been made to sign the wretched pamphlet which had borne his name, but which he protested he did not impute to him as his composition. Had Prussia asked any practicable favour of him, he said he would have granted it; but she had asked his dishonour, and ought to have known there could be but one answer. In consideration of their former friendship, Napoleon stated himself to be ready to restore peace to Prussia and her monarch; and, advising his good brother to dismiss such counsellors as recommended the present war and that of 1792, he bade him heartily farewell.

Buonaparte neither expected nor received any answer to this missive, which was written under the exulting sensations experienced by the angler, when he feels the fish is hooked, and about to become his secure prey. Naumburg and its magazines were consigned to the flames, which first announced to the Prussians that the French army had gotten completely into their rear, had destroyed their magazines, and, being now interposed betwixt them and Saxony, left them no alternative save that of battle, which was to be waged at the greatest

disadvantage with an alert enemy, to whom their supineness had already given the choice of time and place for it. There was also this ominous consideration, that, in case of disaster, the Prussians had neither principle, nor order, nor line of retreat. The enemy were betwixt them and Magdeburg, which ought to have been their rallying point; and the army of the Great Frederick was, it must be owned, brought to combat with as little reflection or military science, as a herd of schoolboys might have displayed in a mutiny.

Too late determined to make some exertion to clear their communications to the rear, the Duke of Brunswick, with the King of Prussia in person, marched with great part of their army to the recovery of Naumburg. Here Davoust, who had taken the place, remained at the head of a division of six-and-thirty thousand men, with whom he was to oppose nearly double the number. The march of the Duke of Brunswick was so slow, as to lose the advantage of this superiority. He paused on the evening of the twelfth on the heights of Auerstadt, and gave Davoust time to reinforce the troops with which he occupied the strong defile of Koesen. The next morning, Davoust, with strong reinforcements, but still unequal in numbers to the Prussians, marched towards the enemy, whose columns were already in motion. The van-guard of both armies met,

without previously knowing that they were so closely approaching each other, so thick lay the mist upon the ground.

The village of Hassen-Hausen, near which the opposite armies were first made aware of each other's proximity, became instantly the scene of a severe conflict, and was taken and retaken repeatedly. The Prussian cavalry, being superior in numbers to that of the French, and long famous for its appointments and discipline, attacked repeatedly, and was as often resisted by the French squares of infantry, whom they found it impossible to throw into disorder, or break upon any point. The French having thus repelled the Prussian horse, carried at the point of the bayonet some woods and the village of Spilberg, and remained in undisturbed possession of that of Hassen-Hausen. The Prussians had by this time maintained the battle from eight in the morning till eleven, and being now engaged on all points, with the exception of two divisions of the reserve, had suffered great loss. The generalissimo, Duke of Brunswick, wounded in the face by a grape-shot, was carried off; so was General Schmettau, and other officers of distinction. The want of an experienced chief began to be felt, when, to increase the difficulties of their situation, the King of Prussia received intelligence that General Mollendorf, who commanded his right wing, stationed near

Jena, was in the act of being defeated by Buonaparte in person. The king took the generous but perhaps desperate resolution, of trying, whether in one general charge he could not redeem the fortune of the day, by defeating that part of the French with which he was personally engaged. He ordered the attack to be made along all the line, and with all the forces which he had in the field; and his commands were obeyed with gallantry enough to vindicate the honour of the troops, but not to lead to success. They were beaten off, and the French resumed the offensive in their turn.

Still the Prussian monarch, who seems now to have taken the command upon himself, endeavouring to supply the want of professional experience by courage, brought up his last reserves, and encouraged his broken troops rather to make a final stand for victory, than to retreat in face of a conquering army. This effort also proved in vain. The Prussian line was attacked everywhere at once; centre and wings were broken through by the French at the bayonet's point; and the retreat, after so many fruitless efforts, in which no division had been left unengaged, was of the most disorderly character. But the confusion was increased tenfold, when, as the defeated troops reached Weimar, they fell in with the right wing of their own army, fugitives like them-

selves, and who were attempting to retreat in the same direction. The disorder of two routed armies meeting in opposing currents, soon became inextricable. The roads were choked up with artillery and baggage waggons; the retreat became a hurried flight; and the king himself, who had shown the utmost courage during the battle of Auerstadt, was at length, for personal safety, compelled to leave the high-roads, and escape across the fields, escorted by a small body of cavalry.

While the left of the Prussian army were in the act of combating Davoust at Auerstadt, their right, as we have hinted, were with equally bad fortune engaged at Jena. This second action, though the least important of the two, has always given the name to the double battle; because it was at Jena that Napoleon was engaged in person.

The French Emperor had arrived at this town, which is situated upon the Saale, on the 13th of October, and had lost no time in issuing those orders to his mareschals, which produced the demonstrations of Davoust, and the victory of Auerstadt. His attention was not less turned to the position he himself occupied, and in which he had the prospect of fighting Mollendorf, and the right of the Prussians, on the next morning. With his usual activity, he formed or enlarged, in the course of the night, the roads by which he proposed to bring up

his artillery on the succeeding day, and, by hewing the solid rock, made a path practicable for guns to the plateau, or elevated plain in the front of Jena, where his centre was established. The Prussian army lay before them, extended on a line of six leagues, while that of Napoleon, extremely concentrated, showed a very narrow front, but was well secured both in the flanks and in the rear. Buonaparte, according to his custom, slept in the bivouac, surrounded by his guards. In the morning he harangued his soldiers, and recommended to them to stand firm against the charges of the Prussian cavalry, which had been represented as very redoubtable. As before Ulm he had promised his soldiers a repetition of the battle of Marengo, so now he pointed out to his men that the Prussians, separated from their magazines, and cut off from their country, were in the situation of Mack at Ulm. He told them that the enemy no longer fought for honour and victory, but for the chance of opening a way to retreat; and he added, that the corps which should permit them to escape would lose their honour. The French replied with loud shouts, and demanded instantly to advance to the combat. The Emperor ordered the columns destined for the attack to descend into the plain. His centre consisted of the Imperial Guard, and two divisions of Lannes. Augereau commanded the right, which rested

on a village and a forest; and Soult's division, with a part of Ney's, were upon the left.

General Mollendorf advanced on his side, and both armies, as at Auerstadt, were hid from each other by the mist, until suddenly the atmosphere cleared, and showed them to each other within the distance of half cannon-shot. The conflict instantly commenced. It began on the French right, where the Prussians attacked with the purpose of driving Augereau from the village on which he rested his extreme flank. Lannes was sent to support him, by whose succour he was enabled to stand his ground. The battle then became general; and the Prussians showed themselves such masters of discipline, that it was long impossible to gain any advantage over men, who advanced, retired, or moved to either flank, with the regularity of machines. Soult at length, by the most desperate efforts, dispossessed the Prussians opposed to him of the woods from which they had annoyed the French left; and at the same conjuncture the division of Ney, and a large reserve of cavalry, appeared upon the field of battle. Napoleon, thus strengthened, advanced the centre, consisting in a great measure of the Imperial Guard, who, being fresh and in the highest spirits, compelled the Prussian army to give way. Their retreat was at first orderly; but it was a part of Buonaparte's tactics to pour attack after attack upon a worst-

ed enemy, as the billows of a tempestuous ocean follow each other in succession, till the last waves totally disperse the fragments of the bulwark which the first have breached. Murat, at the head of the dragoons and the cavalry of reserve, charged, as one who would merit, as far as bravery could merit, the splendid destinies which seemed now opening to him. The Prussian infantry were unable to support the shock, nor could their cavalry protect them. The rout became general. Great part of the artillery was taken, and the broken troops retreated in disorder upon Weimar, where, as we have already stated, their confusion became inextricable, by their encountering the other tide of fugitives from their own left, which was directed upon Weimar also. All leading and following seemed now lost in this army, so lately confiding in its numbers and discipline. There was scarcely a general left to issue orders, scarcely a soldier disposed to obey them; and it seems to have been more by a sort of instinct, than any resolved purpose, that several broken regiments were directed, or directed themselves, upon Magdeburg, where Prince Hohenloe endeavoured to rally them.

Besides the double battle of Jena and Auerstadt, Bernadotte had his share in the conflict, as he worsted at Apolda, a village betwixt these two points of general action, a large detach-

ment. The French accounts state that 20,000 Prussians were killed and taken in the course of this fatal day; that three hundred guns fell into their power, with twenty generals, or lieutenant-generals, and standards and colours to the number of sixty.

The mismanagement of the Prussian generals in these calamitous battles, and in all the manœuvres which preceded them, amounted to infatuation. The troops also, according to Buonaparte's evidence, scarcely maintained their high character, oppressed probably by a sense of the disadvantages under which they combated. But it is unnecessary to dwell on the various causes of a defeat, when the vanquished seem neither to have formed one combined and general plan of attack in the action, nor maintained communication with each other while it endured, nor agreed upon any scheme of retreat when the day was lost. The Duke of Brunswick, too, and General Schmettau, being mortally wounded early in the battle, the several divisions of the Prussian army fought individually, without receiving any general orders, and consequently without regular plan or combined manœuvres. The consequences of the defeat were more universally calamitous than could have been anticipated, even when we consider, that no mode of retreat having been fixed on, or general rallying-place appointed, the broken army resem-

bled a covey of heath-fowl, which the sportsman marks down and destroys in detail and at his leisure.

Next day after the action, a large body of the Prussians, who, under the command of Mollendorf, had retired to Erfurt, were compelled to surrender to the victors, and the mareschal, with the Prince of Orange Fulda, became prisoners. Other relics of this most unhappy defeat met with the same fate. General Kalkreuth, at the head of a considerable division of troops, was overtaken and routed in an attempt to cross the Hartz mountains. Prince Eugène of Wirtemberg commanded an untouched body of sixteen thousand men, whom the Prussian general-in-chief had suffered to remain at Memmingen, without an attempt to bring them into the field. Instead of retiring when he heard all was lost, the prince was rash enough to advance towards Halle, as if to put the only unbroken division of the Prussian army in the way of the far superior and victorious hosts of France. He was accordingly attacked and defeated by Bernadotte.

The chief point of rallying, however, was Magdeburg, under the walls of which strong city Prince Hohenloe, though wounded, contrived to assemble an army amounting to fifty thousand men, but wanting every thing, and in the last degree of confusion. But Magdeburg

was no place of rest for them. The same improvidence, which had marked every step of the campaign, had exhausted that city of the immense magazines which it contained, and taken them for the supply of the Duke of Brunswick's army. The wrecks of the field of Jena were exposed to famine as well as the sword. It only remained for Prince Hohenloe to make the best escape he could to the Oder, and, considering the disastrous circumstances in which he was placed, he seems to have displayed both courage and skill in his proceedings. After various partial actions, however, in all of which he lost men, he finally found himself, with the advanced guard and centre of his army, on the heights of Prenzlow, without provisions, forage, or ammunition. Surrender became unavoidable; and at Prenzlow and Passewalk, nearly twenty thousand Prussians laid down their arms.

The rear of Prince Hohenloe's army did not immediately share this calamity. They were at Bortzenberg when the surrender took place, and amounted to about ten thousand men, the relics of the battle in which Prince Eugène of Wirtemberg had engaged near Weimar, and were under the command of a general whose name hereafter was destined to sound like a war trumpet—the celebrated Blucher.

In the extremity of his country's distresses, this distinguished soldier showed the same

indomitable spirit, the same activity in execution, and daringness of resolve, which afterwards led to such glorious results. He was about to leave Bortzenberg on the 29th, in consequence of his orders from Prince Hohenloe, when he learned that general's disaster at Prenzlow. He instantly changed the direction of his retreat, and, by a rapid march towards Strelitz, contrived to unite his forces with about ten thousand men, gleanings of Jena and Auerstadt, which, under the Dukes of Weimar and of Brunswick Oels, had taken their route in that direction. Thus reinforced, Blucher adopted the plan of passing the Elbe at Lauenburg, and reinforcing the Prussian garrisons in Lower Saxony. With this view he fought several sharp actions, and made many rapid marches. But the odds were too great to be balanced by courage and activity. The division of Soult, which had crossed the Elbe, cut him off from Lauenburg, that of Murat interposed between him and Stralsund, while Bernadotte pressed upon his rear. Blucher had no resource but to throw himself and his diminished and dispirited army into Lubeck. The pursuers came soon up, and found him like a stag at bay. A battle was fought on the 6th of November, in the streets of Lubeck, with extreme fury on both sides, in which the Prussians were overpowered by numbers, and lost many slain, besides four thousand pri-

soners. Blucher fought his way out of the town, and reached Schwerta. But he had now retreated as far as he had Prussian ground to bear him, and to violate the neutrality of the Danish territory, would only have raised up new enemies to his unfortunate master.

On the 7th November, therefore, he gave up his good sword, to be resumed under happier auspices, and surrendered with the few thousand men which remained under his command. But the courage which he had manifested, like the lights of St Elmo amid the gloom of the tempest, showed that there was at least one pupil of the Great Frederick worthy of his master, and afforded hopes, on which Prussia long dwelt in silence, till the moment of action arrived.

The total destruction, for such it might almost be termed, of the Prussian army, was scarcely so wonderful, as the facility with which the fortresses which defend that country, some of them ranking among the foremost in Europe, were surrendered by their commandants, without shame, and without resistance, to the victorious enemy. Strong towns, and fortified places, on which the engineer had exhausted his science, provided too with large garrisons, and ample supplies, opened their gates at the sound of a French trumpet, or the explosion of a few bombs. Spandau, Stettin, Custrin, Hamelen, were each qualified

to have arrested the march of invaders for months, yet were all surrendered on little more than a summons. In Magdeburg was a garrison of twenty-two thousand men, two thousand of them being artillerymen; and nevertheless this celebrated city capitulated with Mareschal Ney at the first flight of shells. Hamelen was garrisoned by six thousand troops, amply supplied with provisions, and every means of maintaining a siege. The place was surrendered to a force scarcely one-third in proportion to that of the garrison. These incidents were too gross to be imputed to folly and cowardice alone. The French themselves wondered at their conquests, yet had a shrewd guess at the manner in which they were rendered so easy. When the recreant governor of Magdeburg was insulted by the students of Halle for treachery as well as cowardice, the French garrison of the place sympathised, as soldiers, with the youthful enthusiasm of the scholars, and afforded the sordid old coward but little protection against their indignation. From a similar generous impulse, Schoels, the commandant of Hamelen, was nearly destroyed by the troops under his orders. In surrendering the place, he had endeavoured to stipulate, that, in case the Prussian provinces should pass by the fortune of war to some other power, the officers should retain their pay and rank. The sol-

diers were so much incensed at this stipulation, which carried desertion in its front, and a proposal to shape a private fortune to himself amid the ruin of his country, that Schoels only saved himself by delivering up the place to the French before the time stipulated in the articles of capitulation.

It is believed that, on several of these occasions, the French constructed a golden key to open these iron fortresses, without being themselves at the expense of the precious metal which composed it. Every large garrison has of course a military chest, with treasure for the regular payment of the soldiery; and it is said that more than one commandant was unable to resist the proffer, that, in case of an immediate surrender, this deposit should not be inquired into by the captors, but left at the disposal of the governor, whose accommodating disposition had saved them the time and trouble of a siege.

While the French army made this uninterrupted progress, the new King of Holland, Louis Buonaparte, with an army partly composed of Dutch and partly of Frenchmen, possessed himself with equal ease of Westphalia, great part of Hanover, Emden, and East Friesland.

To complete the picture of general disorder which Prussia now exhibited, it is only necessary to add, that the unfortunate king, whose

personal qualities deserved a better fate, had been obliged after the battle to fly into West Prussia, where he finally sought refuge in the city of Koningsberg. L'Estocq, a faithful and able general, was still able to assemble out of the wreck of the Prussian army a few thousand men, for the protection of his sovereign. Buonaparte took possession of Berlin on the 25th October, eleven days after the battle of Jena. The mode in which he improved his good fortune we reserve for future consideration.

The fall of Prussia was so sudden and so total, as to excite the general astonishment of Europe. Its prince was compared to the rash and inexperienced gambler, who risks his whole fortune on one desperate cast, and rises from the table totally ruined. That power had for three quarters of a century ranked among the most important of Europe; but never had she exhibited such a formidable position as almost immediately before her disaster, when, holding in her own hand the balance of Europe, she might, before the day of Austerlitz, have inclined the scale to which side she would. And now she lay at the feet of the antagonist whom she had rashly and in ill time defied, not fallen merely, but totally prostrate, without the means of making a single effort to arise. It was remembered that Austria, when her armies were defeated,

and her capital taken, had still found resources in the courage of her subjects, and that the insurrections of Hungary and Bohemia had assumed, even after Buonaparte's most eminent successes, a character so formidable, as to aid in procuring peace for the defeated Emperor on moderate terms. Austria, therefore, was like a fortress repeatedly besieged, and as often breached and damaged, but which continued to be tenable, though diminished in strength, and deprived of important outworks. But Prussia seemed like the same fortress swallowed up by an earthquake, which leaves nothing either to inhabit or defend, and where the fearful agency of the destroyer reduces the strongest bastions and bulwarks to crumbled masses of ruins and rubbish.

The cause of this great distinction between two countries which have so often contended against each other for political power, and for influence in Germany, may be easily traced.

The empire of Austria combines in itself several large kingdoms, the undisturbed and undisputed dominions of a common sovereign, to whose sway they have been long accustomed, and towards whom they nourish the same sentiments of loyalty which their fathers entertained to the ancient princes of the same house. Austria's natural authority therefore rested, and now rests, on this broad and solid base,

the general and rooted attachment of the people to their prince, and their identification of his interests with their own.

Prussia had also her native provinces, in which her authority was hereditary, and where the affection, loyalty, and patriotism of the inhabitants were natural qualities, which fathers transmitted to their sons. But a large part of her dominions consist of late acquisitions, obtained at different times by the arms or policy of the great Frederick; and thus her territories, made up of a number of small and distant states, want geographical breadth, while their disproportioned length stretches, according to Voltaire's well-known simile, like a pair of garters across the map of Europe. It follows, as a natural consequence, that a long time must intervene betwixt the formation of such a kingdom, and the amalgamation of its component parts, differing in laws, manners, and usages, into one compact and solid monarchy, having respect and affection to their king, as the common head, and regard to each other as members of the same community. It will require generations to pass away, ere a kingdom, so artificially composed, can be cemented into unity and strength; and the tendency to remain disunited, is greatly increased by the disadvantages of its geographical situation.

These considerations alone might explain,

why, after the fatal battle of Jena, the inhabitants of the various provinces of Prussia contributed no important personal assistance to repel the invader; and why, although almost all trained to arms, and accustomed to serve a certain time in the line, they did not display any readiness to exert themselves against the common enemy. They felt that they belonged to Prussia only by the right of the strongest, and therefore were indifferent when the same right seemed about to transfer their allegiance elsewhere. They saw the approaching ruin of the Prussian power, not as children view the danger of a father, which they are bound to prevent at the hazard of their lives, but as servants view that of a master, which concerns them no otherwise than as leading to a change of their employers.

There were other reasons, tending to paralyse any effort at popular resistance, which affected the hereditary states of Prussia, as well as her new acquisitions. The power of Prussia had appeared to depend almost entirely upon her standing army, established by Frederick, and modelled according to his rules. When, therefore, this army was at once annihilated, no hope of safety was entertained by those who had so long regarded it as invincible. The Prussian peasant, who would gladly have joined the ranks of his country while

they continued to keep the field, knew, or thought he knew, too much of the art of war, to have any hope in the efforts which might be made in a desultory guerilla warfare,—which, however, the courage, devotion, and pertinacity of an invaded people have rendered the most formidable means of opposition even to a victorious army.

The ruin of Prussia, to whatever causes it was to be attributed, seemed, in the eyes of astonished Europe, not only universal, but irremediable. The king, driven to the extremity of his dominions, could only be considered as a fugitive, whose precarious chance of restoration to the crown depended on the doubtful success of his ally of Russia, who now, as after the capture of Vienna, had upon his hands, strong as those hands were, not the task of aiding an ally, who was in the act of resistance to the common enemy, but the far more difficult one of raising from the ground a prince who was totally powerless and prostrate. The French crossed the Oder—Glogau and Breslau were taken. Their defence was respectable, but it seemed not the less certain that their fall involved almost the last hopes of Prussia, and that a name, raised so high by the reign of one wise monarch, was like to be blotted from the map of Europe by the events of a single day.

Men looked upon this astonishing calamity

with various sentiments, according as they considered it with relation to the Prussian administration alone, or as connected with the character of the king and kingdom, and the general interests of Europe. In the former point of view, the mind could not avoid acknowledging, with a feeling of embittered satisfaction, that the crooked and selfish policy of Prussia's recent conduct,—as short-sighted as it was grasping and unconscientious,—had met in this present hour of disaster with no more than merited chastisement. The indifference with which the Prussian cabinet had viewed the distresses of the house of Austria, which their firm interposition might probably have prevented—the total want of conscience and decency with which they accepted Hanover from France, at the moment when they meditated war with the power at whose hand they received it—the shameless rapacity with which they proposed to detain the Electorate from its legal owner, at the very time when they were negotiating an alliance with Britain, —intimated that contempt of the ordinary principles of justice, which, while it renders a nation undeserving of success, is frequently a direct obstacle to their attaining it. Their whole procedure was founded on the principles of a felon, who is willing to betray his accomplice, providing he is allowed to retain his own share of the common booty. It was no

wonder, men said, that a government setting such an example to its subjects, of greediness and breach of faith in its public transactions, should find among them, in the hour of need, many who were capable of preferring their own private interests to that of their country. And if the conduct of this wretched administration was regarded in a political instead of a moral point of view, the disasters of the kingdom might be considered as the consequence of their incapacity, as well as the just remuneration of their profligacy. The hurried and presumptuous declaration of war, after every favourable opportunity had been suffered to escape, and indeed the whole conduct of the campaign, showed a degree of folly not far short of actual imbecility, and which must have arisen either from gross treachery, or something like infatuation. So far, therefore, as the ministers of Prussia were concerned, they reaped only the reward due to their political want of morality, and their practical want of judgment.

Very different, indeed, were the feelings with which the battle of Jena and its consequences were regarded, when men considered that great calamity in reference not to the evil counsellors by whom it was prepared, but to the prince and nation who were to pay the penalty. « We are human,» and, according

to the sentiment of the poet, on the extinction of the state of Venice,[1] « must mourn even when the shadow of that which has once been great passes away. » But the apparent destruction of Prussia was not like the departure of the aged man, whose life is come to the natural close, or the fall of a ruined tower, whose mouldering arches can no longer support the incumbent weight. These are viewed with awe indeed, and with sympathy, but they do not excite astonishment or horror. The seeming fate of the Prussian monarchy resembled the agonizing death of him who expires in the flower of manhood. The fall of the house of Brandenburg was as if a castle, with all its trophied turrets strong and entire, should be at once hurled to the earth by a super-human power. Men, alike stunned with the extent and suddenness of the catastrophe, were moved with sympathy for those instantly involved in the ruin, and struck with terror at the demolition of a bulwark, by the destruction of which all found their own safety endangered. The excellent and patriotic character of Frederick William, on whose rectitude and honour even the misconduct of his ministers had not brought any stain; the distress of his interest-

[1] Men are we, and must grieve even when the shade
Of that which once was great is passed away.

WORDSWORTH.

ing, high-spirited, and beautiful consort; the general sufferings of a brave and proud people, accustomed to assume and deserve the name of Protectors of the Protestant Faith and of the Liberties of Germany, and whose energies, corresponding with the talents of their leader, had enabled them in former times to withstand the combined force of France, Austria, and Russia,—excited deep and general sympathy.

Still wider did that sympathy extend, and more thrilling became its impulse, when it was remembered that in Prussia fell the last state of Germany, who could treat with Napoleon in the style of an equal; and that to the exorbitant power which France already possessed in the south of Europe, was now to be added an authority in the north almost equally arbitrary and equally extensive. The prospect was a gloomy one; and they who felt neither for the fallen authority of a prince, nor the destroyed independence of a kingdom, trembled at the prospect likely to be entailed on their own country by a ruin, which seemed as remediless as it was extensive and astounding.

But yet the end was NOT.——

Providence, which disappoints presumptuous hopes by the event, is often mercifully pleased to give aid when human aid seems hopeless. Whatever may be thought of the doctrine of

an intermediate state of sufferance and purification in an after stage of existence, it is evident from history, that in this world, kingdoms, as well as individuals, are often subjected to misfortunes arising from their own errors, and which prove in the event conducive to future regeneration. Prussia was exposed to a long and painful discipline in the severe school of adversity, by which she profited in such a degree as enabled her to regain her high rank in the republic of Europe, with more honour perhaps to her prince and people, than if she had never been thrust from her lofty station. Her government, it may be hoped, have learned to respect the rights of other nations, from the sufferings which followed the destruction of their own—her people have been taught to understand the difference between the dominion of strangers and the value of independence. Indeed the Prussians showed in the event, by every species of sacrifice, how fully they had become aware, that the blessing of freedom from foreign control is not to be secured by the efforts of a regular army only, but must be attained and rendered permanent by the general resolution of the nation, from highest to lowest, to dedicate their united exertions to the achievement of the public liberty at every risk, and by every act of self-devotion. Their improvement under the stern lessons which

calamity taught them, we shall record in a brighter page. For the time, the cloud of misfortune sunk hopelessly dark over Prussia, of which not merely the renown, but the very national existence, seemed in danger of being extinguished for ever.

CHAPTER XII.

Ungenerous conduct of Buonaparte to the Duke of Brunswick.—The approach of the French Troops to Brunswick compels the dying Prince to cause himself to be carried to Altona, where he expires—Oath of Revenge taken by his Son.—At Potsdam and Berlin, the proceedings of Napoleon are equally cruel and vindictive—His Clemency towards the Prince of Hatzfeld—His Treatment of the Lesser Powers.—Jérôme Buonaparte.—Seizure of Hambugh.—Celebrated Berlin Decrees against British Commerce—Reasoning as to their justice—Napoleon rejects all application from the continental commercial towns to relax or repeal them.—Commerce, nevertheless, flourishes in spite of them.—Second anticipation called for of the Conscription for 1807.—The King of Prussia applies for an Armistice, which is clogged with such harsh terms that he refuses them.

The will of Napoleon seemed now the only law, from which the conquered country, that so late stood forth as the rival of France, was to expect her destiny; and circumstances indicated, that, with more than the fortune of Cæsar or Alexander, the conqueror would not emulate their generosity or clemency.

The treatment of the ill-fated Duke of Bruns-

wick did little honour to the victor. After receiving a mortal wound on the field of battle, he was transported from thence to Brunswick, his hereditary capital. Upon attaining his native dominions, in the government of which his conduct had been always patriotic and praise-worthy, he wrote to Napoleon, representing that, although he had fought against him as a general in the Prussian service, he nevertheless, as a Prince of the Empire, recommended his hereditary principality to the moderation and clemency of the victor. This attempt to separate his two characters, or to appeal to the immunities of a league which Napoleon had dissolved, although natural in the duke's forlorn situation, formed a plea not likely to be attended to by the conqueror. But, on other and broader grounds, Buonaparte, if not influenced by personal animosity against the duke, or desirous to degrade, in his person, the father-in-law of the heir of the British crown, might have found reasons for treating the defeated general with the respect due to his rank and his misfortunes. The Duke of Brunswick was one of the oldest soldiers in Europe, and his unquestioned bravery ought to have recommended him to his junior in arms. He was a reigning prince, and Buonaparte's own aspirations towards confirmation of aristocratical rank should have led him to treat the vanquished with decency. Above all, the

duke was defenceless, wounded, dying; a situation to command the sympathy of every military man, who knows on what casual circumstances the fate of battle depends. The answer of Napoleon was, nevertheless, harsh and insulting in the last degree. He reproached the departing general with his celebrated proclamation against France in 1792, with the result of his unhappy campaign in that country, with the recent summons by which the French had been required to retreat beyond the Rhine. He charged him as having been the instigator of a war which his counsels ought to have prevented. He announced the right which he had acquired, to leave not one stone standing upon another in the town of Brunswick; and summed up his ungenerous reply by intimating, that though he might treat the subjects of the duke like a generous victor, it was his purpose to deprive the dying prince and his family of their hereditary sovereignty.

As if to fulfil these menaces, the French troops approached the city of Brunswick, and the wounded veteran, dreading the further resentment of his ungenerous victor, was compelled to cause himself to be removed to the neutral town of Altona, where he expired. An application from his son, requesting permission to lay his father's body in the tomb of his ancestors, was rejected with the same sternness, which had characterized Buonaparte's

answer to the attempt of the duke, when living, to soften his enmity. The successor of the Duke vowed, it is believed, to requite these insults with mortal hatred,—did much to express it during his life,—and bequeathed to his followers the legacy of revenge, which the Black Brunswickers had the means of amply discharging upon the 18th June, 1815.

Some have imputed this illiberal conduct of Buonaparte to an ebullition of spleen against the object of his personal dislike; others have supposed that his resentment was, in whole or part, affected, in order to ground upon it his resolution of confiscating the state of Brunswick, and uniting it with the kingdom of Westphalia, which, as we shall presently see, he proposed to erect as an appanage for his brother Jérôme. Whether arising from a burst of temperament, or a cold calculation of interested selfishness, his conduct was equally unworthy of a monarch and a soldier.

At Potsdam and at Berlin, Napoleon showed himself equally as the sworn and implacable enemy, rather than as the generous conqueror. At Potsdam he seized on the sword, belt, and hat of the Great Frederick, and at Berlin he appropriated and removed to Paris the monument of Victory, erected by the same monarch, in consequence of the defeat of the French at Rosbach. The finest paintings and

works of art in Prussia were seized upon for the benefit of the French National Museum.

The language of the victor corresponded with his actions. His bulletins and proclamations abounded with the same bitter sarcasms against the king, the queen, and those whom he called the war faction of Prussia. Ascribing the war to the unrepressed audacity of the young nobility, he said, in one of those proclamations, he would permit no more rioting in Berlin, no more breaking of windows; and, in addressing the Count Neale, he threatened, in plain terms, to reduce the nobles of Prussia to beg their bread. These, and similar expressions of irritated spleen, used in the hour of conquest, level the character of the great victor with that of the vulgar Englishman in the farce, who cannot be satisfied with beating his enemy, but must scold him also. Napoleon's constant study of the poetry ascribed to Ossian, might have taught him that wrath should fly on eagles' wings from a conquered foe. The soldiers, and even the officers, caught the example of their Emperor, and conceived they met his wishes by behaving more imperiously in quarters, and producing more distress to their hosts, than had been their custom in the Austrian campaigns. Great aggressions, perhaps, were rarely perpetrated, and would have been punished, as contrary to

military discipline; but a grinding, constant, and unremitting system of vexation and requisition, was bitterly felt by the Prussians at the time, and afterwards sternly revenged.

It is but justice, however, to record an act of clemency of Napoleon amid these severities. He had intercepted a letter containing some private intelligence respecting the motions of the French, sent by Prince Hatzfeld, late the Prussian governor of Berlin, to Prince Hohenloe, then still at the head of an army. Napoleon appointed a military commission for the trial of Hatzfeld; and his doom, for continuing to serve his native prince after his capital had been occupied by the enemy, would have been not less certain than severe. His wife, however, threw herself at Napoleon's feet, who put into her hands the fatal document which contained evidence of what was called her husband's guilt, with permission to throw it into the fire. The French Emperor is entitled to credit for the degree of mercy he showed on this occasion; but it must be granted at the same time, that to have proceeded to sentence and execution upon such a charge, would have been an act of great severity, if not of actual atrocity. If, as has been alleged, the correspondence of Prince Hatzfeld was dated before, not after the capitulation of Berlin, his death would have been an unqualified murder.

The victor, who had all at his disposal, was now to express his pleasure concerning those satellites of Prussia, which, till her fall, had looked up to her as their natural protector and ally. Of these, Saxony and Hesse-Cassel were the principal; and, in his proceedings towards them, Buonaparte regarded the train of his own policy much more than the merits which the two electors might have respectively pleaded towards France.

Saxony had joined her arms to those of Prussia—forced, as she said, by the arguments which a powerful neighbour can always apply to a weaker—still she *had* joined her, and fought on her side at the battle of Jena. The apology of compulsion was admitted by Buonaparte; the Saxon troops were dismissed upon their parole, and their prince raised to the rank of a king, shortly afterwards admitted as a member of the Confederacy of the Rhine. and treated by Buonaparte with much personal consideration. The Dukes of Saxe-Weimar and Saxe-Gotha also were permitted to retain their dominions, on acknowledging a similar vassalage to the French empire.

The Landgrave, or elector, of Hesse-Cassel, might have expected a still more favourable acceptance in the eyes of the victor, for he had refused to join Prussia, and, in spite of threats and persuasions, had observed neutrality during the brief contest. But Napoleon

remembered, to the prejudice of the landgrave, that he had resisted all previous temptations to enter into the Confederation of the Rhine. He imputed his neutrality to fear, not choice. He alleged, that it had not been strictly observed; and, treating the inaction of Hesse, whose inclinations were with Prussia, as a greater crime than the actual hostilities of Saxony, whose will was with France, he declared, according to his usual form of dethronement, that the house of Hesse-Cassel had ceased to reign. The doom was executed even before it was pronounced. Louis Buonaparte, with Marshal Mortier, had possessed himself of Hesse-Cassel by the 1st of November. The army of the landgrave made no resistance—a part of them passed under the banners of France, the rest were disbanded.

The real cause of seizing the territories of an unoffending prince, who was totally helpless, unless in so far as right or justice could afford him protection, was Buonaparte's previous resolution, already hinted at, to incorporate Hesse-Cassel with the adjacent territories, for the purpose of forming a kingdom to be conferred on his youngest brother Jérôme. This young person bore a gay and dissipated character; and, though such men may at times make considerable sacrifices for the indulgence of transient passion, they are seldom capable of retaining for a length of time

a steady affection for an object, however amiable. Jerôme Buonaparte had married an American young lady, distinguished for her beauty and her talents, and had thus lost the countenance of Napoleon, who maintained the principle, that, segregated as his kindred were from the nation at large by their connexion with him, his rank, and his fortunes, they were not entitled to enter into alliances according to the dictates of their own feelings, but were bound to form such as were most suitable to his policy. Jerôme was tempted by ambition finally to acquiesce in this reasoning, and sacrificed the connexion which his heart had chosen, to become the tool of his brother's ever-extending schemes of ambition. The reward was the kingdom of Westphalia, to which was united Hesse-Cassel, with the various provinces which Prussia had possessed in Franconia, Westphalia Proper, and Lower Saxony, as also the territories of the unfortunate Duke of Brunswick. Security could be scarcely supposed to attend upon a sovereignty, where the materials were acquired by public rapine, and the crown purchased by domestic infidelity.

About the middle of November, Mortier formally re-occupied Hanover in the name of the Emperor, and, marching upon Hamburgh, took possession of that ancient free town, so long the emporium of commerce for the North of Europe. Here, as formerly at Leipsic, the strictest search was made for British commo-

dities and property, which were declared the lawful subject of confiscation. The *Moniteur* trumpeted forth, that these rigorous measures were accompanied with losses to British commerce which would shake the credit of the nation. This was not true. The citizens of Hamburgh had long foreseen that their neutrality would be no protection, and in spite of the fraudful assurances of the French envoy, designed to lull them into security, the merchants had availed themselves of the last two years to dispose of their stock, call in their capital, [illegible] up their trade, so that the rapacity [illegible] great measure [illegible] after British p[illegible] which was d[illegible] at Hamburgh and elsewhere, were not isolated acts of plunder and spoliation, but made parts of one great system for destroying the commerce of England, which was shortly after laid before the world by the celebrated decree of Berlin.

It was frequently remarked of Buonaparte, that he studied a sort of theatrical effect in the mode of issuing his decrees and proclamations, the subject matter of which formed often a strange contrast with the date, the latter, perhaps, being at the capital of some subdued monarch, while the matter promulgated respected some minute regulation affecting the municipality of Paris. But there was no such discrepancy in the date and substance of the

Berlin decrees against British enterprise. It was when Buonaparte had destroyed the natural bulwark which protected the independence of the north of Germany, and had necessarily obtained a corresponding power on the shores of the Baltic, that he seriously undertook to promulgate his sweeping plan of destroying the commerce of his Island foe.

When slight inconveniencies, according to Buonaparte's expression, put an end to his hopes of invading Britain, or when, as at other times he more candidly admitted, the defeat at Trafalgar induced him « to throw helve after hatchet, » and resign all hope of attaining any success by means of his navy, he became desirous of sapping and undermining the bulwark, which he found it impossible to storm; and by directing his efforts to the destruction of British commerce, he trusted gradually to impair the foundations of her national wealth and prosperity. He erred, perhaps, in thinking, that, even if his object could have been fully attained, the full consequences would have followed which his animosity anticipated. Great Britain's prosperity mainly rests on her commerce, but her existence as a nation is not absolutely dependent upon it; as those foreigners are apt to imagine, who have only seen the numerous vessels with which she covers the ocean and fills foreign ports, but have never witnessed the extent of

her agricultural and domestic resources. But, entertaining the belief which Napoleon did, in regard to the indispensable connexion betwixt British commerce and British power, the policy of his war upon the former cannot be denied. It was that of the Abyssinian hunter, who, dreading to front the elephant in his fury, draws his sabre along the animal's heel-joint, and waits until the exertions of the powerful brute burst the injured sinews, and he sinks prostrate under his own weight.

The celebrated decrees of Berlin appeared on the 21st November, 1806, interdicting all commerce betwixt Great Britain and the Continent; which interdiction was declared a fundamental law of the French empire, until the English should consent to certain alterations in the mode of conducting hostilities by sea, which should render her naval superiority less useful to herself, and less detrimental to the enemy. This measure was justified upon the following grounds:—That England had either introduced new customs into her maritime code, or revived those of a barbarous age—that she seized on merchant vessels, and made their crews prisoners, just as if they had been found on board ships of war—declared harbours blockaded which were not so in reality—and extended the evils of war to the peaceful and unarmed citizen.

This induction to the celebrated project,

afterwards callèd the Continental System of the Emperor, was false in the original proposition, and sophistical in those by which it was supported. It was positively false that Great Britain had introduced into her maritime law, either by new enactment, or by the revival of obsolete and barbarous customs, any alteration by which the rights of neutrals were infringed, or the unarmed citizen prejudiced, more then necessarily arose out of the usual customs of war. The law respecting the blockade of ports, and the capture of vessels at sea, was the same on which every nation had acted for three centuries past, France herself not excepted. It is true, that the maritime code seemed at this period to be peculiarly that of England, because no nation save herself had the means of enforcing them; but she did not in this respect possess any greater advantage by sea than Napoleon enjoyed by land.

The reasoning of the Emperor Napoleon upon the inequality and injustice of the maritime mode of exercising war, compared with the law of hostilities by land, was not more accurate than his allegation, that Britain had innovated upon the former for the purpose of introducing new, or reviving old severities. This will appear plain from the following considerations:—

At an early period of society, the practice of war was doubtless the same by land or sea;

and the savage slaughtered or enslaved his enemy whether he found him in his hut or in his canoe. But when centuries of civilization began to mitigate the horrors of barbarous warfare, the restrictive rules introduced into naval hostilities were different from those adopted in the case of wars by land, as the difference of the services obviously dictated. A land army has a precise object, which it can always attain if victorious. If a general conquer a town, he can garrison it, he can levy contributions; nay, he may declare that he will appropriate it to himself in right of sovereignty. He can afford to spare the property of private individuals, when he is at liberty to seize, if he is so minded, upon all their public rights, and new-mould them at his pleasure. The seaman, on the other hand, seizes on the merchant vessel and its cargo, by the same right of superior force, in virtue of which the victor by land has seized upon castles, provinces, and on the very haven, it may be, which the vessel belongs to. If the maritime conqueror had no right to do this, he would gain nothing by his superiority except blows, when he met with vessels of force, and would be cut off from any share of the spoils of war, which form the reward of victory. The innocent and unarmed citizen, perhaps the neutral stranger, suffers in both cases; but a state of war is of course a state

of violence, and its evils, unhappily, cannot be limited to those who are actually engaged in hostilities. If the spirit of philanthropy affected in the peroration to Buonaparte's decrees had been real, he might have attained his pretended purpose of softening the woes of war, by proposing some relaxation of the rights of a conqueror by land, in exchange for restrictions to be introduced into the practice of hostilities by sea. Instead of doing so, he, under the pretext of exercising the right of reprisals, introduced the following decrees, unheard of hitherto among belligerent powers, and tending greatly to augment the general distress, which must, under all circumstances, attend a state of war.

1. The British isles were declared in a state of blockade. 2. All commerce and correspondence with England was forbidden. All English letters were to be seized in the post-houses. 3. Every Englishman, of whatever rank or quality, found in France, or the countries allied with her, was declared a prisoner of war. 4. All merchandize, or property of any kind, belonging to English subjects, was declared lawful prize. 5. All articles of English manufacture, and articles produced in her colonies, were in like manner declared contraband and lawful prize. 6. Half of the produce of the above confiscations was to be employed in the relief of those merchants,

whose vessels had been captured by the English cruizers. 7. All vessels coming from England, or the English colonies, were to be refused admission into any harbour. Four additional articles provided the mode of promulgating and enforcing the decree, and directed that it should be communicated to the allies of France.

This was the first link of a long chain of arbitrary decrees and ordinances, by which Napoleon, aiming at the destruction of British finance, interrupted the whole commerce of Europe, and destroyed for a season, and as far as lay in his power, that connexion between distant nations which unites them to each other by the most natural and advantageous means, the supply of the wants of the one country by the superfluous produce of the other. The extent of public inconvenience and distress, which was occasioned by the sudden suppression of commercial communication with England, may be judged of by reflecting, how many of the most ordinary articles of consumption are brought from foreign countries,—in how many instances the use of these articles has brought them into the list of necessaries,—and how, before an ordinary mechanic or peasant sits down to breakfast, distant climes must be taxed to raise the coffee and sugar which he consumes.

The painful embarrassment of those de-

prived of their habitual comforts was yet exceeded by the clamour and despair of the whole commercial world on the Continent, who were thus, under pretext of relieving them from the vexation of the English cruizers, threatened with a total abrogation of their profession. Hamburgh, Bordeaux, Nantes, and other continental towns, solicited, by petitions and deputations, some relaxation of decrees which inferred their general ruin. They pleaded the prospect of universal bankruptcy, which this prohibitory system must occasion. «Let it be so,» answered the Emperor; «the more insolvency on the Continent, the greater will be the distress of the merchants in London. The fewer traders in Hamburgh, the less will be the temptation to carry on commerce with England. Britain must be humbled, were it at the expense of throwing civilization back for centuries, and returning to the original mode of trading by barter.»

But great as was Buonaparte's power, he had overrated it in supposing that, by a mere expression of his will, he could put an and to an intercourse, in the existence of which the whole world possessed an interest. The attempt to annihilate commerce resembled that of a child who tries to stop with his hand the stream of an artificial fountain, which escapes in a hundred partial jets from under his palm and between his fingers. The Genius of Com-

merce, like a second Proteus, assumed every variety of shape, in order to elude the imperial interdiction, and all manner of evasions was practised for that purpose. False papers, false certificates, false bills of lading, were devised, and these frauds were overlooked in the seaports, by the very agents of the police, and custom-house officers, to whom the execution of the decrees was committed. Douaniers, magistrates, generals, and prefects, nay, some of the kindred princes of the house of Napoleon, were well pleased to listen to the small still voice of their interest, rather than to his authoritative commands; and the British commerce, though charged with heavy expenses, continued to flourish in spite of the continental system. The new, and still more violent measures, which Napoleon had recourse to for enforcing his prohibitions, will require our notice hereafter. Meantime, it is enough to say, that such acts of increasing severity had the natural consequence of rendering his person and power more and more unpopular; so that, while he was sacrificing the interests and the comforts of the nations under his authority to his hope of destroying England, he was in fact digging a mine under his own feet, which exploded to his destruction long before the security of England was materially affected.

Napoleon had foreseen that, in order to

enforce the decrees by which, without possession of any naval power, he proposed to annihilate the naval supremacy of England, it would be necessary to augment to a great extent the immense superiority of land forces which France already possessed. It was necessary, he was aware, that to enable him to maintain the prohibitions which he had imposed upon general commerce, as well as to prosecute the struggle in which he was about to be engaged with Russia, a large draught should be made on the population of France. He had, accordingly, by a requisition addressed to the Senate, dated from Bamberg, 7th of October, required a second anticipation of the conscription of 1807, amounting to a levy of eighty thousand men.

The measure was supported in the Senate by the oratory of Regnault de St Jean d'Angély, an ancient Republican. This friend of freedom saw nothing inconsistent in advocating a measure, which the absolute monarch recommended as the necessary step to a general peace. The conscripts who had first marched had secured victory; those who were now to be put in motion were to realize the prospect of peace, the principal object of their brethren's success. The obsequious Senate readily admitted these arguments, as they would have done any which had been urged in support of a request which they dared not deny.

The sole purpose of Regnault's eloquence was to express in decent amplification the simple phrase, « Napoleon so wills it. »

A deputation of the Senate, carrying to Napoleon in person their warm acquiescence in the proposed measure, received in guerdon the honourable task of conveying to Paris the spoils of Potsdam and Berlin, with three hundred and forty-six stand of colours, the trophies of the war against Prussia,—with the task of announcing the celebrated decrees, by which the general commerce of Europe and of France itself was annihilated, to secure it from the aggressions of the British naval force. The military trophies were received—the decrees were recorded; and no one dared undertake the delicate task of balancing the victories of the Emperor against the advantage which his dominions were likely to derive from them.

In the mean while, the unfortunate Frederick William, whose possession of his late flourishing kingdom was reduced to such territories as Prussia held beyond the Oder, sent an embassy to Berlin, for the purpose of learning upon what terms he might be yet admitted to treat for peace with the victor, who had hold of his capital and the greater part of his dominions. The Marquis Lucchesini was employed on this mission, a subtle Italian, who, being employed in negotiations

at Paris, had been accustomed to treat with France on a footing of equality. But these times were passed since the battle of Jena; and the only terms to which Prussia could be now admitted, were to be so dearly purchased, that even a mere temporary armistice was to cost the surrender of Graudentz, Dantzic, Colberg,—in short, all the fortresses yet remaining to Prussia, and still in a state of defence. As this would have been placing himself entirely at the mercy of Buonaparte, and in as bad circumstances as he could be reduced to even by the most unsuccessful military operations, the king refused to acquiesce in such severe terms, and determined to repose his fate in the chance of war, and in the support of the auxiliary army of Russia, which was now hastily advancing to his assistance.

CHAPTER XIII.

Retrospect of the Partition of Poland.—Napoleon receives addresses from Poland, which he evades.—He advances into Poland, Bennigsen retreating before him.—Character of the Russian Soldiery.—The Cossacks.—Engagement at Pultusk, on 26th November, terminating to the disadvantage of the French.—Bennigsen continues his retreat.—The French go into winter quarters. —Bennigsen appointed Commander-in-chief in the place of Kaminskoy, who shows symptoms of insanity—He resumes offensive operations.—Battle of Eylau, fought on 8th February, 1807—Claimed as a victory by both parties—The loss on both sides amounts to 50,000 men killed, the greater part Frenchmen.—Bennigsen retreats upon Konigsberg.—Napoleon offers favourable terms for an Armistice to the King of Prussia, who refuses to treat, save for a general Peace.—Napoleon falls back to the line of the Vistula.—Dantzic is besieged, and surrenders —Russian army is poorly recruited—the French powerfully.—Actions during the Summer.—Battle of Heilsberg, and retreat of the Russians.—Battle of Friedland on 13th June, and defeat of the Russians, after a hard-fought day.—An Armistice takes place on the 23d.

Napoleon was politically justified in the harsh terms which he was desirous to impose on Prussia, by having now brought his victorious

armies to the neighbourhood of Poland, in which he had a good right to conceive himself sure to find numerous followers and a friendly reception.

The partition of this fine kingdom by its powerful neighbours, Russia, Austria, and Prussia, was the first open and audacious transgression of the law of nations, which disgraced the annals of civilized Europe. It was executed by a combination of three of the most powerful states of Europe, against one too unhappy in the nature of its constitution, and too much divided by factions, to offer any effectual resistance. The kingdom subjected to this aggression had appealed in vain to the code of nations for protection against an outrage, to which, after a desultory and uncombined, and therefore a vain defence, she saw herself under a necessity of submitting. The Poles retained, too, a secret sense of their fruitless attempt to recover freedom in 1791, and an animated recollection of the violence by which it had been suppressed by the Russian arms. They waited with hope and exultation the approach of the French armies; and candour must allow, that, unlawfully subjected as they had been to a foreign yoke, they had a right to avail themselves of the assistance, not only of Napoleon, but of Mahomet, or of Satan himself, had he proposed to aid them in regaining the independence

of which they had been oppressively and unjustly deprived.

This feeling was general among the middling classes of the Polish aristocracy, who recollected with mortified pride the diminution of their independent privileges, the abrogation of their Diets, and the suppression of the *Liberum Veto*, by which a private gentleman might render null the decision of a whole assembly, unless unanimity should be attained, by putting the dissentient to death upon the spot.[1] But the higher order of nobility,

[1] Most readers must be so far acquainted with the ancient form of Polish Diets as to know, that their resolutions were not legally valid if there was one dissenting voice, and that in many cases the most violent means were resorted to, to obtain unanimity. The following instance was related to our informer, a person of high rank. On some occasion, a provincial Diet was convened for the purpose of passing a resolution which was generally acceptable, but to which it was apprehended one noble of the district would oppose his *veto*. To escape this interruption, it was generally resolved to meet exactly at the hour of summons, to proceed to business upon the instant, and thus to elude the anticipated attempt of the individual to defeat the purpose of their meeting. They accordingly met at the hour, with most accurate precision, and shut and bolted the doors of their place of meeting. But the dissentient arrived a few minutes afterwards, and entrance being refused, under the excuse that the Diet was already constituted, he climbed upon the roof of the hall, and, it being summer time when no fires were lighted, descended through the vent into the stove by which, in winter, the apartment was heated. Here he lay perdu, until the vote was called,

gratified by the rank they held, and the pleasures they enjoyed at the courts of Berlin, Vienna, and especially St Petersburgh, preferred in general the peaceful enjoyment of their immense estates to the privileges of a stormy independence, which raised the most insignificant of the numerous aristocracy to a rank and importance nearly resembling their own. They might, too, with some justice, distrust the views of Napoleon, though recommended by the most specious promises. The dominion of Russia in particular, from similarity of manners, and the particular attention

when, just as it was about to be recorded as unanimous in favour of the proposed measure, he thrust his head out of the stove, like a turtle protruding his neck from his shell, and pronounced the fatal *veto*. Unfortunately for himself, instead of instantly withdrawing his head, he looked round for an instant with exultation, to remark and enjoy the confusion which his sudden appearance and interruption had excited in the assembly. One of the nobles, who stood by, unsheathed his sabre, and severed at one blow the head of the dissentient from his body. Our noble informer, expressing some doubt of a story so extraordinary, was referred for its confirmation to Prince Sobieski, afterwards King of Poland, who not only bore testimony to the strange scene, as what he had himself witnessed, but declared that the head of the Dietin rolled over on his own foot, almost as soon as he heard the word *veto* uttered. Such a constitution required much amelioration, but that formed no apology for the neighbouring states, who dismembered and appropriated to themselves an independent kingdom, with the faults or advantages of whose government they had not the slightest title to interfere.

paid to their persons and interests, was not so unpopular among the higher branches of the aristocracy as might have been expected, from the unjust and arbitrary mode in which she had combined to appropriate so large a part of their once independent kingdom. These did not, therefore, so generally embrace the side of France as the minor nobles or gentry had done. As for the ordinary mass of the population, being almost all in the estate of serfage, or villanage, which had been general over Europe during the prevalence of the feudal system, they followed their respective lords, without pretending to entertain any opinion of their own.

While Russia was marching her armies hastily forward, not only to support, or rather raise up once more, her unfortunate ally the King of Prussia, but to suppress any ebullition of popular spirit in Poland, Buonaparte received addresses from that country, which endeavoured to prevail on him to aid them in their views of regaining their independence. Their application was of a nature to embarrass him considerably. To have declared himself the patron of Polish independence might have, indeed, brought large forces to his standard, —might have consummated the disasters of Prussia, and greatly embarrassed even Russia herself, and so far policy recommended to Napoleon to encourage their hopes of her

restored independence. But Austria had been a large sharer in the various partitions of Poland, and Austria, humbled as she had been, was still a powerful state, whose enmity might have proved formidable, if, by bereaving her of her Polish dominions, or encouraging her subjects to rebel, Buonaparte had provoked her to hostilities, at the time when he himself and the best part of his forces were engaged in the North of Europe. The same attempt would have given a very different character to the war, which Russia at present waged only in the capacity of the auxiliary of Prussia. The safety and integrity of the Russian empire, south of the Volga, depends almost entirely upon the preservation of those territories which she has acquired in Poland; and, if she had engaged in the war as a principal, Buonaparte was scarcely yet prepared to enter upon a contest with the immense power of that empire, which must be waged upon the very frontier of the enemy, and as near to their resources as he was distant from his own. It might have been difficult, also, to have stated any consistent grounds, why he, who had carved out so many new sovereignties in Europe with the point of his sword, should reprobate the principle of the partition of Poland. Influenced by these motives, the modern setter-up and puller-down of kings abstained from re-establishing the only monarchy in Europe, which

he might have new-modelled to his mind, in the character not of a conqueror, but a liberator.

While Napoleon declined making any precise declaration, or binding himself by any express stipulations to the Polish delegates, the language he used to them was cautiously worded, so as to keep up their zeal, and animate their exertions. Dombrowski, a Polish exile in the French army, was employed to raise men for Napoleon's service, and the enthusiasm of those who entered, as well as the expectations of the kingdom at large, were excited by such oracular passages as the following, which appeared in the 36th bulletin :—« Is the throne of Poland to be re-established, and will that great nation regain her existence and independence? Will she be recalled to life, as if summoned to arise from the tomb?—God only, the great disposer of events, can be the arbiter of this great political problem.»

The continuance of war was now to be determined upon; a war to be waged with circumstances of more than usual horror, as it involved the sufferings of a winter-campaign in the northern latitudes. The French, having completely conquered the Prussian estates to the east of the Oder, had formed the sieges of Great Glogau, of Breslau, and of Graudentz, and were at the same time pushing westward to occupy Poland. The Russian general, Ben-

nigsen, had on his side pressed forward for the purpose of assisting the Prussians, and had occupied Warsaw. But finding that their unfortunate allies had scarcely the remnant of an army in the field, the Russian general retreated after some skirmishes, and recrossed the Vistula, while the capital of Poland, thus evacuated, was entered on the 28th November by Murat, at the head of the French vanguard.

About the 25th, Napoleon, leaving Berlin, had established himself at Posen, a centrical town of Poland, which country began to manifest an agitation, partly the consequence of French intrigues, partly arising from the animating prospect of restored independence. The Poles resumed in many instances their ancient national dress and manners, and sent deputies to urge the decision of Buonaparte in their favour. The language in which they entreated his interposition resembled that of Oriental idolatry. « The Polish nation,» said Count Radyiminski, the Palatine of Gnesna, « presents itself before your Majesty, groaning still under the yoke of German nations, and salutes with the purest joy the regenerator of their dear country, the legislator of the universe. Full of submission to your will, they adore you, and repose on you with confidence all their hopes, as upon him who has the power of raising empires and destroying them, and

of humbling the proud.» The address of the President of the Judicial Council-Chamber of the Regency of Poland was not less energetic. « Already,» he said, « we see our dear country saved; for in your person we adore the most just and the most profound Solon. We commit our fate and our hopes into your hands, and we implore the mighty protection of the most august Cæsar.»

Not even these eastern hyperboles could extort any thing from Buonaparte more distinctly indicative of his intentions, than the obscure hints we have already mentioned.

In the mean while, Warsaw was put into a state of defence, and the auxiliary forces of Saxony and the new confederates of the Rhine were brought up by forced marches, while strong reinforcements from France repaired the losses of the early part of the campaign.

The French army at length advanced in full force, and crossed successively the rivers Vistula and Bug, forcing a passage wherever it was disputed. But it was not the object of Bennigsen to give battle to forces superior to his own, and he therefore retreated behind the Wkra, and was joined by the large bodies of troops commanded by Generals Buxhowden and Kaminskoy. The latter took the general command. He was a contemporary of Suwarrow, and esteemed an excellent officer, but more skilled in the theory than the practice of

war. « Kaminskoy,» said Suwarrow, « knows war, but war does not know him—I do not know war, but war knows me.» It appears also, that during this campaign Kaminskoy was afflicted with mental alienation.

On the 23d November, Napoleon arrived in person upon the Wkra, and ordered the advance of his army in three divisions. Kaminskoy, when he saw the passage of this river forced, determined to retreat behind the Niemen, and sent orders to his lieutenants accordingly. Benningsen, therefore, fell back upon Pultusk, and Prince Galitzin upon Golymin, both pursued by large divisions of the French army. The Russian generals Buxhowden and d'Anrep also retreated in different directions, and apparently without maintaining a sufficiently accurate communication either with Benningsen, or with Galitzin. In their retrograde movements the Russians sustained some loss, which the bulletins magnified to such an extent, as to represent their army as entirely disorganized, their columns wandering at hazard in unimaginable disorder, and their safety only caused by the shortness of the days, the difficulties of a country covered with woods and intersected with ravines, and a thaw which had filled the roads with mud to the depth of five feet. It was, therefore, predicted, that although the enemy might possibly escape from the position in which he had placed him

self, it must necessarily be effected at the certain loss of his artillery, his carriages, and his baggage.

These were exaggerations calculated for the meridian of Paris. Napoleon was himself sensible, that he was approaching a conflict of a different kind from that which he had maintained with Austria, and more lately against Prussia. The common soldier in both those services was too much levelled into a mere moving piece of machinery, the hundred-thousandth part of the great machine called an army, to have any confidence in himself, or zeal beyond the mere discharge of the task intrusted to him according to the word of command. These troops, however highly disciplined, wanted that powerful and individual feeling, which in armies possessing a strong national character (by which the Russians are peculiarly distinguished), induces the soldier to resist to the last moment, even when resistance can only assure him of revenge. They were still the same Russians, of whom Frederick the Great said, «that he could kill, but could not defeat them;»—they were also strong of constitution, and inured to the iron climate in which Frenchmen were now making war for the first time,—they were accustomed from their earliest life to spare nourishment and hardship;—in a word, they formed then, as they do now, the sole instance in Europe of

an army, the privates of which are semi-barbarians, with the passions, courage, love of war, and devotion to their country, which is found in the earlier periods of society, while the education received by their superior officers places them on a level with those of any other nation. That of the inferior regimental officers is too much neglected; but they are naturally brave, kind to the common soldier, and united among themselves like a family of brothers,—attributes which go far to compensate the want of information. Among the higher officers, are some of the best-informed men in Europe.

The Russian army was at this period deficient in its military staff, and thence imperfect in the execution of combined movements; and their generals were better accustomed to lead an army in the day of actual battle, than to prepare for victory by a skilful combination of previous manœuvres. But this disadvantage was balanced by their zealous and unhesitating devotion to their Emperor and their country. There scarcely existed a Russian, even of the lowest rank, within the influence of bribery; and an officer, like the Prussian commandant of Hamelen, who began to speculate upon retaining his rank in another service, when surrendering the charge intrusted to him by his sovereign, would have been accounted in Russia a prodigy of unexampled villany. In the

mode of disciplining their forces, the Russians proceeded on the system most approved in Europe. Their infantry was confessedly excellent, composed of men in the prime of life, and carefully selected as best qualified for military service. Their artillery was of the first description, so far as the men, guns, carriages, and appointments were concerned; but the rank of General of Artillery had not the predominant weight in the Russian army, which ought to be possessed by those particularly dedicated to the direction of that arm, by which, according to Napoleon, modern battles must be usually decided. The direction of their guns was too often intrusted to general officers of the line. The service of cavalry is less natural to the Russian than that of the infantry, but their horse regiments are nevertheless excellently trained, and have uniformly behaved well.

But the Cossacks are a species of force belonging to Russia exclusively, and although subsequent events have probably rendered every reader in some degree acquainted with their national character, they make too conspicuous a figure in the history of Napoleon, to be passed over without a brief description here.

The natives on the banks of the Don and the Volga hold their lands by military service, and enjoy certain immunities and prescrip-

tions, in consequence of which each individual is obliged to serve four years in the Russian armies. They are trained from early childhood to the use of the lance and sword, and familiarized to the management of a horse peculiar to the country; far from handsome in appearance, but tractable, hardy, swift, and sure-footed, beyond any breed perhaps in the world. At home, and with his family and children, the Cossack is kind, gentle, generous, and simple; but when in arms, and in a foreign country, he resumes the predatory, and sometimes the ferocious habits of his ancestors, the roving Scythians. As the Cossacks receive no pay, plunder is generally their object, and as prisoners were esteemed a useless encumbrance, they granted no quarter, until Alexander promised a ducat for every Frenchman whom they brought in alive. In the actual field of battle, their mode of attack is singular. Instead of acting in line, a body of Cossacks about to charge, disperse at the word of command, very much in the manner of a fan suddenly flung open, and, joining in a loud yell or *hourra*, rush, each acting individually, upon the object of attack, whether infantry, cavalry, or artillery, to all of which they have been in this wild way of fighting formidable assailants But it is as light cavalry that the Cossacks are perhaps unrivalled. They and their horses have been known to march one hundred miles

in twenty-four hours without halting. They plunge into woods, swim rivers, thread passes, cross deep morasses, and penetrate through deserts of snow, without undergoing material loss, or suffering from fatigue. No Russian army, with a large body of Cossacks in front, can be liable to surprise; nor, on the other hand, can an enemy surrounded by them ever be confident against it. In covering the retreat of their own army, their velocity, activity, and courage, render pursuit by the enemy's cavalry peculiarly dangerous; and in pursuing a flying enemy, these qualities are still more redoubtable. In the campaign of 1806-7, the Cossacks took the field in great numbers, under their celebrated Hettmann, or Attaman Platow, who, himself a Cossack, knew their peculiar capacity for warfare, and raised their fame to a pitch which it had not attained in former European wars.

The Russians had also in their service Tartar tribes, who in irregularity resembled the Cossacks, but were not to be compared with them in discipline or courage, being, in truth, little better than hordes of roving savages.

It remains only to be mentioned, that at this time the Russian commissariat was very indifferent, and above all, deficient in funds. The funds of the Imperial treasury were exhausted, and an aid, amounting only to eighty thousand pounds, was obtained from

England with difficulty. In consequence of these circumstances, the Russians were repeatedly, during the campaign, obliged to fight at disadvantage for want of provisions. —We return to the progress of the war.

On the 25th of November, the Russian army of Bennigsen, closely concentrated, occupied a position behind Pultusk; their left, commanded by Count Ostermann, resting upon the town, which is situated on the river Narew. A corps occupied the bridge, to prevent any attack from that point. The right, under Barclay de Tolly, was strongly posted in a wood, and the centre was under the orders of General Sacken. A considerable plain extended between the town of Pultusk and the wood, which formed the right of the Russian position. They had stationed a powerful advanced guard, had occupied the plain with their cavalry, and established a strong reserve in their rear. On the 26th, the Russian position was attacked by the French divisions of Lannes and Davoust, together with the French guards. After skirmishing some time in the centre, without making the desired impression, the battle appeared doubtful, when, suddenly assembling a great strength on their own left, the French made a decisive effort to overwhelm the Russians, by turning their right wing. The attack prevailed to a certain extent. The accumulated

and superior weight of fire, determined Barclay de Tolly to retreat on his reserves, which he did without confusion, while the French seized upon the wood, and took several Russian guns. But Bennigsen, in spite of Kaminskoy's order to retreat, was determined to abide the brunt of battle, and to avail himself of the rugged intrepidity of the troops which he commanded. Ordering Barclay de Tolly to continue his retreat, and thus throwing back his right wing, he enticed the French, confident in victory, to pursue their success, until the Russian cavalry, which had covered the manœuvre, suddenly withdrawing, they found themselves under a murderous and well-directed fire from one hundred and twenty guns, which, extending along the Russian front, played on the French advancing columns with the utmost success. The Russian line at the same time advanced in turn, and pushing the enemy before them, recovered the ground from which they had been driven. The approach of night ended the combat, which had been both obstinate and bloody. The French lost near eight thousand men, killed and wounded, including General Lannes and five other general officers among the latter. The Russian loss amounted to five thousand. The French retreated after nightfall with such rapidity, that on the next day the Cossacks could not find a rear-guard in the vicinity of Pultusk.

The action of Pultusk raised the reputation of Bennigsen, and the character as well as the spirits of the Russian army, but its moral effect on the soldiers was its only important consequence. Had Bennigsen been joined during the action by the division of Buxhowden or d'Anrep, of whom the former was only eight miles distant, the check might have been converted into a victory, highly influential on the issue of the campaign. But either the orders of Kaminskoy, or some misunderstanding, prevented either of these corps from advancing to support the efforts of Bennigsen. It became impossible for him, therefore, notwithstanding the advantages he had obtained, to retain his position at Pultusk, where he must have been surrounded. He accordingly fell back upon Ostrolenka, where he was joined by Prince Galitzin, who had been engaged in action at Golymin upon the day of the battle of Pultusk, had like Bennigsen driven back the enemy, and like him had retreated, for the purpose of concentrating his forces with those of the grand army. The French evinced a feeling of the unusual and obstinate nature of the contest in which they had been engaged at Pultusk and Golymin. Instead of pressing their operations, they retreated into winter quarters, Napoleon withdrawing his guard as far as Warsaw, while the other divisions were cantoned in the

towns to the east ward, but without attempting to realize the prophecies of the bulletins concerning the approaching fate of the Russian army.

The conduct of Kaminskoy began now to evince decided tokens of insanity. He was withdrawn from the supreme command, which, with the general approbation of the soldiers, was conferred upon Bennigsen. This general was not equal in military genius to Suwarrow, but he seems to have been well fitted to command a Russian army. He was active, hardy, and enterprising, and showed none of that peculiarly fatal hesitation, by which officers of other nations opposed to the French generals, and to Buonaparte in particular, seem often to have been affected, as with a sort of moral palsy, which disabled them for the combat at the very moment when it seemed about to commence. On the contrary, Bennigsen, finding himself in the supreme command of ninety thousand men, was resolved not to wait for Buonaparte's onset, but determined to anticipate his motions, wisely concluding, that the desire of desisting from active operations, which the French Emperor had evinced by cantoning his troops in winter quarters, ought to be a signal to the Russians again to take the field.

The situation of the king of Prussia tended to confirm that determination. This unfortu-

nate monarch—well surely did Frederick William then deserve that epithet—was cooped up in the town of Konigsberg, only covered by a small army of a few thousand men, and threatened by the gradual approach of the divisions of Ney and Bernadotte, so that the king's personal safety appeared to be in considerable danger. Graudentz, the key of the Vistula, continued indeed to hold out, but the Prussian garrison was reduced to distress, and the hour of surrender seemed to be approaching. To relieve this important fortress, therefore, and at the same time protect Konigsberg, were motives added to the other reasons which determined Benningsen to resume offensive operations. A severe and doubtful skirmish was fought near Mohringen, in which the French sustained considerable loss. The Cossacks spread abroad over the country, making numerous prisoners, and the scheme of the Russian general succeeded so well, as to enable the faithful l'Estocq to relieve Graudentz with reinforcements and provisions.

By these daring operations, Buonaparte saw himself forced into a winter campaign, and issued general orders for drawing out his forces, with the purpose of concentrating them at Willenberg, in the rear of the Russians (then stationed at Mohringen), and betwixt them and their own country. He proposed, in short, to force his enemies eastward towards the Vis-

tula, as at Jena he had compelled the Prussians to fight with their rear turned to the Rhine Bernadotte had orders to engage the attention of Bennigsen upon the right, and detain him in his present situation, or rather, if possible, induce him to advance eastward towards Thorn, so as to facilitate the operation he meditated

The Russian general learned Buonaparte's intention from an intercepted dispatch, and changed his purpose of advancing on Ney and Bernadotte Marches and counter-marches took place, through a country at all times difficult, and now covered with snow The experience and dexterity of the French secured some advantages, but these were fully counterbalanced by the daily annoyance and loss which they in turn sustained from Platow and his Cossacks In cases where the French retreated, the Scythian lances were always on their rear, and when the Russians retired in turn and were pursued by the French, with the same venturous spirit which they had displayed against others, the latter seldom failed to suffer for their presumption. There was found in the spearmen of the Don and Volga a natural and instinctive turn for military stratagem, ambuscade, and sudden assault, which compelled the French light troops to adopt a caution, very different from their usual habits of audacity

Bennigsen was aware that it was the interest of Russia to protract the campaign in this manner. He was near his reinforcements, the French were distant from theirs—every loss, therefore, told more in proportion on the enemy, than on his army. On the other hand, the Russian army, impatient of protracted hostilities, became clamorous for battle; for the hardships of their situation were such as to give them every desire to bring the war to a crisis. We have noticed the defects of the Russian commissariat. They were especially manifest during those campaigns, when the leader was obliged more than once, merely from want of provisions, to peril the fate of the war upon a general battle, which prudence would have induced him to avoid. In those northern latitudes, and in the month of February, the troops had no resource but to prowl about, and dig for the hoards of provision concealed by the peasants. This labour, added to their military duty, left them scarcely time to lie down; and when they did so, they had no bed but the snow, no shelter but the wintry heaven, and no covering but their rags.[1] The distresses of the army were so extreme, that it induced General Bennigsen, against his judgment, to give battle at all risks, and for

[1] Sir Robert Wilson's *Sketch of the Campaigns in Poland, in* 1806-7, p. 94

this purpose to concentrate his forces at Preuss-Eylau, which was pitched on as the field on which he proposed to await Buonaparte.

In marching through Landsberg to occupy the selected ground, the Russian rear guard was exposed to a serious attack by the French, and was only saved from great loss by the gallantry of Prince Bagration, who redeemed, by sheer dint of fighting, the loss sustained by want of conduct in defiling through the streets of a narrow village, while pursued by an enterprising enemy. The Russian army lost 3000 men. On the 7th February, the same gallant prince, with the Russian rear guard, gained such decided advantages over the French van as nearly balanced the loss at Landsberg, and gave time for the whole army to march through the town of Preuss-Eylau, and to take up a position behind it. It had been intended to maintain the town itself, and a body of troops had been left for that purpose; but in the confusion attending the movement of so large an army, the orders issued had been misunderstood, and the division designed for this service evacuated the place so soon as the rear guard had passed through it.

A Russian division was hastily ordered to re-occupy Preuss-Eylau. They found the French already in possession, and, although they dislodged them, were themselves driven out in turn by another division of French, to

whom Buonaparte had promised the plunder of the town. A third division of Russians was ordered to advance; for Bennigsen was desirous to protract the contest for the town until the arrival of his heavy artillery, which joined him by a different route. When it came up, he would have discontinued the struggle for possession of Preuss-Eylau, but it was impossible to control the ardour of the Russian columns, who persevered in advancing with drums beating, rushed into the town, and, surprising the French in the act of sacking it, put many of them to the bayonet, even in the acts of license which they were practising. Preuss-Eylau, however, proved no place of shelter. It was protected by no works of any kind; and the French, advancing under cover of the hillocks and broken ground which skirt the village, threw their fire upon the streets, by which the Russians sustained some loss. General Barclay de Tolly was wounded, and his forces again evacuated the town, which was once more and finally occupied by the French. Night fell, and the combat ceased, to be renewed with treble fury on the next day.

The position of the two armies may be easily described. That of Russia occupied a space of uneven ground, about two miles in length and a mile in depth, with the village of Serpallen on their left, in the front of their army

lay the town of Preuss-Eylau, situated in a hollow, and in possession of the French. It was watched by a Russian division; which, to protect the Russian centre from being broken by an attack from that quarter, was strongly reinforced, though by doing so the right wing was considerably weakened. This was thought of the less consequence, that l'Estocq, with his division of Prussians, was hourly expected to join the Russians on that point. The French occupied Eylau with their left, while their centre and right lay parallel to the Russians, upon a chain of heights which commanded in a great measure the ground possessed by the enemy. They also expected to be reinforced by the division of Ney, which had not come up, and which was destined to form on the extreme left.

The space betwixt the hostile armies was open and flat, and intersected with frozen lakes. They might trace each other's position by the pale glimmer of the watch-lights upon the snow. The difference of numerical force was considerably to the advantage of the French. Sir Robert Wilson rates them at 90,000 men, opposed to 60,000 only; but the disproportion is probably considerably overrated.

The eventful action commenced with day-break on the 8th of February. Two strong columns of the French advanced, with the

purpose of turning the right, and storming the centre, of the Russians, at one and the same time. But they were driven back in great disorder by the heavy and sustained fire of the Russian artillery. An attack on the Russian left was equally unsuccessful. The Russian infantry stood like stone ramparts—they repulsed the enemy—their cavalry came to their support, pursued the retiring assailants, and took standards and eagles. About midday, a heavy storm of snow began to fall, which the wind drove right in the face of the Russians, and which added to the obscurity caused by the smoke of the burning village of Serpallen, that rolled along the line.

Under cover of the darkness, six columns of the French advanced with artillery and cavalry, and were close on the Russian position ere they were opposed. Bennigsen, at the head of his staff, brought up the reserves in person, who, uniting with the first line, bore the French back at the point of the bayonet. Their columns, partly broken, were driven again to their own position, where they rallied with difficulty. A French regiment of cuirassiers, which, during this part of the action, had gained an interval in the Russian army, were charged by the Cossacks, and found their defensive armour no protection against the lance. They were all slain except

At the moment when victory appeared to declare for the Russians, it was on the point of being wrested from them. Davoust's division had been manœuvring since the beginning of the action to turn the left, and gain the rear, of the Russian line. They now made their appearance on the field of battle with such sudden effect, that Serpallen was lost, the Russian left wing, and a part of their centre, were thrown into disorder, and forced to retire and change their front, so as to form almost at right angles with the right, and that part of the centre which retained their original position.

At this crisis, and while the French were gaining ground on the rear of the Russians, l'Estocq, so long expected, appeared in his turn suddenly on the field, and, passing the left of the French, and the right of the Russians, pushed down in three columns to redeem the battle on the Russian centre and rear. The Prussians, under that loyal and gallant leader, regained in this bloody field their ancient military reputation. They never fired till within a few paces of the enemy, and then used the bayonet with readiness and courage. They redeemed the ground which the Russians had lost, and drove back in their turn the troops of Davoust and Bernadotte, who had been lately victorious.

Ney, in the mean while, appeared on the

field, and occupied Schloditten, a village on the road to Konigsberg. As this endangered the communication of the Russians with that town, it was thought necessary to carry it by storm; a gallant resolution, which was successfully executed. This was the last act of that bloody day. It was ten o'clock at night, and the combat was ended.

Fifty thousand men perished in this dreadful battle—the best contested in which Buonaparte had yet engaged, and by far the most unsuccessful. He retired to the heights from which he had advanced in the morning, without having gained one point for which he had struggled, and after having suffered a loss considerably greater than that which he had inflicted on the enemy. But the condition of the Russian army was also extremely calamitous. Their generals held a council of war upon the field of battle, and without dismounting from their horses. The general sentiment which prevailed among them was, a desire to renew the battle on the next day, at all hazards. Tolstoy undertook to move forward on the French lines—l'Estocq urged the same counsel. They offered to pledge their lives, that, would Bennigsen advance, Napoleon must necessarily retire; and they urged the moral effect which would be produced, not on their army only, but on Germany and on Europe, by such an admission of weakness on

the part of him who had never advanced but to victory. But Bennigsen conceived that the circumstances of his army did not permit him to encounter the hazard of being cut off from Konigsberg, and endangering the person of the King of Prussia; or that of risking a second general action, with an army diminished by at least 20,000 killed and wounded, short of ammunition, and totally deprived of provisions. The Russians accordingly commenced their retreat on Konigsberg that very night. The division of Count Ostremann did not move till the next morning, when it traversed the field in front of Preuss-Eylau, without the slightest interruption from the French, who still occupied the town.

The battle of Preuss-Eylau was claimed as a victory by both parties, though it was very far from being decided in favour of either. Bennigsen had it to boast, that he had repelled the attacks of Buonaparte along the whole of his line, and that the fighting terminated unfavourably to the French. He could also exhibit the unusual spectacle of twelve imperial eagles of France, taken in one action. For many days after the battle, also, the Cossacks continued to scour the country, and bring into Konigsberg great numbers of French prisoners. On the other hand, the subsequent retreat of the Russians was interpreted by the French into an acknowledgment of weakness;

and they appealed to their own possession of the field of battle, with the dead and wounded, as the usual testimonials of victory.

But there were two remarkable circumstances, by which Napoleon virtually acknowledged that he had received an unusual check. On the 13th February, four days after the battle, a message was dispatched to the King of Prussia by Buonaparte, proposing an armistice, on grounds far more favourable to the prince than those Frederick William might have been disposed to accept, or which Buonaparte would have been inclined to grant, after the battle of Jena. It was even intimated, that in case of agreeing to make a separate peace, the Prussian king might obtain from the French Emperor the restoration of his whole dominions. True to his ally, the Emperor of Russia, Frederick William, even in the extremity of his distress, refused to accede to any save a general peace. The proposal of an armistice was also peremptorily refused, and the ground on which it was offered was construed to indicate Buonaparte's conscious weakness.

Another decisive proof of the loss which Napoleon had sustained in the battle of Preuss-Eylau, was his inactivity after the battle. For eight days he remained without making any movement, excepting by means of his cavalry, which were generally worsted, and on the

13th February he evacuated the place, and prepared himself to retreat upon the Vistula, instead of driving the Russians, as he had threatened, behind the Pregel. Various actions took place during his retreat with different fortunes, but the Russian Cossacks and light troops succeeded in making numbers of prisoners, and collecting much spoil.

The operations of Napoleon, when he had again retired to the line of the Vistula, intimated caution, and the sense of a difficult task before him. He appeared to feel, that the advance into Poland had been premature, while Dantzic remained in the hands of the Prussians, from whence the most alarming operations might take place in his rear, should he again advance to the Vistula without subduing it. The siege of Dantzic was therefore to be formed without delay. The place was defended by General Kalkreuth to the last extremity. After many unsuccessful attempts to relieve it, Dantzic finally surrendered in the end of May, 1807, after trenches had been opened before it for fifty-two days. If the season of the year had admitted, a British expedition to Dantzic might, if ably conducted, have operated in the rear of the Emperor Napoleon the relief of Prussia, and perhaps effected the liberation of Europe.

The utmost care was also taken, to supply the loss which Napoleon's armies had sustained

in these hard-fought campaigns. He raised the siege of Colberg, drew the greater part of his forces out of Silesia, ordered a new levy in Switzerland, urged the march of bodies of troops from Italy, and, to complete his means, demanded a new conscription of the year 1808, which was instantly complied with by the Senate as a matter of course. At length, as summer approached, the surrender of Dantzic enabled him to unite the besieging division, twenty-five thousand strong, to his main army, and to prepare to resume offensive operations. A large levy of Poles was made at the same time; and they, with other light troops of the French, were employed in making strong recognizances, with various fortune, but never without the exchange of hard blows. It became evident to all Europe, that, whatever might be the end of this bloody conflict, the French Emperor was contending with a general and troops, against whom it was impossible to gain those overpowering and irresistible advantages, which characterized his campaigns in Italy and Germany. The bulletins, it is true, announced new successes from day to day; but as the geographical advance upon the Polish territory was by no means in proportion to the advantages claimed, it was plain that Napoleon was as often engaged in parrying as in pushing, in repairing losses as in improving victories. The Russian generals com-

posed plans with skill, and executed them with activity and spirit, for cutting off separate divisions, and disturbing the French communications.

The Russian army had received reinforcements; but they were deficient in numerical amount, and only made up their strength, at the utmost, to their original computation of 90,000 men. This proved unpardonable negligence in the Russian government, considering the ease with which men can there be levied to any extent by the mere will of the Emperor, and the vital importance of the war which they were now waging. It is said, however, that the poverty of the Russian administration was the cause of this failure to recruit their forces; and that the British being applied to, to negotiate a loan of six millions, and advance one million to account, had declined the transaction, and thereby given great offence to the Emperor Alexander.

Napoleon, so much more remote from his own territories, had already, by exertions unparalleled in the history of Europe, assembled two hundred and eighty thousand men between the Vistula and Memel, including the garrison of Dantzic. With such unequal forces the war recommenced.

The Russians were the assailants, making a combined movement on Ney's division, which was stationed at Gutstadt, and in the vicinity.

They pursued him as far as Deppen, where there was some fighting; but upon the 8th of June, Napoleon advanced in person to extricate his marshal, and Bennigsen was obliged to retreat in his turn. He was hardly pressed on the rear by the Grand Army of France. But even in this moment of peril, Platow, with his Cossacks, made a charge, or, in their phrase, a hourra, upon the French, with such success, that they not only dispersed the skirmishers of the French van-guard, and the advanced troops destined to support them, but compelled the infantry to form squares, endangered the personal safety of Napoleon, and occupied the attention of the whole French cavalry, who bore down on them at full speed. Musketry and artillery were all turned on them at once, but to little or no purpose; for, having once gained the purpose of checking the advance, which was all they aimed at, the cloud of Cossacks dispersed over the field, like mist before the sun, and united behind the battalions whom their demonstration had protected.

By this means Platow and his followers had got before the retreating division of the Russian army under Bagration, which they were expected to support, and had reached first a bridge over the Aller. The Cossacks were alarmed by the immense display of force demonstrated against them, and showed a dispo-

sition to throw themselves confusedly on the bridge, which must certainly have been attended with the most disastrous consequences to the rear-guard, who would thus have been impeded in their retreat by the very troops appointed to support them. The courage and devotion of Platow prevented that great misfortune. He threw himself from his horse. « Let the Cossack that is base enough, » he exclaimed, « desert his Hettmann! » The children of the wilderness halted around him, and he disposed them in perfect order to protect the retreat of Bagration and the rear-guard, and afterwards achieved his own retreat with trifling loss.

The Russian army fell back upon Heilsberg, and there concentrating their forces, made a most desperate stand. A very hard-fought action here took place. The Russians, overpowered by superior numbers, and forced from the level ground, continued to defend with fury their position on the heights, which the French made equally strenuous efforts to carry by assault. The combat was repeatedly renewed, with cavalry, infantry, and artillery; but without the fiery valour of the assailants making any effectual impression on the iron ranks of the Russians. The battle continued, till the approach of midnight, upon terms of equality; and when the morning dawned, the space of ground betwen the position of the

Russians and that of the French, was not merely strewed, but literally sheeted over, with the bodies of the dead and wounded. The Russians retired unmolested after the battle of Heilsberg, and, crossing the river Aller, placed that barrier betwixt them and the army of Buonaparte, which, though it had suffered great losses, had, in consequence of the superiority of numbers, been less affected by them than the Russian forces. In the condition of Bennigsen's army, it was his obvious policy to protract the war, especially as reinforcements, to the number of thirty thousand men, were approaching the frontier from the interior of the empire. It was probably with this view that he kept his army on the right bank of the Aller, with the exception of a few bodies of cavalry, for the sake of observation and intelligence.

On the 13th, the Russian army reached Friedland, a considerable town on the west side of the Aller, communicating with the eastern, or right bank of the river, by a long wooden bridge. It was the object of Napoleon to induce the Russian general to pass by this narrow bridge to the left bank, and then to decoy him into a general action, in a position where the difficulty of defiling through the town, and over the bridge, must render retreat almost impossible. For this purpose he showed such a proportion only of

his forces, as induced General Bennigsen to believe that the French troops on the western side of the Aller consisted only of Oudinot's division, which had been severely handled in the battle of Heilsberg, and which he now hoped altogether to destroy. Under this deception he ordered a Russian division to pass the bridge, defile through the town, and march to the assault. The French took care to offer no such resistance as should intimate their real strength. Bennigsen was thus led to reinforce this division with another—the battle thickened, and the Russian general at length transported all his army, one division excepted, to the left bank of the Aller, by means of the wooden bridge and three pontoons, and arrayed them in front of the town of Friedland, to overpower, as he supposed, the crippled division of the French, to which alone he believed himself opposed.

But no sooner had he taken this irretrievable step than the mask was dropped. The French skirmishers advanced in force; heavy columns of infantry began to show themselves; batteries of cannon were got into position; and all circumstances concurred, with the report of prisoners, to assure Bennigsen, that he, with his enfeebled forces, was in presence of the grand French army. His position, a sort of plain, surrounded by woods and broken ground, was difficult to defend; with the town

and a large river in his rear, it was dangerous to attempt a retreat, and to advance was prevented by the inequality of his force. Bennigsen now became anxious to maintain his communication with Wehlau, a town on the Pregel, which was the original point of retreat, and where he hoped to join with the Prussians under General l'Estocq. If the enemy should seize the bridge at Allerberg, some miles lower down the Aller than Friedland, this plan would become impossible, and he found himself therefore obliged to diminish his forces, by detaching six thousand men to defend that point. With the remainder of his force he resolved to maintain his present position till night.

The French advanced to the attack about ten o'clock. The broken and wooded country which they occupied, enabled them to maintain and renew their efforts at pleasure, while the Russians, in their exposed situation, could not make the slightest movement without beign observed. Yet they fought with such obstinate valour, that about noon the French seemed sickening of the contest, and about to retire. But this was only a feint, to repose such of their forces as had been engaged, and to bring up reinforcements. The cannonade continued till about half past four, when Buonaparte brought up his full force in person, for the purpose of one of those despe-

rate and generally irresistible efforts to which he was wont to trust the decision of a doubtful day. Columns of enormous power, and extensive depth, appeared partially visible among the interstices of the wooded country, and seen from the town of Friedland, the hapless Russian army looked as if surrounded by a deep semicircle of glittering steel. The attack upon all the line, with cavalry, infantry, and artillery, was general and simultaneous, the French advancing with shouts of assured victory; while the Russians, weakened by the loss of at least twelve thousand killed and wounded, were obliged to attempt that most dispiriting and dangerous of movements—a retreat through encumbered defiles, in front of a superior enemy. The principal attack was on the left wing, where the Russian position was at length forced. The troops which composed it streamed into the town, and crowded the bridge and pontoons; the enemy thundered on their rear, and, without the valour of Alexander's Imperial Guard, the Russians would have been utterly destroyed. These brave soldiers charged with the bayonet the corps of Ney, who led the French van-guard, disordered his column, and, though they were overpowered by numbers, prevented the total ruin of the left wing.

Meanwhile, the bridge and pontoons were set on fire, to prevent the French, who had

forced their way into the town, from taking possession of them. The smoke, rolling over the combatants, increased the horror and confusion of the scene; yet a considerable part of the Russian infantry escaped through a ford close by the town, which was discovered in the moment of defeat. The Russian centre and right, who remained on the west bank of the Aller, effected a retreat by a circuitous route, leaving on the right the town of Friedland, with its burning bridges, no longer practicable for friend or foe, and passing the Aller by a ford considerably farther down the river. This also was found out in the very moment of extremity,—was deep and dangerous, took the infantry up to the breast, and destroyed what ammunition was left in the tumbrils.

Thus were the Russians once more united on the right bank of the Aller, and enabled to prosecute their march towards Wehlau. Amid the calamities of defeat, they had saved all their cannon except seventeen, and preserved their baggage. Indeed, the stubborn character of their defence seems to have paralyzed the energies of the victor, who, after carrying the Russian position, showed little of that activity in improving his success, which usually characterized him upon such occasions. He pushed no troops over the Aller in pursuit of the retreating enemy, but suffered Bennigsen to rally his broken troops without interrup-

tion. Neither, when in possession of Friedland, did he detach any force down the left bank, to act upon the flank of the Russian centre and right, and cut them off from the river. In short, the battle of Friedland, according to the expression of a French general, was a battle gained, but a victory lost.

Yet the most important consequences resulted from the action, though the French success had been but partially improved. Konigsberg, which had been so long the refuge of the King of Prussia, was evacuated by his forces, as it became plain his Russian auxiliaries could no longer maintain the war in Poland. Bennigsen retreated to Tilsit, towards the Russian frontiers. But the moral consequences of the defeat were of far greater consequence than could have been either the capture of guns and prisoners, or the acquisition of territory. It had the effect, evidently desired by Napoleon, of disposing the Emperor Alexander to peace. *The former could not but feel that he was engaged with a more obstinate* enemy in Russia, than any he had yet encountered. After so many bloody battles, he was scarce arrived on the frontiers of an immense empire, boundless in its extent, and almost inexhaustible in resources; while the French, after suffering extremely in defeating an army that was merely auxiliary, could scarce be supposed capable of undertaking, a scheme

of invasion so gigantic, as that of plunging into the vast regions of Muscovy.

Such an enterprise would have been peculiarly hazardous in the situation in which the French Emperor now stood. The English expedition to the Baltic was daily expected. Gustavus was in Swedish Pomerania, at the head of a considerable army, which had raised the siege of Stralsund. A spirit of resistance was awakening in Prussia, where the resolute conduct of Blucher had admirers and imitators, and the nation seemed to be reviving from the consternation inflicted by the defeat of Jena. The celebrated Schill, a partisan of great courage and address, had gained many advantages, and was not unlikely, in a nation bred to arms, to acquire the command of a numerous body of men. Hesse, Hanover, Brunswick, and the other provinces of Germany, deprived of their ancient princes, and subjected to heavy exactions by the conquerors, were ripe for insurrection. All these dangers were of a nature from which little could be apprehended while the Grand Army was at a moderate distance; but were it to advance into Russia, especially were it to meet with a check there, these sparks of fire, left in the rear, might be expected to kindle a dreadful conflagration.

Moved by such considerations, Napoleon had fully kept open the door for reconciliation betwixt the Czar and himself, abstaining from

all those personal reflections against him, which he usually showered upon those who thwarted his projects, and intimating more than once, by different modes of communication, that a peace, which should enable Russia and France to divide the world betwixt them, should be placed within Alexander's reach so soon as he was disposed to accept it.

The time was now arrived when the Emperor of Russia was disposed to listen to terms of accommodation with France. He had been for some time dissatisfied with his allies. Against Frederick William, indeed, nothing could be objected, save his bad fortune; but what is it that so soon deprives us of our friends as a constant train of bad luck, rendering us always a burthen more than an aid to them? The King of Sweden was a feeble ally at best, and had become so unpopular with his subjects, that his dethronement was anticipated; and it was probably remembered, that the Swedish province of Finland extended so near to St Petersburgh, as to be a desirable acquisition, which, in the course of a treaty with Buonaparte, might be easily attained.

The principal ally of the Czar had been Britain. But he was displeased, as we have already noticed, with the economy of the English cabinet, who had declined, in his instance, the loans and subsidies, of which they used to be liberal to allies of far less importance. A

subsidy of about eighty thousand pounds was all which he had been able to extract from them. England had, indeed, sent an army into the north to join the Swedes, in forming the siege of Stralsund; but this was too distant an operation to produce any effect upon the Polish campaign. Alexander was also affected by the extreme sufferings of his subjects. His army had been to him, as to most young sovereigns, a particular object of attention; and he was justly proud of his noble regiment of Guards, which, maltreated as they had been in the desperate actions of which we have given some account, remained scarce the shadow of themselves, in numbers and appearance. His fame, moreover, suffered little in withdrawing from a contest in which he was engaged as an auxiliary only; and Alexander was no doubt made to comprehend, that he might do more in behalf of the king of Prussia, his ally, by negotiation than by continuation of the war. The influence of Napoleon's name and the extraordinary splendour of his talents and his exploits, must also have had an effect upon the youthful imagination of the Russian Emperor. He might be allowed to feel pride (high as his own situation was) that the Destined Victor, who had subdued so many princes, was willing to acknowledge an equality in his case; and he might not yet be so much aware of the nature of ambition, as to know that it

holds the world as inadequate to maintain two co-ordinate sovereigns.

The Russian Emperor's wish of an armistice was first hinted at by Bennigsen, on the 21st of June, was ratified on the 23d of the same month, and was soon afterwards followed, not only by peace with Russia and Prussia, on a basis which seemed to preclude the possibility of future misunderstanding, but by the formation of a personal intimacy and friendship between Napoleon and the only sovereign in Europe, who had the power necessary to treat with him on an equal footing.

The negotiation for this important pacification was not conducted in the usual style of diplomacy, but in that which Napoleon had repeatedly shown a desire to substitute for the conferences of inferior agents, by the intervention, namely, of the high-contracting parties in person.

The armistice was no sooner agreed upon, than preparations were made for a personal interview betwixt the two Emperors. It took place upon a raft prepared for the purpose, and moored in the midst of the river Niemen, which bore an immense tent or pavilion. At half past nine, 25th June, 1807, the two Emperors, in the midst of thousands of spectators, embarked at the same moment from the opposite banks of the river. Buonaparte was attended by Murat, Berthier, Bessières, Duroc,

and Caulaincourt, Alexander, by his brother the Archduke Constantine, Generals Benningsen and Ouwarow, with the Count de Lieven, one of his aides-de-camp. Arriving at the raft, they disembarked and embraced amid the shouts and acclamations of both armies, and, entering the pavilion which had been prepared, held a private conference of two hours. Their officers, who remained at a distance during the interview, were then reciprocally introduced, and the fullest good understanding seemed to be established between the sovereigns, who had at their disposal so great a portion of the universe. It is not to be doubted, that on this momentous occasion Napoleon exerted all those personal powers of attraction, which, exercised on the part of one otherwise so distinguished, rarely failed to acquire the good will of all with whom he had intercourse, when he was disposed to employ them.[1] He possessed also, in an eminent degree, the sort of eloquence which can make the worse ap-

[1] The impression which Buonaparte's presence and conversation, aided by the preconceived ideas of his talents, made on all who approached his person, was of the most striking kind. The captain of a British man of war, who was present at his occupying the island of Elba, disturbed on that occasion the solemnity and gravity of a levee, at which several British functionaries attended, by bearing a homely, but certainly a striking testimony to his powers of attraction, while he exclaimed, that Boney was a d—d good fellow after all.

pear the better reason, and which, turning into ridicule the arguments derived from general principles of morality or honesty, which he was accustomed to term idiosyncrasy, makes all reasoning rest upon existing circumstances. Thus, all the maxims of truth and honour might be plausibly parried by those arising out of immediate convenience; and the direct interest, or what seemed the direct interest, of the party whom he wished to gain over, was put in immediate opposition to the dictates of moral sentiment, and of princely virtue. In this manner he might plausibly represent, in many points, that the weal of Alexander's empire might require him to strain some of the maxims of truth and justice, and to do a little wrong in order to attain a great national advantage.

The town of Tilsit was now declared neutral. Entertainments of every kind followed each other in close succession, and the French and Russian, nay, even the Prussian officers, seemed so delighted with each other's society, that it was difficult to conceive that men, so courteous and amiable, had been for so many months drenching trampled snows and muddy wastes with each other's blood. The two Emperors were constantly together in public and in private, and on those occasions their intimacy approached to the character of that of two young men of rank, who are comrades in

sport or frolic, as well as accustomed to be associates in affairs, and upon occasions, of graver moment. They are well known to have had private and confidential meetings, where gaiety and even gallantry seemed to be the sole purpose, but where politics were not entirely forgotten.

Upon the more public occasions, there were guests at the imperial festivities, for which they contained small mirth. On the 28th, the unfortunate King of Prussia arrived at Tilsit, and was presented to his formidable victor. Buonaparte did not admit him to the footing of equality on which he treated the Emperor Alexander, and made an early intimation, that it would only be for the purpose of obliging his brother of the North, that he might consent to relax his grasp on the Prussian territories. Those in the king's own possession were reduced to the petty territory of Memel, with the fortresses of Colberg and Graudentz. It was soon plain, that the terms on which he was to be restored to a part of his dominions would deprive Prussia of almost all the accessions which had been made since 1773, under the system and by the talents of the Great Frederick, and reduce her at once from a first-rate power in Europe to one of the second class.

The beautiful and unfortunate queen, whose high spirit had hastened the war, was anxious, if possible, to interfere with such weight as

female intercession might use, to diminish the calamities of the peace. It was but on the first day of the foregoing April, that when meeting the Emperor Alexander at Koingsberg, and feeling the full difference betwixt that interview, and those at Berlin which preceded the war, Alexander and Frederick William had remained locked for a time in each other's arms; the former shedding tears of compassion, the latter of grief. On the same occasion, the queen, as she saluted the Emperor, could only utter amidst her tears the words, « Dear cousin!» intimating at once the depth of their distress, and their affectionate confidence in the magnanimity of their ally. This scene was melancholy, but that which succeeded it at Tilsit was more so, for it was embittered by degradation. The queen, who arrived at the place of treaty some days after her husband, was now not only to support the presence of Napoleon, in whose official prints she was personally abused, and who was the author of all the misfortunes which had befallen her country; but if she would in any degree repair these misfortunes, it could only be by exciting his compassion, and propitiating his favour. « Forgive us,» she said, « this fatal war—the memory of the Great Frederick deceived us—we thought ourselves his equals because we are his descendants—alas, we have not proved such!» With a zeal for the welfare

of Prussia, which must have cost her own feelings exquisite pain, she used towards Napoleon those arts of insinuation, by which women possessed of high rank, great beauty, wit, and grace, frequently exercise an important influence. Desirous to pay his court, Napoleon on one occasion offered her a rose of uncommon beauty. The queen at first seemed to decline receiving the courtesy—then accepted it, adding the stipulation—« At least with Magdeburg.» Buonaparte, as he boasted to Joséphine, was proof against these lady-like artifices, as wax-cloth is against rain. « Your Majesty will be pleased to remember,» he said, « that it is I who offer, and that your Majesty has only the task of accepting.»

It was discourteous to remind the unfortunate princess how absolutely she was at the mercy of the victor, and unchivalrous to dispute that a lady, accepting a courtesy, has a right to conceive herself as conferring an obligation, and is therefore entitled to annex a condition. But it is true, on the other hand, as Napoleon himself urged, that it would have been playing the gallant at a high price, if he had exchanged towns and provinces in return for civilities. It is not believed that the Queen of Prussia succeeded to any extent in obtaining a modification of the terms to which her husband was subjected; and it is certain, that she felt so deeply the distress into which her

country was plunged, that her sense of it brought her to an untimely grave. The death of this interesting and beautiful queen, not only powerfully affected the mind of her husband and family, but the Prussian nation at large; who, regarding her as having died a victim to her patriotic sorrow for the national misfortunes, recorded her fate as one of the many injuries, for which they were to call France and Napoleon to a severe accompting.

The terms imposed on Prussia by the treaty of Tilsit were briefly these:—

That portion of Poland acquired by Prussia in the partition of 1772 was disunited from that kingdom, and erected into a separate territory, to be called the Great Duchy of Warsaw. It was to be held by the King of Saxony, under the character of Grand Duke; and it was stipulated that he was to have direct communication with this new acquisition by means of a military road across Silesia, a privilege likely to occasion constant jealousy betwixt the courts of Berlin and Warsaw. Thus ended the hope of the Poles to be restored to the condition of an independent nation. They merely exchanged the dominion of one German master for another Prussia for Saxony, Frederick William for Augustus—the only difference being, that the latter was descended from the ancient kings of Poland. They were, however, subjected to a milder and more easy

yoke than that which they had hitherto borne; nor does it appear that the king (as he had been created) of Saxony derived any real addition of authority and consequence from the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. It seems indeed probable, that the erection of this sovereignty was the effect of a composition between the Emperors; Napoleon, on the one hand, renouncing all attempts at the liberation of Poland, which he could not have persevered in without continuing the war with Russia, and perhaps with Austria also; and Alexander consenting that Prussia should be deprived of her Polish dominions, under the stipulation that they were to be transferred to Saxony, from whose vicinity his empire could apprehend little danger.

The constitution arranged for the Grand Duchy, also, was such as was not liable to lead to disturbances among those provinces of Poland which were united with Austria and Russia. Slavery was abolished, and the equality of legal rights among all ranks of citizens was acknowledged. The Grand Duke held the executive power. A Senate, or Upper House, of eighteen members, and a Lower House of Nuncios, or Deputies, amounting to a hundred, passed into laws, or rejected at their pleasure, such propositions as the Duke laid before them. But the Diets, the Pospolite, the *Liberum Veto*, and all the other turbulent

privileges of the Polish nobles, continued abolished, as they had been under the Prussian government.

Buonaparte made it his boast that he had returned the Prussian territories not to the house of Brandenburgh, but to Alexander; so that if Frederick William yet reigned, it was only, he said, by the friendship of Alexander, —« a term,» he added, « which he himself did not recognize in the vocabulary of sovereigns, under the head of state affairs.» Alexander, however, was not altogether so disinterested, as Buonaparte, with something like a sneer, thus seemed to insinuate. There was excepted from the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, and added to the territory of Russia at the expense of Prussia, the province of Bialystock, serving materially to improve the frontier of the empire. Thus the Czar, in some degree, profited by the distress of his ally. The apology for his conduct must rest, first, on the strength of the temptation to stretch his empire towards the Vistula, as a great natural boundary; secondly, on the plea, that if he had declined the acquisition from a point of delicacy, Saxony, not Prussia, would have profited by his self-denial, as the territory of Bialystock would in that event have gone to augment the Duchy of Warsaw. Russia ceded the Lordship of Iever to Holland, as an ostensible compensation for her new acquisition.

Dantzic, with a certain surrounding territory, was by the treaty of Tilsit recognized as a free city, under the protection of Prussia and Saxony. There can be little doubt, that the further provision, that France should occupy the town until the conclusion of a maritime peace, was intended to secure for the use of Napoleon a place of arms, so important in case of a new breach betwixt him and Russia.

It followed, as a matter of course, that the Emperor Alexander, and the King of Prussia, ratified all the changes which Napoleon had wrought on Europe, acknowledged the thrones which he had erected, and recognized the leagues which he had formed. On the other hand, out of deference to the Emperor, Buonaparte consented that the Dukes of Saxe-Coburg, Oldenburg, and Mecklenburg-Schwerin, German princes connected with Alexander, should remain in possession of their territories; the French, however, continuing to occupy the seaports of the two countries last named, until a final peace betwixt France and England.

While these important negotiations were proceeding, a radical change took place in the councils of the British nation; what was called the Fox and Grenville administration being dissolved, and their place supplied by one formed under the auspices of the Duke of Portland, and comprehending Lords Liverpool, Castlereagh, Mr Canning, and other statesmen,

professing the principles of the late William Pitt. It was an anxious object with the new cabinet to reconcile the Czar to the alliance of England, and atone for the neglect with which he considered himself as having been treated by their predecessors. With this purpose, Lord Leveson Gower (now Lord Viscount Granville) was dispatched, with power to make such offers of conciliation as might maintain or renew an amicable intercourse between Britain and Russia. But the Emperor Alexander had taken his part, at least for the present; and, being predetermined to embrace the course recommended by his new ally, Buonaparte, he avoided giving audience to the British ambassador, and took his measures at Tilsit, without listening to the offers of accommodation which Lord Gower was empowered to propose.

By the treaty of Tilsit, so far as made public, Russia offered her mediation betwixt Britain and France, on condition that the first-named kingdom should accept the proffer of her interference within a month. So far, therefore, the Czar appeared to a certain extent careful of the interests of his late ally. But it is now perfectly well understood, that among other private articles of this memorable treaty, there existed one, by which the Emperor bound himself, in case of Britain's rejecting the proposed mediation, to recognize and enforce what Buonaparte called the Continental System, by

shutting his ports against British vessels, and engaging the Northern Courts in a new coalition, having for its object the destruction of English maritime superiority. In a word, the armed Northern Neutrality, originally formed under the auspices of Catherine, and in an evil hour adopted by the unfortunate Paul, was again to be established under the authority of Alexander. Denmark, smarting under the recollections of the battle of Copenhagen, only waited, it was thought, the signal to join such a coalition, and would willingly consent to lend her still powerful navy to its support; and Sweden was in too weak and distracted a state to resist the united will of France and Russia, either regarding war with Britain, or any other stipulations which it might be intended to impose upon her. But as there is no country of Europe to which the commerce of England is so beneficial as Russia, whose gross produce she purchases almost exclusively, it was necessary to observe strict secresy upon these further objects. The ostensible proposal of mediation was therefore resorted to, less in the hope, perhaps, of establishing peace betwixt France and England, than in the expectation of affording a pretext, which might justify in the eye of the Russian nation a rupture with the latter power. But, in spite of every precaution which could be adopted, the address of the Bristish ambassador obtained

possession of the secret which France and Russia deemed it so important to conceal; and Lord Gower was able to transmit to his court an exact account of this secret article, and particularly of the two Emperors having resolved to employ the Danish fleet in the destruction of the maritime rights of Britain, which had been so lately put upon a footing, that, to Alexander at least, had, till his recent fraternization with Buonaparte, seemed entirely satisfactory.

There were no doubt other secret articles named in the treaty of Tilsit, by which it seems to have been the object of these two great Emperors, as they loved to term themselves, of the North and of the South, to divide the civilized world between them. It may be regarded as certain, that Buonaparte opened to Alexander the course of unprincipled policy which he intended to pursue respecting the kingdom of Spain, and procured his acquiescence in that daring usurpation. And it has been affirmed, that he also stipulated for the aid of Russia to take Gibraltar, to recover Malta and Egypt, and to banish the British flag from the Mediterranean. All these enterprises were more or less directly calculated to the depression, or rather the destruction of Great Britain, the only formidable enemy who still maintained the strife against France, and so far the promised co-operation of Russia must

have been in the highest degree grateful to Napoleon. But Alexander, however much he might be Buonaparte's personal admirer, did not follow his father's simplicity in becoming his absolute dupe, but took care, in return for his compliance with the distant, and in some degree visionary projects of Buonaparte's ambition, to exact his countenance and co-operation in gaining certain acquisitions of the highest importance to Russia, and which were found at a future period to have added powerfully to her means of defence, when she once more matched her strength with that of France. To explain this, we must look back to the ancient policy of France and of Europe, when, by supporting the weaker states, and maintaining their independence, it was the object to prevent the growth of any gigantic and overbearing power, who might derange the balance of the civilized world.

The growing strength of Russia used in former times to be the natural subject of jealousy to the French government, and they endeavoured to counterbalance these apprehensions by extending the protection of France to the two weaker neighbours of Russia, the Porte and the kingdom of Sweden, with which powers it had always been the policy of France to connect herself, and which connexion was not only honourable to that kingdom, but useful to Europe. But at the treaty of Tilsit, and in

Buonaparte's subsequent conduct relating to these powers, he lost sight of this national policy, or rather sacrificed it to his own personal objects.

One of the most important private articles of the treaty of Tilsit seems to have provided, that Sweden should be despoiled of her provinces of Finland in favour of the Czar, and be thus, with the consent of Buonaparte, deprived of all effectual means of annoying Russia. A single glance at the map will show, how completely the possession of Finland put a Swedish army, or the army of France as an ally of Sweden, within a short march of St Petersburgh; and how, by consenting to Sweden's being stripped of that important province, Napoleon relinquished the grand advantage to be derived from it, in case of his ever being again obliged to contend with Russia upon Russian ground. Yet there can be no doubt, that at the treaty of Tilsit he became privy to the war which Russia shortly after waged against Sweden, in which Alexander deprived that ancient kingdom of her frontier province of Finland, and thereby obtained a covering territory of the last and most important consequence to his own capital.

The Porte was no less made a sacrifice to the inordinate anxiety, which, at the treaty of Tilsit, Buonaparte seems to have entertained, for acquiring at any price the accession of

Russia to his extravagant desire of destroying England. By the public treaty, indeed, some care seems to have been taken of the interests of Turkey, since it provides that Turkey was to have the benefit of peace under the mediation of France, and that Russia was to evacuate Moldavia and Wallachia, for the acquisition of which she was then waging an unprovoked war. But by the secret agreement of the two Emperors, it was unquestionably understood, that Turkey in Europe was to be placed at the mercy of Alexander, as forming naturally a part of the Russian Empire, as Spain, Portugal, and perhaps Great Britain, were, from local position, destined to become provinces of France. At the subsequent Congress betwixt the Emperors at Erfurt, their measures against the Porte were more fully adjusted.

It may seem strange, that the shrewd and jealous Napoleon should have suffered himself to be so much overreached in his treaty with Alexander, since the benefits stipulated for France, in the treaty of Tilsit, were in a great measure vague, and subjects of hope rather than certainty. The British naval force was not easily to be subdued—Gibraltar and Malta are as strong fortresses as the world can exhibit—the conquest of Spain was at least a doubtful undertaking, if the last war of the Succession was carefully considered. But the Russian objects were nearer, and were within

her grasp. Finland was seized on with little difficulty, nor did the conquest even of Constantinople possess any thing very difficult to a Russian army, if unopposed save by the undisciplined forces of the Turkish empire. Thus it is evident, that Napoleon exchanged, for distant and contingent prospects, his acquiescence in the Russian objects, which were near, essential, and, in comparison, of easy attainment. The effect of this policy we shall afterwards advert to. Meanwhile, the two most ancient allies of France, and who were of the greatest political importance to her in case of a second war with Russia, were most unwisely abandoned to the mercy of that power, who failed not to despoil Sweden of Finland, and, but for intervening causes, would probably have seized upon Constantinople with the same ease.

If the reader should wonder how Buonaparte, able and astucious as he was, came to be overreached in the treaty of Tilsit, we believe the secret may be found in a piece of private history. Even at that early period, Napoleon nourished the idea of fixing, as he supposed, the fate of his own family, or dynasty, by connecting it by marriage with the blood of one of the established monarchies of Europe. He had hopes, even then, that he might obtain the hand of one of the Archduchesses of Russia, nor did the Emperor throw any obstacle

in the way of the scheme. It is well known that his suit was afterwards disappointed by the Empress Mother, who pleaded the difference of religion; but at the time of the treaty of Tilsit, Napoleon was actually encouraged, or deceived himself into an idea that he received encouragement, to form a perpetual family-connexion with Russia. This induced him to deal easily with Alexander in the matters which they had to discuss together, and to act the generous, almost the prodigal friend. And this also seems to have been the reason why Napoleon frequently complained of Alexander's insincerity, and often termed him *The Greek*, according to the Italian sense of the name, which signifies a trickster, or deceiver.

But we must return from the secret articles of the Tilsit treaty, which opened such long vistas in futurity, to the indisputable and direct consequences of that remarkable measure.

The treaty betwixt Russia and France was signed upon the 7th—that betwixt France and Prussia on the 9th July. Frederick William published upon the 24th of the same month one of the most dignified, and at the same time the most affecting proclamations, that ever expressed the grief of an unfortunate sovereign.

« Dear inhabitants of faithful provinces, districts, and towns,» said this most interesting

document, « my arms have been unfortunate. The efforts of the relics of my army have been of no avail. Driven to the extreme boundaries of my empire, and having seen my powerful ally conclude an armistice, and sign a peace, no choice remained for me save to follow his example. That peace was necessarily purchased upon terms corresponding to imperious circumstances. It has imposed on me, and on my house—it has imposed upon the whole country, the most painful sacrifices. The bonds of treaties, the reciprocalities of love and duty, the work of ages, have been broken asunder. My efforts have proved in vain. Fate ordains it, and a father parts from his children. I release you completely from your allegiance to myself and to my house. My most ardent prayers for your welfare will always attend you in your relations to your new sovereign. Be to him what you have ever been to me. Neither force nor fate shall ever efface the remembrance of you from my heart.»

To trace the triumphant return of the victor is a singular contrast to those melancholy effusions of the vanquished monarch. The treaty of Tilsit had ended all appearance of opposition to France upon the Continent. The British armament, which had been sent to Pomerania too late in the campaign, was re-embarked, and the King of Sweden, evacuat-

ing Stralsund, retired to the dominions which he was not very long destined to call his own. After having remained together for twenty days, during which they daily maintained the most friendly intercourse, and held together long and secret conferences, the two Emperors at last separated, with demonstrations of the highest personal esteem, and each heaping upon the other all the honours which it was in his power to bestow. The Congress broke up on the 9th July; and on his return to France, Napoleon visited Saxony, and was there met at Bautzen (doomed for a very different reason to be renowned in his history) by King Augustus, who received him with the honours due to one who had, in outward appearance at least, augmented the power which he might have overthrown.

On 27th July, Napoleon, restored to his palace at St Cloud, received the homage of the Senate and other official and constitutional bodies. The celebrated naturalist, Lacépède, as the organ of the former body, made a pompous enumeration of the miracles of the campaign; and avowed that the accomplishment of such wonderful actions as would seemingly have required ages was but to Napoleon the work of a few months; while at the same time his ruling genius gave motion to all the domestic administration of his vast empire, and, although four hundred leagues distant from

the capital, was present with and observant of the most complicate as well as extensive details. «We cannot,» concludes the orator, «offer to your Majesty praises worthy of you. Your glory is too much raised above us. It will be the task of posterity, removed at a distance from your presence, to estimate with greater truth its real degree of elevation. Enjoy, sire, the recompense the most worthy of the greatest of monarchs, the happiness of being beloved by the greatest of nations, and may our great-grandchildren be long happy under your Majesty's reign.»

So spoke the President of the French Senate; and who, that wished to retain the name of a rational being, dared have said, that, within the period of seven years, the same Senate would be carrying to the downfallen and dejected King of Prussia their congratulations on his share in the overthrow of the very man, whom they were now adoring as a demigod!

The fortunes and fame of Napoleon were, indeed, such as to excite in the highest degree the veneration with which men look upon talents and success. All opposition seemed to sink before him, and Fortune seemed only to have looked doubtfully upon him during the last campaign, in order to render still brighter the auspicious aspect by which she closed it. Many of his most confirmed ene-

mies, who, from their proved attachment to the house of Bourbon, had secretly disowned the authority of Buonaparte, and doubted the continuance of his success, when they saw Prussia lying at his feet, and Russia clasping his hand in friendship, conceived they should be struggling against the decrees of Providence, did they longer continue to resist their predestined master. Austerlitz had shaken their constancy; Tilsit destroyed it: and with few and silent exceptions, the vows, hopes, and wishes of France, seemed turned on Napoleon as her Heir by Destiny. Perhaps he himself, only, could finally have disappointed their expectations. But he was like the adventurous climber on the Alps, to whom the surmounting the most tremendous precipices, and ascending to the most towering peaks, only shows yet dizzier heights and higher points of elevation.

APPENDIX.

INSTRUCTIONS BY NAPOLEON TO TALLEYRAND, PRINCE OF BENEVENTUM.

Page 46.

This very singular memorandum contains the instructions given by Napoleon to Talleyrand, concerning the manner in which he wished him to receive Lord Whitworth, then about to quit Paris, under the immediate prospect of the war again breaking out. He did not trust, it seems, to that accomplished statesman the slightest circumstance of the conference; « although, » as Talleyrand himself observed, as he gave to the Duke of Wellington the interesting document, in Napoleon's own hand-writing, « if I could be trusted with any thing, it must have been the mode of receiving and negotiating with an ambassador » From the style of the note, it seems that the warmth, or rather violence, which the First Consul had thrown into the discussion at the levee, did not actually flow from Napoleon's irritated feelings, but was a calculated burst of passion, designed to confound and overwhelm the English nobleman, who proved by no means the kind of person to be shaken with the utmost vehemence. It may be also remarked, that Napoleon, while he was desirous to try the effect of a cold, stern, and indifferent mode of conduct towards the English minister, was yet desirous, if that should not shake Lord Whitworth's firmness, that Talleyrand, by reference to the pleasure of the First Consul, should take care to keep open the door for reconciliation.

The various errors in orthography, as *fait* for *fais* or *faites, dit* for *dis* or *dites,* are taken from the original.

S. Cloud, à 4 ½.

« Je reçois votre lettre qui m'a été remise à la Malmaison. Je desire que la conférence ne se tourne pas en parlage. Montrez-vous y froid, altier, et même un peu fier.

« Si la note comtient le mot *ultimatum,* fait[1] lui sentir que ce mot renferme celui de guerre, que cette manière de negocier et d'un supérieur à un inférieur. Si la note ne comtient pas ce mot, fait[2] qu'il le mette, en lui observant qu'il faut enfin savoir à quoi nous en tenir—que nous sommes las de cet état d'anxiété—que jamais on n'obtiendra de nous ce que l'on *a obtenu des dernières années des Bourbons,—que nous ne sommes plus ce peuple qui recevra un Commissaire à Dunquerque;* que, l'ultimatum remis, tout deviendra rompût

« Effrayez le sur les suites de cette remise S'il est *inebranlable,* accompagnez le dans votre salon . . . . . .[3] de vous quitter, dit[4] lui, mais le Cap et l'isle de Gorée, sont ils évacués?—radoucissez un peu la fin de la conference, et invitez le à revenir avant d'écrire à sa cour, enfin que vous puissiez lui dire l'impression qu'elle a fait sur moi, qu'elle pourrait être diminué par les mesures de ces evacuations du Cap et de l'isle de Gorée.»

TRANSLATION.

St Cloud, half past four.

I received your letter, which was brought to me at Malmaison. I request that the conference do not go into dialogue. Show yourself cold, lofty, even a little haughty.

If his note contains the word *ultimatum,* make him sensible that that word imports war, since such a manner

[1] Faites. [2] Faites. [3] Illegible. [4] Dites.

of negotiating only takes place betwixt a superior and an inferior. If the note does not contain that word, contrive to make him insert it, by observing to him that it is necessary at length we should know upon what footing we are to stand with respect to each other; that we are weary of this state of anxiety; that they will never obtain from us those advantages which they extorted during the latter part of the reign of the Bourbons; that we are no longer the same people who received an English Commissary at Dunkirk; that the *ultimatum* being rejected, all treaty will be broken of.

Alarm him upon the consequences of that rejection. If he remains still immovable, accompany him into your saloon . . . . . and at the moment of his departure, ask him incidentally, « By the way, the Cape and the Island of Goree, are they evacuated?» Soften your tone a little towards the end of the conference, and invite him to return before writing to his court. At last, you may hint that the unfavourable impression he has made on me may possibly be diminished by the evacuation of the Cape and the Isle of Goree.

FURTHER PARTICULARS CONCERNING THE ARREST, TRIAL, AND DEATH OF THE DUKE D'ENGHIEN.

Page 112.

This most melancholy history appears to deserve farther notice than we had it in our power to bestow, without too long interrupting the course of our narrative. It has been, and must for ever remain, the most marked and indelible blot upon the character of Napoleon Buonaparte. « A young prince, » says the author of a well-reasoned dissertation on this subject, « in the flower of his age, treacherously seized in a neutral country, where he reposed under the protection of the law of nations, dragged into France, brought before judges, who had no

pretension to assume that character, accused of supposed crimes, deprived of the assistance of a legal advocate or defender, put to death by night in the ditches of a state-prison;—so many virtues misconstrued, so many fond hopes crushed in the bud, will always render that catastrophe one of the most revolting acts which absolute power has been tempted to consummate.»

The Duke d'Enghien was one of the most active and determined of the exiled princes of the house of Bourbon, to whom the emigrants and the royalists who remained within France were alike devotedly attached. He was master of many of their secrets; and in July, 1799, when the affairs of the Republic were in a very perilous state, and the Royalists were adjusting a general rising through all the South of France, his name was used upon the following extraordinary occasion.

A former member of the Representation, known as much by his character as a royalist, as by his worth and probity, requested a private interview with General Bernadotte, then minister at war. The audience being granted by the minister, with whom he had some connexion, the representative entered into a long argument to prove what could not be denied—the disastrous and dangerous state of France, and then proceeded thus: «The republican system being no longer able to support itself, a general movement is about to take place for the restoration of the King, and is so well organized, that it can scarce fail to be successful. The Duke d'Enghien, lieutenant-general of the royal army, is at Paris at this very moment while I speak to you, and I am deputed by one of his most faithful adherents, to make known these circumstances to General Bernadotte. The prince esteems you, confides his safety to your loyalty, reckons on your assistance, and is ready to grant any conditions which you may attach to your services.» Bernadotte replied to this unexpected communication, «That the Duke d'Enghien should have no reason to repent the confidence which he had reposed in him: but that the loyalty which the duke had ascribed to him prevented his complying with the prince's wishes and request.» He proceeded to state, that his own fame and

personal interests were alike interested in his adherence to a government sprung from the will of the people; and that he was incapable of violating his oath of fidelity, or overthrowing the constitution to which he had sworn. « Make haste, » he continued, « to convey my sentiments to him who sent you; tell him they are sincere and unalterable. But let him know, that for three days I will keep the secret which I have just learned, most profoundly. During that time he must find means of placing himself in security, by repassing the frontiers: but on the fourth morning, the secret will be mine no longer. This very morning, the term of three days will commence; make haste—and remember that the least imprudence on your part will be attended with fatal consequences. »

It was afterwards ascertained that the Deputy was mistaken, when he averred that the Duke d'Enghien was in Paris. It was pretty certain that he had never crossed the Rhine, and only waited the favourable reply of the minister at war to make the attempt. But in the light in which the case was presented to Bernadotte, his generous and firm conduct does not the less honour that eminent person, especially when contrasted with that of Napoleon. There might have been a strong temptation, and even a show of right, to have seized on the unfortunate prince, supposing him to be in Paris, negotiating plans against the existing government, and tempting the fidelity of their principal ministers;—there could be none to kidnap him in foreign parts, when, however it might be suspected, it could not be shown by proof, that the unfortunate duke was concerned in any of the political intrigues which were laid to his charge. The tottering state of public affairs requiring so much vigilance and vigour on the part of the government, might also have been pleaded in excuse of Bernadotte, had he delivered up the Duke d'Enghien to a dungeon or scaffold; while Napoleon, on the contrary, took the unhappy prince's life at a moment when his own power was so firmly established, as rather to incur danger than to acquire safety by the indulgence of a cruel revenge. The above anecdote, not, we believe, generally known, may be relied upon as authentic.

reviving them in their utmost severity against a single individual, it was therefore doubly incumbent to show that the party arraigned fell within these charges.

By no force of construction could the Duke d'Enghien be brought under the influence of these laws. He was not, properly speaking, an emigrant, nor did he possess the qualities of such. He was a prince of France,—as such declared an alien, and banished for ever from France. But, what is much more to the purpose, the Duke d'Enghien was neither found within France, nor in the precincts of any hostile or conquered country; but brought by force from a territory neutral to and friendly in its relations with France; and that without legal warrant, and by main force. Buonaparte took credit to himself for having prevented the execution of those laws against emigrants who had been forced on the shore of France by tempest, and had thereby come under the letter, though not the spirit of the law. How much more ought the Duke d'Enghien's case to have been excepted, who was only within France by the force exercise[1] on his person, and, instead of being arrested within the territory, as the law required, was arrested in a neutral country, and brought into France against his will? The arrest was therefore, so far as respected the person on whom it was used, an act of illegal violence; and not less so considering the grounds on which it proceeded, since there was no charge founded on any existing law.

INCOMPETENCY OF THE COURT.

A Military Commission was assembled at Paris, to take under trial the Duke d'Enghien, accused of having borne arms against the republic— of having been, and of still being in the pay of England—and, lastly, of having taken part in the conspiracies against the safety of the republic, both external and internal.

Mons. Dupin, by the most decisive arguments and authorities, shows, that although the Military Commission might possibly be competent judges in the case of bearing arms against France, or receiving pay from England, yet the trial of a criminal accused of political conspiracy

was totally beyond the power of a court martial, and could only be taken cognizance of by the regular tribunals. He quotes decisions of the Minister of Justice upon this point of jurisprudence, and concludes by applying to the Military Commission the well-known brocard of law, *Nullus major defectus, quam potestatis*

IRREGULARITIES IN THE PROCEDURE.

1. The procedure took place at the dead of night, contrary to the laws of France and every civilized country. The worn-out and exhausted criminal was roused at midnight from the first sleep he had been permitted to enjoy for three nights, and called in to place himself on defence for his life, whilst, through fatigue of body and mind, he could scarcely keep himself awake.

He answered to their interrogatories in a manly and simple manner; and, by the French order of process, his answers ought to have been read over to him, and he should have been called upon for his remarks upon the exactitude with which they had been taken down; but nothing of this kind was proposed to the Duke d'Enghien

2. The French law enjoins, that after closing the interrogatory, the reporter should require of the accused person to make choice of a friend for the purpose of conducting his defence. The accused, it further declares, shall have the selection amongst all the persons present, and failing his making such a choice, the reporter shall select a defender to act on his behalf. No such choice was allowed to the Duke d'Enghien; and indeed, it would have been to little purpose; nor was any legal assistant assigned to him in terms of the law. The law presumes an open court at a legal hour, and held in broad day-light. It would have been but an additional insult to have required the Duke to select a friend or a defender among the gendarmes, who alone were bystanders in the Castle of Vincennes, or at the hour of midnight. Contrary, therefore, to the privilege of accused persons by the existing law of France, the accused had no benefit either of legal defence or friendly assistance.

DEFECTS OF THE SENTENCE.

The trial itself, though it deserves not the name, took place on the day after the interrogatory, or more properly on the night of that day, being what was then called the 30th Ventose;—like the previous interrogation, at the hour of midnight. The whole Castle of Vincennes was filled with gendarmes, and Savary was in the actual command. He has published that he was led there by curiosity, though the hour was midnight, and the place so strictly guarded against every person, saving those who were to be officially concerned, that even one of the officers, who had been summoned, had considerable difficulty in procuring admission. We shall presently see if his presence and conduct indicated the part of a mere by-stander; for the vindication which he was pleased to publish, drew forth that of General Hulin, president of the Military Commission, who has informed us of several important circumstances which had escaped the memory of the Duke of Rovigo, but which bear, nevertheless, very much on the point at issue.

The Court being constituted duly, the warrant was read, which contained the charge against the prisoner. It accused him, 1. Of having fought against France; 2. Of being in the pay of England; 3. Of plotting with the latter power against the internal and external safety of the Republic. Of the *two first* counts, as they may be termed, of the indictment, we have already shown that they could not be rendered cognizable under any law then existing in France, unless qualified by the additional circumstance, that the emigrant accused had been found either within France, or in a country hostile to, or which had been subdued by France, which could not be stated to be the case of the Duke d'Enghien. Respecting the *third* count, the Military Commission were not legally competent to try it; the courts ordinary of France alone had the alleged crime within their jurisdiction. Nevertheless, in mockery of the form, as well as the essence of law, the Court proceeded upon the trial upon two points of accusation, which were irrelevant, and upon a third which was incompetent.

The mock trial, when brought on, was a mere repetition

of the interrogatory which the Duke had been previously subjected to. We are now to give an abstract of both interrogatories, only premising that within their limits must be found the whole head and front of the offences charged. The guilt of the accused must either be proved from thence, or his innocence must be acknowledged; the sole evidence produced or attempted to be brought forward on the trial being the answers of the Duke.

Upon the first examination, the following admissions were made by the accused. The duke avowed his name, birth, and quality; his exile from France, and the campaigns which he had made with the emigrant army under his grandfather, the Prince of Condé. He stated the various countries which he had inhabited since the army of Condé was disbanded, and that he had resided at Ettenheim for two years and a half, by permission of the Elector. Interrogated if he had ever been in England, or if that government made him any allowance; he answered he had never been in that country, but that England did allow him an annuity, which was his only means of support. Interrogated, what were his reasons for residing at Ettenheim; he answered that he had thoughts of settling at Fribourg in the Brisgaw, as a pleasanter place of residence, and had only remained at Ettenheim on account of the Elector's indulging him with full liberty of hunting, to which amusement he was very partial. Interrogated, if he kept up any correspondence with the French princes of his family who were at London, and if he had seen them lately; he replied, that he naturally kept up a correspondence with his grandfather ever since he had left him at Vienna, after the disbanding of his army; but had not seen him since that period;—that he also corresponded with his father (Duke of Bourbon), but had not seen him since 1794 or 1795. Interrogated, what rank he occupied in the army of Condé; he answered, commandant of the van-guard, and that when the enemy was received into Prussia, and divided into two corps, he was made colonel of one of them. These admisions might have been deduced or presumed from the simple fact, that the individual before them was the Duke d'Enghien,

whose history and military services were sufficiently known.

The subsequent part of the examination consisted in an attempt to implicate the accused in the conspiracy of George, Pichegru, and Moreau. The reader will see how far his answers make the charge good.

Interrogated, if he knew General Pichegru, and if he had any connexion or intercourse with him;—Replied, « I do not know him; I have never, I believe, seen him; I have had no conversation with him; I am glad I have not been acquainted with him, if the story told be true, respecting the vile means which he proposed making use of »

« Interrogated, if he knew General Dumourier, or had any connexion with him;—Answered, that he knew him no more than the other—he had never seen him.»

« Interrogated, if, after the peace, he had not kept up a correspondence in the interior of the Republic;—Replied, I have written to some friends that are still attached to me, who had fought along with me, both on their affairs and my own. These correspondences were not of the character which I conceive to be alluded to.»

The report further bears, that when the procès-verbal was closed, he expressed himself thus: « Before signing the procès-verbal, I make with urgency the request, to have a particular audience of the First Consul. My name, my rank, my manner of thinking, and the horror of my situation, make me hope he will not refuse my desire.»

In the second interrogatory, in presence of the Military Commission, the duke adhered to what he had said in his preceding examination, with the sole additional circumstance, that he was ready to renew the war, and to take service in the approaching hostilities betwixt England and France.

The Commission, as appears from record of their proceedings, received no other evidence of any kind whatever, whether written or oral, and undertook the task which they knew was expected from them, of extracting reasons for awarding a capital punishment out of a confession from which nothing could be drawn by any ordinary process of reasoning, save that the accused person had been

in arms against France, and was willing to be so again, —but in open warfare, and in the hope of recovering what he considered as the rights of his family—a case which could not be brought under the penalty of death, except under the laws of 28th March, 1793, and of 25 Brumaire, An. III., where the capital punishment is limited, as we have repeatedly said, to emigrants taken within the limits of France, or of countries hostile to her, or subjected by her arms. The avowal that the duke had a pension from England did not infer that he was in her military pay, nor, indeed, did he in fact hold that allowance on any other conditions than as an alimentary provision allowed by the generous compassion of the British Nation. Neither could he be found guilty upon his candid avowal that he was willing, or even desirous, to enter into the English service; for, supposing the actually doing so were a crime, the mere intention to do so could not be construed into one, since men are in this world responsible only for their actions, not for their thoughts, or the unexecuted purposes of their mind. No other evidence was adduced excepting the report of an officer of police, or state spy, sent to watch the Duke d'Enghien's movements, who declared that the Duke d'Enghien received many emigrants at his table, and that he was frequently absent for several days without his (the spy's) being able to discover where he went; but which suspicious facts were sufficiently explained, by his having the means of giving some assistance to his distressed companions, and his long hunting-parties in the Black Forest, in which he was wont to pass many days at a time. A report from Shee, the Prefect of the Lower Rhine, was also read; but neither Savary nor Hulin mention its import, nor how it was converted into evidence, or bore upon the question of the Duke d'Enghien's guilt or innocence. Hulin also mentions a long report from the councillor of state, Real, where the affair, with all its ramifications, was rendered so interesting, that it seemed the safety of the state, and the existence of the government, depended on the judgment which should be returned. Such a report could only argue the thirst of the go-

vernment for the poor young man's blood, and exhibits that open tampering with the Court, which they were not ashamed to have recourse to, but certainly could not constitute evidence in the case.

But both Savary and Hulin are disposed to rest the reason of the condemnation upon the frank and noble avowal of the prisoner, which, in their opinion, made it imperative on the Court to condemn him. He uniformly maintained, that «'he had only sustained the right of his family, and that a Condé could never enter France save with arms in his hands. My birth,' he said, 'my opinions, must ever render me inflexible on this point.' The firmness of his answers reduced the judges,» continues Hulin, «to despair. Ten times we gave him an opening to retract his declarations, but he still persisted in them immovably. 'I see', he said, 'the honourable intention of the members of the Commission, but I cannot resort to the means of safety which they indicate.' » And being acquainted that the Military Commissioners judge without appeal; «I know it,» he replied, «and I do not disguise from myself the danger which I incur. My only request is to have an interview with the First Consul.» It is sufficiently plain that the gallant bearing of the prince, so honourable to himself, brought him under no law by which he was not previously affected. But it did much worse for him in a practical sense. It avowed him the open enemy of Buonaparte, and placed each judge under the influence of such reasoning as encouraged Sir Piers Exton to the murder of a deposed prince at the hint of a usurper. [1]

The doom of the prisoner had been fixed from the moment he crossed the draw-bridge of that gloomy

[1] Didst thou not mark the king, what words he spoke—
Have I no friend will rid me of this fear'—
Have I no friend' quoth he—he spoke it twice,
And speaking it, looked wistfully on me,
As who should say, I would thou wert the man
That would divorce this terror from my breast—
Meaning the king at Pomfret.—Let us go;
I am the king's friend, and will rid his foe.

state prison. But it required no small degree of dexterity to accommodate the evidence to the law, so as to make out an ostensible case of guilt which should not carry absurdity and contradiction on its very front. This was the more difficult, as it is an express legal form in French courts-martial, that it shall express upon its record the exact fact for which death is to be inflicted, and the precise article of the law under which the sentence is awarded. The Military Commission had much more trouble in placing the record upon a plausible footing, than they found in going through the brief forms of such a trial as they were pleased to afford the accused. They experienced the truth of the observation, that it is much more easy to commit a crime than to justify it.

VERDICT.

The first difficulty which occurred, was to apply the verdict to the indictment, to which it ought to be the precise answer, since it would be monstrous to find a man guilty of a crime different from that of which he stood accused; as for example, to find a man guilty of theft, when he had been charged with murder, or *vice versa*. The judges of this Military Commission had, at the same time, the additional difficulty of reconciling the verdict with the evidence which had been adduced, as well as with the accusations laid. If the reader will take the trouble to peruse the following copy of the record, with our observations, which we have marked by Italics, they will see how far the Military Court of Vincennes had been able to reconcile their verdict with the act of accusation, and with the sentence.

The verdict bears: « The voices being collected on each of the underwritten questions, beginning with the younger, and ending with the President; the Court declares Louis Antoine de Bourbon, Duke d'Enghien,—

1. Unanimously guilty of having borne arms against the French Republic.—*This is in conformity with the act of accusation, and the evidence; therefore, so far regular.*

2. Unanimously guilty of having offered his services to the English government, the enemy of the French Re-

public.—*This is not in conformity to the charge. The duke only said he was willing to join the English in the new war, not that his services had been either offered or accepted. The former was a matter of intention, the latter would have been a point of fact.*

3. Unanimously guilty of having received and accredited agents of the said English government, of having procured them means of intelligence in France, and of having conspired with them against the internal and external safety of the Republic.—*The facts alluded to in this clause of the verdict may be considered as contained by implication in the general charge in the accusation, that the Duke plotted with England. But certainly they are not there stated in the precise and articulate manner in which a charge which a man must answer with his life ought to be brought against him. As to evidence, there is not, in the examination of the duke, the slightest word to justify the finding him guilty of such an offence. Not a question was put, or an answer received, respecting the plots with England, or the duke's accession to and encouragement of them.*

4. Unanimously guilty of having placed himself at the head of a large collection of French emigrants, and others, formed in the frontiers of France, in the county of Fribourg and Baden, paid by England.—*There is not a word of such a charge in the accusation or indictment, nor was the slightest evidence of its existence brought forward before the Court, or inquired into upon the duke's examination.*

5. Unanimously guilty of having had communications with the town of Strasburg, tending to excite insurrection in the neighbouring departments, for the purpose of a diversion in favour of England.—*There is no mention of this charge in the accusation—there is no mention of it in the evidence.*

6. Unanimously guilty of being one of the favourers and accomplices of the conspiracy carried on by the English against the life of the First Consul; and intending, in the event of such conspiracy, to enter France.—*There is no mention of this charge in the act of accusation*

or indictment. The evidence on the subject goes distinctly to disprove the charge. The Duke d'Enghien said he did not know Pichegru, and had no connexion with him; and added, that he rejoiced at the circumstance, if it was true that the general aimed at success by means so horrible.

The result of the whole is, that this most liberal Commission, in answer to the three charges, brought in a verdict upon six points of indictment; and that, on applying the evidence to the verdict, not one of the returns is found supported by evidence, the first excepted; of the other five, of which three at least are gratuitously introduced into the charge, four are altogether unsupported by the evidence, and the sixth is not only unsupported, but disproved, being in direct contradiction to the only testimony laid before the Commissioners.

SENTENCE.

Having drawn up their verdict, or answer to the act of accusation, with so little regard either to the essence or forms of justice, this unconscientious court proceeded to the sentence, which, according to the regular form, ought to bear an express reference to the law by which it was authorized. But to discover such a law, must be inevitably a work of some difficulty; and in the mean time, the devoted victim still lived. The record of the Court-Martial bore the date, *two in the morning;* [1] so that *two hours* had already elapsed upon the trial and subsequent proceedings, and it was destined the sun should not rise on the devoted head of the young Bourbon. · It was, therefore, necessary that he should be immediately found guilty and executed, as all that was considered the direct object for which the Court was convened. It would be time enough to consider after he was no more, under what law he had suffered, and to fill up the blanks in the sentence accordingly. One would have thought such a tragedy could never have taken place in a civilized age and country,

[1] A sense of shame caused these words to be erased, but the operation has left them still legible. The attempt at concealment shows the sense of guilt, without hiding the crime

seven French officers, claiming to be esteemed men of honour by profession, being the slavish agents. It must, one would say, have occurred at Tripoli or Fez, or rather among the Galla and Shangalla, the Agows, or the Lasta of Abyssinia. But here is the sentence to speak for itself:—

« The prisoner having withdrawn, the Court being cleared, deliberating with closed doors, the president collected the votes of the members; beginning with the *junior*, and voting himself the last, the prisoner was unanimously found Guilty; and in pursuance of the——*blank*——article of the law of———*blank*——to the following effect———— [two or three lines left blank for inserting the law which should be found applicable]———condemned to suffer the punishment of death. *Ordered that the Judge-Advocate should see the present sentence executed* IMMEDIATELY.»

Most laws allow at least a few days of intervention betwixt sentence and execution. Such an interval is due to religion and to humanity; but in France it was also allowed for the purpose of appeal. The laws 25 Brumaire, An. VI., and 27 Ventose, An. VIII., permitted appeals from the judgments of courts-martial. The decree of the 17 Messidor, An. XII., permitting no appeal from military sentences, was not then in existence; but if it had, even that severe and despotic enactment allowed prisoners some brief space of time betwixt this world and the next, and did not send a human being to execution until the tumult of spirits, incidental to a trial for life and death, had subsided, and his heart had ceased to throb betwixt hope and fear. Twenty-four hours were permitted betwixt the court of justice and the scaffold,—a small space in ordinary life, but an age when the foot is on the brink of the grave. But the Duke d'Enghien was ordered for instant execution.

Besides the blanks in the sentence of this Court, as originally drawn up, which made it a mockery of all judicial form, there lay this fatal error to the sentence, that it was not signed by the Greffier, or Clerk of Court.

We do the judges the credit to believe that they felt for the accused, and for themselves; saw with pity the doom inflicted, and experienced shame and horror at becoming

his murderers. A final attempt was made by General Hulin to induce the Court to transfer to Buonaparte the request of the prisoner. He was checked by Savary. « It will be *inopportune,*» said that officer, who, leaning on the back of the president's chair, seems to have watched and controlled the decisions of the Court. The hint was understood, and nothing more was said.

We have given one copy of the sentence of the Court-Martial. It was not the only one. « Many draughts of this sentence were tried,» says Hulin, « among the rest, the one in question; but after we had signed it, we doubted (*and with good reason*) whether it were regular, and, therefore, caused the clerk make out a new draught, grounded chiefly on a report of the Privy-Councillor Real, and the answers of the Prince. This second draught was the true one, and ought alone to have been preserved.»

This second draught has been preserved, and affords a curious specimen of the cobbling and trumping up which the procedure underwent, in hopes it might be rendered fit for public inspection. Notwithstanding what the president says was intended, the new draught contains no reference to the report of Shee, or the arguments of Real, neither of which could be brought into evidence against the Duke. The only evidence against him, was his owning the character of a prince of the blood, an enemy by birth, and upon principle, to the present government of France. His sole actual crime, as is allowed by Monsieur Savary himself, consisted in his being the Duke d'Enghien; the sole proof was his own avowal, without which it was pretended the Commissioners would not have found him guilty.

To return to the new draught of this sentence. It agrees with the original draught, in so far as it finds the Duke guilty of *six* criminal acts upon a charge which only accused him of *three*. But there is a wide distinction in other respects. The new draught, though designed to rest (according to Hulin's account) upon the report of the Privy-Councillor Real, and the answers of the Prince, takes no notice of either. It does make an attempt, however, to fill up the blanks of the first copy, by combining the sentence with three existing laws; but how far applicable

to the case under consideration, the reader shall be enabled to judge.

Article II. 1st Brumaire, An. V. Every individual, of whatever rank, quality, or profession, convicted of being a spy for the enemy, shall be punished with death —*The Duke d'Enghien had neither been accused nor convicted of being a spy for the enemy.*

Article I. Every plot against the republic shall be punished with death.—*There was no evidence that the Duke was engaged in any plot; he positively denied it on his examination*

Article II. *All conspiracies or plots tending to disturb* the state, by a civil war—to arm the citizens against each other, or against lawful authority, shall, be punished with death. *Here the same want of evidence applies*

Upon the whole, it appears that the law could neither be so moulded as to apply to the evidence, nor the evidence so twisted as to come under the law, —the judges were obliged to suppress the one or the other, or to send their sentence forth with a manifest contradiction on the face of it.

But this second draught of the sentence was so far conforming to the law, that it was signed by the Greffier or Clerk of Court, which was not the case with the former. It was also more indulgent towards the accused; for the order for immediate execution was omitted, and its place supplied by the following details.

« It is enjoined to the Capitaine Rapporteur instantly to read the present judgment to the condemned person in presence of the guard assembled under arms

« Ordered that the President and the Reporter use their diligence according to the legal forms, in dispatching copies of this procedure to the Minister at War, the Great Judge, Minister of Justice, and to the General in Chief, Governor of Paris.»

By the interposition of these legal forms, the Commissioners unquestionably desired to gain some time, to make interest with Buonaparte that he might not carry his cruel purpose into execution. This has been explained by the President of the court-martial, General Hulin himself,

who, blind, aged, and retired from the world, found himself obliged, on the appearance of Savary's vindication of his share in the murder of the Duke d'Enghien, to come forward, not to vindicate his conduct, but, while expressing his remorse for the share he really had in the tragedy, to transfer the principal charge to the superior officer, who was present during the whole trial, to overawe, it would seem, and to control the Court. His account is in these words:—

« Scarcely was it (the sentence) signed, when I began a letter to Napoleon, in which I conveyed to him, in obedience to the unanimous wish of the Court, the desire expressed by the prince of an interview with the First Consul; and farther, to conjure the First Consul to remit the punishment, which the severity of our situation did not permit us to elude. It was at this moment that a man interfered (Savary), who had persisted in remaining in the court-room, and whom I should name without hesitation, if I did not recollect that, even in attempting a defence for myself, it does not become me to accuse another. 'What are you doing there?' said this person, coming up to me. 'I am ' I replied, 'writing to the First Consul, to convey to him the wish of the prisoner, and the recommendation of the Court.' 'You have done your business,' said he, taking the pen out of my hand, 'and what follows is mine.' I confess that I thought at the moment, and so did several of my colleagues, that he meant to say, that the conveying of these sentiments to the First Consul was his business. His answer, thus understood, left us still the hope that the recommendation would reach the First Consul. I only recollect, that I even at the moment felt a kind of vexation at seeing thus taken out of my hands, the only agreeable circumstance of the painful situation in which I was placed. Indeed, how could we imagine, that a person had been placed about us with an order to violate all the provisions of the law? I was in the hall, outside the council-room, conversing about what had just occurred. Several knots of persons had got into private conversation I was waiting for my carriage, which not being permitted (any more than those of the other members) to come into the inner

court of the castle, delayed my departure and theirs. We were ourselves shut in, and could not communicate with those without, when an explosion took place—a terrible sound, which struck us to the hearts, and froze them with terror and fright. Yes, I swear, in the name of myself and my colleagues, that this execution was not authorized by us; our sentence directed that copies of the sentence should be sent to the Minister of War, the Grand Judge, and the General Governor of Paris. The latter alone could, according to law, direct the execution; the copies were not yet made; they would occupy a considerable portion of the day. On my return to Paris, I should have waited on the Governor—on the First Consul; who knows what might have happened?—but all of a sudden, this terrific explosion informed us that the prince was no more. We know not whether he (Savary) who thus hurried on this dreadful execution, had orders for doing so. If he had not, he alone is responsible; if he had, the Court, which knew nothing of these orders, which itself was kept in confinement—the Court, whose last resolution was in favour of the prince, could neither foresee nor prevent the catastrophe.»

EXECUTION.

The gallant young prince, therefore, was cut off in the flower of his age, and, so far as we can see, on no evidence whatever, excepting that he was a son of the house of Bourbon, the enemy, by his birth, of the temporary Governor of France, but his public and declared enemy, who had never owed duty to him and who had not been taken engaged in any active proceedings against him. The descendant of the great Condé was condemned to a bloody death by a Court, the judges of which were themselves prisoners, at the hour when thieves and murderers deal with their victims, upon an unproved accusation tried by incompetent judges.

The research of the lawyer must go beyond the prince's nameless and bloody tomb to inquire into the warrant by which he was consigned to it. Was it by virtue of the first or of the second draught of that sentence, which the military erudition found so much difficulty in cobbling up into

the form of a legal sentence? We suppose it must have been in virtue of the *first* draught, because *that* commands instant execution. If this conjecture is allowed, the Duke d'Enghien was executed in virtue of a document totally deficient in solemnity, since that first remains blank in its most essential parts, and is not signed by the Greffier or clerk of Court—a formality expressly enjoined by law.

If, again, we suppose that the *second*, not the *first* copy of the sentence, was the warrant made use of, the proceeding to execution will be found not less illegal. For that second draught, though it exhibits no blanks, and is signed by the Greffier, and is so far more formal than the first, gives no authority for *instant* execution of the sentence. On the contrary, it enjoins the usual legal delays, until the copies should be made out and sent to the various officers of state mentioned in the warrant itself. The effect of this delay might have probably been the saving of the unfortunate prince's life; for if Paris had not heard of his death at the same time with his arrestment, it is not likely that Buonaparte would have braved public opinion, by venturing on concluding his nocturnal tragedy by a day-light catastrophe. But, laying that consideration aside, it is enough for a lawyer to pronounce, that such sentence, executed in a manner disconforming from its warrant, is neither more nor less than A MURDER; for as such are construed in the laws of every civilized country, those cases in which the prompt will of the executioner anticipates the warrant of the judge.

GENERAL VIEW OF THE PROCEDURE.

Looking over this whole procedure, with the eyes of one accustomed to juridical reasoning, it is impossible to resist the conviction, that a train of more gross inconsistencies, practised with a more barefaced audacity, or for a worse purpose, does not stain and disgrace the page of history. The arrest was against the law of nations; the constitution of the Court was against the military law: the mode of conducting the trial was against the law of France; the sentence was contrary to the forms of every civilized nation, the execution was a contravention of the laws of God

and man. It would be absurd to term the slaughter of the Duke d'Enghien a murder committed by the sword of justice, unless we understand Hogarth's parody of that allegorical figure, with one eye open, one scale depressed with a bribe, and a butcher's knife in her hand instead of the even-swayed sword.

Having endeavoured to trace this bloody and cruel proceeding in a legal point of view, we must, before leaving the subject, consider what apologies have been set up against the black charge which arises out of the details.

The first of these screens would have been doubly convenient, providing it could have been rendered plausible. It amounted to the transference of the more active part of the guilt from Napoleon himself to Talleyrand, whom it would have been delicious revenge to have overwhelmed with the odium of a crime which must have made an impassable gulf between the ex-imperial minister and the restored royal family. Napoleon therefore repeatedly hinted and expressed, that the measure of the Duke d'Enghien's death had been thrust upon him by the advice of Talleyrand, and that without giving the matter due consideration, he had adopted the course recommended to him. It was afterwards still more broadly averred, that Talleyrand had intercepted a letter written by the prince from Strasburg, begging his life, and offering in grateful return, to serve Napoleon in his armies. This boon Napoleon intimates he might have granted if Talleyrand had delivered the letter; but by intercepting it, that statesman became the actual murderer of the unfortunate prince.

There are two modes of considering every allegation, that is, according to the presumptive, or the positive and direct evidence brought in support of it. If we look at the former, we cannot discern the shadow of a motive why Talleyrand, however unprincipled we may suppose him, should have led his master into the commission of a great and odious crime, of which he was likely to have the whole

unpopularity thrown upon himself, so soon as it should be found too heavy for his principal. Talleyrand was a politician; but so far as we have ever heard, possessed of no blood-thirsty disposition, and being himself descended from a noble family, was unlikely, to say the least, to urge the catastrophe of a young prince, against whom, or his family, he is never believed to have had any especial enmity. On the other hand, if we suppose him guided to the step by foolish and misguided zeal for Buonaparte's own interest, we traduce Talleyrand's mental capacity as much in the one case, as we should do his natural disposition in the other. No man knew better than the Prince of Beneventum, that power is, in enlightened nations, dependent on public opinion, and that the blood of an innocent and high-spirited enemy might indeed stain his master's throne, but could not cement its basis.—Again, if we regard the spirit displayed by the Duke d'Enghien upon his mock trial, when he declared he would not recal his avowed enmity to the French, in conformity to the hints thrown out by the Court-Martial, how is it possible that the same individual can be supposed capable of having, two days before, crouched to Buonaparte for his life; or how are we to reconcile his having offered to accept service under the First Consul, with his declaration that it did not become a Condé to enter France save with arms in his hands? We must suppose him a madman, if, having endeavoured to creep to Buonaparte's favour by the means of submission, he should have assumed an air of contumacy and defiance towards the judges who were to report his conduct on his trial to the First Consul. The existence of the letter, and the fact of its being intercepted by Talleyrand, is, therefore, disproved as far as it can be, both by the character of the alleged writer, and of the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

But, farther, it is disproved not only by reasoning *a priori*, but directly and from the state of facts, as far as negative evidence possibly can go. The whole proceedings against the Duke d'Enghien took place under the councillor of state, Real, and were managed entirely by the police; those safe, silent agents, who acted by immediate directions from the supreme head of the government, like the mutes

of the seraglio, and were not liable to the control of any subordinate minister. Talleyrand never interfered, nor indeed had an opportunity of interfering in it.

It was an officer of the police who was sent to inquire into the state of things at Ettenheim; and his report was made, *not* to Talleyrand, not even to his proper chief, Real,—but to Buonaparte himself. This is proved by Savary's own narrative, who says expressly, that « the first inspector of the gendarmerie received the report from the officer, and carried it himself to the First Consul, instead of giving it to M. Real. » The troops employed in the act of seizing the Duke d'Enghien were also gendarmes, that is policemen; and had a letter been written by their prisoner at Strasburg, or anywhere else, it would certainly have gone, like the report above-mentioned, to the First Consul, and not to Talleyrand to the foreign department. *2dly*, There is a sad but minute memorial of his imprisonment, kept by the duke as a sort of diary. In this record is no mention of his having written such a letter. *3dly*, As the Baron St Jacques, secretary to the unfortunate prince, was with his master constantly until the duke was taken from Strasburg, he was in a situation to offer a formal testimony against the very allegation of such a letter having been written, since he must have become acquainted with it, if it had any real existence. *4thly*, The gendarmes who collected the duke's few papers, and made an inventory of them, would not have failed to secure such a document, if, as we said before, there had been such a document to secure.

For all these reasons, the story of the suppressed letter must be considered, from beginning to end, as an absolute fiction, invented to absolve Napoleon of what he felt was generally considered as a great crime, and to transfer the odium to Talleyrand, whose active offices in behalf of the royal family, his former master could neither forget nor forgive.

But the story of the letter was not the only one to which Napoleon had recourse to qualify the public indignation, which was so generally directed against him as the author of this unhappy deed.

In the examination of the persons who were arrested on account of accession to the conspiracy of Pichegru and George, it appeared, according to a very apocryphal statement by Napoleon, that a person occasionally appeared among the conspirators, of noble mien and distinguished manners, to whom the principal conspirators showed such symptoms of homage and deference as are paid only to princes. «He appeared,» says Savary, «36 years of age, his hair was fair, his forehead open, of a middle stature and size. When he entered the apartment, all present, even Messrs de Polignac and de Rivière, rose and remained standing in his presence.» The police considered who this mysterious personage could be, and agreed it must be the Duke d'Enghien. To the impression this supposed discovery made on the mind of the First Consul, was to be inputed, according to his own account and General Savary's, the mission of the police officer to Strasbürg, as already mentioned. The report of the spy concerning the frequent absences of the Duke d'Enghien from Ettenheim, was held sufficient to identify him with the mysterious stranger at Paris—the resolution to kidnap him was formed and executed; and although no circumstances occured to show that he had been in Paris, or to identify him with the incognito above alluded to, and although they were not even at the trouble of confronting the Duke with the persons who described that individual, to see if they could recognize them to be one and the same; yet he was put to death, we are called upon to believe, upon the conviction that he was the visitor and friend of George Cadoudal and the person in whose presence all the world testified such profound respect. Hardly, however, had the Duke been huddled into his bloody grave than we are told it was discovered that the mysterious personage so often alluded to, was no other than Pichegru; and the blame of keeping up the mistake in the First Consul's mind is imputed to Talleyrand, who is destined to be the scapegoat in every version of the story which comes from Napoleon or his favourers.

We submit that no author of a novel or romance, when compelled, at the conclusion of his tale, to assign a rea-

son for the various incidents which he has placed befor the reader, ever pressed into his service a string of such improbable and inconsistent circumstances. Was it credible that a prince of the blood, supposing him to have ventured to Paris during the consulate, and mingled with a band of conspirators, would have insisted upon, or would have permitted, the honours of his rank, and thus have betrayed his character to those who did not profess to know more of him than from that circumstance only? The very mention of a line of conduct so improbable, ought to have made the legend suspected at the very outset. Secondly, How could a mistake possibly occur betwixt the person of the Duke D'Enghien and that of General Pichegru? The former was fair, with light-coloured hair; the latter was dark, with a high-coloured complexion, and dark hair. The Duke was slight and elegant in his form; Pichegru was stout-made, robust, ad athletic. The Prince was but just turned of thirty; Pichegru was forty years of age and upwards. There was scarcely a point of simlarty between them. Thirdly, How was it possible for those circumstances to have occurred which occasioned the pretended mistake? Under what imaginable character was Pichegru to have commanded the respects paid to a prince of the blood, and that not only from the Chouan George, but from the Messieurs de Polignac and de Rivière, who, it is pretended, remained uncovered in his presence? Lastly, On the voluminous trial of George, which was published in the *Moniteur,* though several of his band were brought to bear witness against him, there was no evidence whatever of royal honours being rendered either to him or any one else. So that the whole legend seems to have been invented, *ex post facto,* as a screen, and a very frail one, behind which Napoleon might shelter himself. It is evident, indeed, even by his own most improbable account, that if the Duke D'Enghien died in consequence of a blunder, it was one which a moment's consideration must have led every one to doubt, and which a moment's inquiry would have explained, and that Napoleon's credulity can only be imputed to his determination to be deceived.

ow Talleyrand could have contributed to it, is not initiated; but General Savary informs us that the Consul exclaimed—« Ah! wretched Talleyrand, what hast thou made me do!» This apostrophe, if made at all, must have been intended to support a future charge against his minister; for as to being led by the nose by Talleyrand, in a matter where his own passions were so deeply interested, it is totally inconsistent with all that is recorded of Napoleon, as well as with the character, and even the private interest, of his minister.

After this tedious dissertation, the reader may perhaps desire to know the real cause of the extraordinary outrage. Napoleon's interest seemed no way, or very slightly concerned, as the sufferer was, of all the Bourbon family, the farthest removed from the succession to the throne. The odium which the deed was to occasion, without any corresponding advantage, was, it might have seemed, to the politic and calculating spirit which Napoleon usually evinced, a sufficient reason for averting an unnecessary outrage; nor was his temper by any means of that ferocious quality which takes delight in causing misery, or in shedding blood.

All these things admitted, we must remind our readers, that, as Napoleon was calm and moderate by policy, he was also by temperament fierce and ardent, and had in his blood a strain of the wild and revengeful disposition, for which his native Corsica has been famous since the days of the ancients. The temptation was strong on the present occasion. He felt himself exposed to the danger of assassination, to which his nerves seem to have been peculiarly sensible; he knew that the blow would be aimed by the partisans of the Royal Family; and he suspected that they were encouraged by the exiled princes. In such a case, what is the principle of the savage state, or that which approaches next to it? A North American Indian injured by one white trader who escapes his vengeance, retaliates on the first European who falls within his power. A Scotch Highlander, wronged by an individual of another clan, took vengeance on the first of the sept whom he happened to meet. The Corsicans are not less ruthless

and indiscriminate in their feuds, which go from father to son, and affect the whole family, without the resentment being confined to the particular persons who have done the wrong. Upon this principle the First Consul seems to have acted, when, conceiving his life aimed at by the friends of the Bourbons, he sprung like a tiger at the only one of the family who was within his reach and his power. The law of nations and those of society were alike forgotten in the thirst of revenge; and, to gratify an immediate feeling of vengeance, he stained his history with a crime of which no time can wash away the infamy

The tendency to violence, arising out of a fierce and semi-barbaric resentment and love of revenge, might perhaps have shown itself in more instances than actually occurred, had it not been for Napoleon's policy, and his respect for public opinion, which would not have borne many such acts of vindictive cruelty. But though he was able in general to subdue this peculiar temper, he could not disguise it from those by whom he was closely observed. When some one, in the presence of Mounier, pronounced a eulogium upon Napoleon, and concluded by defying any of the listeners to produce a parallel character—« I think I could find something like him, » said Mounier, « *among the Montenegrins* »

END OF VOL. V.